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Abstract
 
 
In this thesis I show that groups can share token emotional states by performing 
music together. First I argue that emotions are perceptions, representing the self’s 
dynamic relation with the world. This representation is achieved by patterns of 
bodily changes, functioning independently of conscious feeling. Moreover, 
emotional expressions should be included in this analysis because they contribute to 
the pattern of bodily changes. This entails that we can ‘think through’ our emotions 
by manipulating our behavioural expressions. I then argue that empathy relies on our 
tendency to neurally mirror the expressive behaviours of other people, resulting in a 
simulation of emotional arousal. 
 
Turning to music, I argue that music hijacks our simulative capacities and thus that 
recognising emotions in music is like recognising emotions in people. The fact that 
the brain processes patterns of sound, vision and touch intermodally as patterns of 
movement underlines this claim. All this allows me to argue that musicians can use 
music to physically extend the cognition of their emotions. Here the music may not 
just influence their bodily changes, but may be processed alongside those changes as 
an elaboration of the overall pattern. On some occasions, the music may even take 
the dominant role in this respect. Thus emotional representations are best described 
more neutrally, though bodily patterns remain the central case of emotions. 
 
I then analyse joint listening to music, arguing that our perceptual activities may be 
interdependently structured, mutually fixing the character of the object, as well as 
encouraging similar emotional responses. In order to show that the intrinsic content 
of mental states can be shared, I then look at the theory of collective intentions. This 
provides a model for embodying the content of a mental state in the agreement 
between individuals. I apply this model to ensemble musical performance. 
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Introduction
 
When we can put on headphones and listen to music as if it’s spontaneously pouring 
from our own brains, we might forget that music is essentially a social activity. 
Music is created by humans for humans. Cross-culturally, music is used to 
accompany all manner of social rituals from weddings to funerals, festivals, religious 
services, healing ceremonies, games and storytelling. Music can send us to sleep, 
send us into battle or accompany work in the field or factory. In addition all societies 
use music for dancing to, either as part of rituals or for its own sake. In general music 
is a ubiquitous means by which we mediate our social interactions. It is no surprise 
then that people use music to assert their collective identity as well as their 
distinctness from other social groups (consider for instance, national anthems or 
genre preferences amongst teenagers). 
 
Claims are also made that music can symbolically express our social relationships. 
For example a concerto may symbolise the dialogue between the individual and the 
social forces that surround him. Similarly the individually expressive yet harmonised 
voices of Bach’s polyphonic music are said to symbolise an ideal balance between 
individuality and collectivity (cf. Small 1998). Yet music may not just represent 
social solidarity in an idealised form, but actually help to generate it to begin with. 
The group cohesion encouraged by shared musical production is even cited as an 
evolutionary reason for the development of music. Psychologist Isabelle Peretz 
writes: 
 
Music possesses two design features that reflect an intrinsic role in 
communion (as opposed to communication, which is the key function of 
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speech). Pitch intervals allow harmonious voice blending when sounding 
together, and temporal regularity facilitates motor synchronicity. (Peretz 
2001: 115) 
 
Contrast this with spoken language: Though speaking may be directly expressive of 
certain mental states (such as beliefs), it cannot allow many people to talk all at once 
without destroying meaning and coherence. Words must be distinctly produced and 
perceived in a way that musical patterns need not be. In addition, I argue that music 
can express and constitute emotions to at least the same degree that words can 
express and constitute beliefs or reasoning processes. As such the twin qualities of 
music to enable both intense expressivity and blending make it almost uniquely 
suitable for the sharing of mental states. 
 
Yet my coming to this thesis was not motivated by conceptual concerns such as this. 
In the first place I was seeking to explain and justify various experiences that I’ve 
had whilst playing music of intense absorption with the sound I was making, as well 
as a feeling of sharing a basic sense of life with my fellow musicians. Other 
musicians I asked reported similar experiences. Some similarities could also be 
found in reports of religious ceremonies (being overtaken by the ‘spirit’ of the 
occasion). Hence there seemed to be a definite phenomenon that could serve as the 
basis for investigation. 
 
Ultimately I argue that music can allow people to share emotional states, not their 
conscious experience. Yet this is certainly enough to justify the socially cohesive 
powers of music. However the level of absorption in music that stimulates the 
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experiences that inspired me seems to be a rare occurrence, typically a result of 
serendipity more than careful planning. Nevertheless I hope to show exactly why it 
happens and how it happens. With any luck, this might help to make it a less rare 
occurrence. At the same time of course, there are a number of philosophical goals to 
this thesis. On the route to justifying my claims, I explore several issues concerning 
the nature of mind, emotions, empathy, music and collective behaviour, many of 
which are further illuminated by the possibility of shared emotions in music. 
 
It is worth making a clarification here about what I mean by ‘sharing’. Sometimes 
we say that we share an emotion and we mean that we both possess qualitatively 
similar (though numerically distinct) emotional states. Sometimes, these emotions 
are also directed towards the same state of affairs (cf. Goldie 2000: 192). However, 
the sense of sharing I am interested in here is more radical than either of these 
possibilities. By sharing an emotion, I mean that there are two people, one mental 
state. Now emotions are not like cake, where you can each have a portion of the 
totality. Rather the sharing involved is one of joint possession or control over the 
emotion; in the manner we might share ownership of a house. The individuals 
involved may contribute in different ways to forming the state, but overall they 
jointly possess the whole thing as a totality. 
 
Clearly, arguing that people can share mental states rejects a very basic assumption 
that people have about minds; that minds are only possessed by individuals. 
However there is a general movement in philosophy towards viewing the mind as 
something extended beyond the boundary of skin and skull. This is known as 
externalism or extended cognition. With these theories we have begun to appreciate 
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how much thinking is an activity that is realised in our physical manipulations of the 
environment. Some claims are also made about the way that other people help us to 
realise our mental states. Yet even these theories tend not to address the core 
qualitative kinds of mental states, perceptions and emotions. This is where my thesis 
takes a step further. 
 
In recent years our understanding of emotions has also developed. In chapters one 
and two I defend and refine Jesse Prinz’s (2004) theory of emotions, which argues 
that emotions are essentially perceptual states, constituted primarily by patterns of 
bodily changes that represent our relations with the world. I use this theory to ground 
my explorations of emotional expression and empathy in chapter two. Here I argue 
for an especially intimate link between expressive behaviour and emotional states. 
One important claim is that we can use expressive behaviour to ‘think through’ our 
emotions. Another is that other peoples’ expressive behaviour can provide us with an 
immediate sense of their inner feelings. 
 
Of course, music is renowned for its ability to express emotional states. There is a 
long philosophical tradition of trying to explain how music is able to capture 
emotional states so effectively. In chapters three and four I review this research, 
firstly explaining the basic capacity of music to express emotions, and then justifying 
to what extent the expressive properties of music are really present in the music. I 
argue that the theory of emotions and empathy I hold helps to synthesise many of the 
prevalent theories of musical expression. 
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Yet although the model of emotions I defend is ultimately intended to apply to music, 
it is justified independently of any ideas about musical experience. In general it is 
unwise to base a theory of X (i.e. emotions) on some application of X in a limited 
field (i.e. expression in music). However I would argue from the example of music to 
a theory of emotions if it were clear which theory of the emotions music supports. 
Unfortunately there is still much debate as to how music manages to express 
emotions, or indeed whether what it expresses is much like a real emotion at all. 
 
Overall, there is a relation of metaphysical supervenience between emotional 
expression in music and emotions in general.
 
This relation is supported by an 
argument that our experience of music is a by-product of more basic emotional 
functions that have evolved for other purposes. Yet before the end of this thesis, I 
argue that music does capture the essential elements of emotions, and that it does 
provide insights into the nature of emotions, as well as the nature of mind generally. 
I even think that music allows the development and transformation of our emotional 
capacities, particularly of course, in regard to the possibility of shared emotions. So 
although I base my theory of music on a theory of emotions, I eventually use that 
theory of music to reciprocally develop theories of emotion (and theories of mind 
generally). Hence once the basic relation between music and the emotions has been 
established, the phenomena surrounding the creation and reception of music can 
more securely reflect on the emotions and other mental processes that underlie them. 
 
So is it the case that my protracted argument for shared experience in music will 
stand or fall according to the strength of the theory of emotions upon which it is 
founded? If our theory of emotions was supplanted, some of the insights of my 
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argument should remain intact inasmuch as they make sense of the phenomenal 
experience of music rather than the cognitive processes underlying it. However my 
account of music is tailored to the model of emotions I offer below to such an extent 
that it would have to be significantly altered to fit another model. In such a 
circumstance, any other model of the emotions would need to permit two general 
premises in order to justify my overall theory: Firstly, that music provides direct 
access to the inner character of emotional states. Secondly, that deliberate emotional 
expression can be (at least partly) constitutive of an emotional state. It is certainly 
not the case that any theory of the emotions will permit these two claims. However I 
argue that this is true for any account of the emotions that accords bodily changes a 
central role. 
 
Overall, the intimate relation between music and emotions allows me to argue in 
chapter five that a musician can use music to extend the cognition of his emotional 
state. I argue that jazz improvisation is particularly suitable in this regard because it 
allows the musician to sincerely commit to the music as directly responsive to his 
actual occurrent emotion in a way that classical performance tends not to encourage. 
 
Having justified the idea that music can partially constitute a musician’s emotional 
state, the final two chapters of my thesis then explore the social issues surrounding 
musical perception and production. In chapter six I address the nature of joint 
attention (where we both attend to the same thing in the environment at the same 
time) and argue that it is best explained as interdependently structuring our 
perceptual activities. The same interdependence can then apply to when we jointly 
listen to music and converge on similar emotional responses. 
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In chapter seven I then explore the possibility of sharing not just the overall structure 
of a mental task, but also the intrinsic content of a mental state. First I explore the 
phenomenon of collective intentionality, which has attracted some significant 
research in recent years. The question here is whether collective intentions are 
simply the combination of the intentions of the individuals involved, or whether the 
group forms a distinctive entity of thinking and acting in its own right. I argue that 
we should indeed think of collective intentions in this latter way. The discussion of 
collective intentions then provides a model for the sharing of emotions in music. 
Music can allow a group of musicians to mutually control and manipulate the 
intrinsic content of their emotional states, where their emotions are partially 
embodied in the sounds they produce. Finally, I end the thesis by suggesting some 
practical methods by which groups may come to enjoy shared emotional states in this 
manner. 
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Chapter One: Emotions as Perception
 
 
The purpose of this first chapter is to set up and defend a model of the emotions, 
which in later chapters I can apply to the more specific case of emotional expression 
in music. In general the debate about how emotions should be understood has been 
dominated by two positions; cognitivist and non-cognitivist. Both are broad 
categories of theories but in general, cognitivists regard cognitive states such as 
judgements as essential to emotions where non-cognitivists do not, focusing instead 
on bodily changes and the experience of those changes. Yet there is some 
disagreement concerning what actually counts as a cognitive state, as well as what 
kinds of roles bodily changes can instantiate. Hence in this chapter I argue that the 
dichotomy has outlived its usefulness. The evidence demands some form of hybrid 
or synthesis of these two positions. 
 
The particular synthesis that I wish to defend here is Jesse Prinz’s (2004) perceptual 
theory of emotions. Prinz follows non-cognitivists such as William James, Carl 
Lange and more recently Antonio Damasio in placing bodily changes central to 
emotional states. However, he also makes a plausible case for how these bodily 
changes can be intentionally directed towards the environment, thus incorporating 
some of the insights of the cognitivist position. Overall Prinz argues that emotions 
are constituted by bodily changes that perceptually represent ‘core relational themes’. 
These core relational themes are then certain formal or general aspects of the 
situation, common to all cases of the emotion, which bear on the well-being of the 
subject in some way. I refine this notion somewhat and argue that bodily changes 
represent the subject’s dynamic relation with the world. This to me makes more 
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sense of the appropriateness of particular bodily changes in representing the 
situations they represent. 
 
So the general goal of this chapter is to establish the perceptual nature of emotions. I 
also look at how conceptual interpretation and the focus of attention can affect 
emotions in ways analogous to other kinds of perceptual states. Yet I argue that 
bodily changes can represent situations independently of any conscious awareness of 
the subject. This claim will be important in establishing that musicians can share 
emotions without having to share their subjective experiences of that emotion.  
 
Having established a basic model of the emotions in this chapter, I then go on in 
chapter two to develop this model somewhat. In particular, the recognition that the 
bodily changes generated by behaviour should be included within the emotional state 
forces us to reevaluate the relation that emotions have with both cognition and action. 
This then impacts on our understanding of emotional expression and our ability to 
recognise the emotions of others. So in chapter two I argue that whilst the central 
function of emotions is to represent certain aspects of one’s situation, they also play 
a richer role in our interactions with the world and other people. 
 
Cognitivism versus Non-cognitivism 
In order to see what motivates Prinz’s perceptual theory of emotion, it is necessary to 
provide some background on the debate between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. 
The most famous non-cognitive theories are those of William James (1884) and Carl 
Lange (1885) who independently proposed what Prinz calls ‘somatic feeling’ 
theories. Here they identify somatic changes in the body as essential to emotional 
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states. Narrowly construed, the somatic system is what processes information about 
the muscles of the body. However the term is usually meant to cover a wide range of 
bodily responses. These include changes to the respiratory system (such as breathing 
rate), circulatory system (heart rate), digestive system, musculoskeletal system 
(including facial expressions) and the endocrine system (the secretion of hormones). 
Lange focuses on the vasomotor system in particular, which regulates blood flow, 
where James refers to changes in the viscera, facial expressions, and behaviours like 
crying or impulsively striking out. 
 
Prinz describes the James-Lange positions as somatic feeling theories because they 
both stipulate that an emotion must have a phenomenological feel in order to count 
as an emotion. So altogether they claim that perception of some object causes a 
change in the body, the phenomenal feeling of which constitutes the emotion. 
Antonio Damasio (2000) has a similar view, but claims that the brain may register 
bodily changes in a way that constitutes an emotion without these changes being 
consciously experienced.1 For the moment I take a neutral stance and assume that on 
the non-cognitivist view, the bodily changes involved in emotions are registered and 
organised at some level, whether this level is conscious or purely neural. Then at the 
end of the chapter, having got a better sense of the relation between bodily changes 
and the overall emotional state, I examine whether they need be consciously 
experienced or not. Also to avoid confusion, throughout this thesis I use the term 
‘feelings’ to refer to the phenomenal experience of bodily changes and ‘bodily 
pattern’ to refer to the registration and organisation of bodily changes in the brain. 
                                                     
1
 Damasio believes that emotions have evolved from the homeostatic functions of the brain, which 
constantly track and alter the state of the body to keep it within survival limits (e.g. not too cold or 
hot). This view is quite compatible with my claim below that emotions represent the dynamic relation 
between self and world, inasmuch as that relation bears on the integrity of the body or self. 
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So non-cognitivists distinguish emotional states from other mental states by looking 
at the characteristic patterns of pangs, tingles and surges that they seem to involve. In 
contrast, cognitivist theorists have been impressed by the fact that emotions usually 
involve a response to the person’s situation or can be embedded within purely 
imaginative episodes. Some cognitivists insist that emotions are identical to thoughts 
or judgements (e.g. Solomon 1976), where others include bodily changes as 
necessary components of emotional states (e.g. Lazarus 1991). Yet they all agree that 
emotions go beyond mere bodily changes. 
 
Typically cognitivists argue that emotions are a kind of propositional attitude.2 A 
simple cognitivist characterisation of an emotion would be as follows: I represent the 
world in some way, for example I believe that I have forgotten my mother’s birthday. 
I then have an attitude towards that representation, for example a belief that I have 
transgressed a moral imperative. There are two propositional attitudes here, but it is 
only the second that constitutes my emotion of guilt. Hence the emotion of guilt or 
any other emotion is never just a simple occurrent state, but should be fully 
characterised as ‘guilt that x’, where ‘x’ involves some sort of appraisal of the world 
as it relates to my well-being. Cognitivists then analyse these propositional attitudes 
in various ways. They may be reduced to beliefs, evaluations, judgements, construals, 
imaginations, desires or combinations thereof. For instance an emotion of anger may 
                                                     
2
 A notable exception is Robert Solomon: 
 
If Mary loves Mary and hates spinach, the objects of his emotions are Mary and spinach, 
respectively, not propositions. If Fred believes that spinach is good for you (and that, 
perhaps is why he loves it), the object of his belief (but not his emotion) is the 
proposition that spinach is good for you. (Solomon 2003b: 181) 
 
However Solomon still retains the basic insight that emotions are about something. 
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be composed of a belief that I have been insulted combined with a desire (or action 
tendency) to revenge myself. 
 
It is not the case that the possessor of an emotion must regard these propositional 
attitudes as somehow true. I can for instance ‘entertain’ a thought that there is danger, 
which constitutes my fear state, without actually believing that there is danger 
(Greenspan 1988). However, arguments in favour of cognitivism typically point out 
the meaningful aspects of emotions. Emotions are usually not only directed at 
relevant situations but can also be more or less appropriate or warranted by those 
situations. In contrast they argue, how can a bodily change be meaningfully about 
something? 
 
Showing that the bodily changes involved in emotions are in fact meaningful is key 
to Prinz’s theory. For the moment however we can admit that meaningful bodily 
changes are at least possible. For example, Prinz offers the experience of feeling 
sickened by some moral offence. We say that the sick feeling is not just triggered by 
the idea of the moral offence but that we feel sickened over that offence. Yet we 
would be hard pressed to say that feeling sickened is a propositional thought of any 
kind (Prinz 2004: 27). 
 
In the above case, the sick feeling, (or the emotion of disgust) is directed at a 
propositional object, the moral offence. However, the sick feeling may be considered 
independently of the propositional object that it happens to attach to. The same 
feeling may be triggered by some other thought or continue even after the 
propositional object has been forgotten. These considerations reveal a general 
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question that needs to be addressed: Of the many potential aspects of emotional 
states, which of them are essential or fundamental and which are merely contingent 
causes or effects? Also, if we regard emotions as being constituted by multiple 
components, how do these components hang together? Is there some key function 
that these components jointly deliver? 
 
It is by locating necessary and sufficient conditions for emotions that we can begin to 
answer these questions. Accordingly one of the main arguments for the necessity of 
bodily changes to emotional states is to be found in William James’s paper ‘What is 
an Emotion?’ (1884). Here he asks the reader to imaginatively subtract all the bodily 
symptoms from an emotional state and see if what remains could intuitively be called 
an emotion: 
 
Can one fancy the state of rage and picture no ebullition of it in the chest, 
no flushing of the face, no dilatation of the nostrils, no clenching of the 
teeth, no impulse to vigourous action, but in their stead limp muscles, 
calm breathing, and a placid face? The present writer, for one, certainly 
cannot. The rage is as completely evaporated as the sensation of its 
so-called manifestations, and the only thing that can possibly be supposed 
to take its place is some cold-blooded and dispassionate judicial sentence, 
confined entirely to the intellectual realm, to the effect that a certain 
person or persons merit chastisement for their sins. In like manner of grief: 
what would it be without its tears, its sobs, its suffocation of the heart, its 
pang in the breast-bone? A feelingless cognition that certain 
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circumstances are deplorable, and nothing more. Every passion in turn 
tells the same story. (James 1884: 194) 
 
It seems that when we take away the conscious feelings of bodily changes, we 
remove the emotion’s distinctive character, its intensity, as well as its immediate 
motivational force. So the strength of this argument depends on showing that we 
ordinarily think of emotions in terms of the feelings of bodily changes. In a similar 
vein, Lange cites our linguistic practices whereby many of our emotion terms also 
refer to bodily changes, for example to ‘shudder’ with fear (Lange 1885: 678). The 
practice of using bodily metaphors for emotional states also appears to be 
cross-cultural (Heelas 1986 and Wierzbicka 1999 cited in Prinz 2004: 139). Various 
cultures associate the emotions with particular body parts such as the liver, heart, 
stomach or the intestines. This indicates a common intuition that there is some link 
between emotions and the body, if not definite correlates. 
 
However, is this link to bodily changes true of all emotional states all the time? The 
range of states we might describe as emotions is broad and without sharp boundaries. 
Yet Prinz claims to find felt aspects to even highly intellectual passions, such as 
those involved in solving mathematical puzzles (Prinz 2004a: 49). Without these 
feelings he claims, the phenomenology of the emotion is exhausted. Of course, the 
problem with these kinds of arguments is that different people have different 
imaginative abilities. If someone claims to be able to imagine an emotional state 
without any corresponding feeling we cannot simply deny the validity of that 
imagination without additional justification. In addition, if we agree that emotions 
need not be consciously experienced, the argument from phenomenology might not 
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be considered relevant, since the phenomenal experience of emotions may be entirely 
incidental to their purpose. Then again, we might expect that our self-reflective 
representations of emotions in conscious awareness would generally target their most 
central component. 
 
Overall, I do not find James’ argument for the necessity of bodily feelings to be 
conclusive, though a recognition that most people do in fact think of emotions in 
terms of physical feelings lends some support to the non-cognitivist position. 
However one potential counter-example to the above argument is that emotions such 
as love or loneliness can persist for many years without constant bodily perturbation. 
But here it is reasonable to claim that these more complex states may be called 
emotions because they reflect the disposition of the subject to have certain distinctive 
bodily states aroused, and these dispositions can continue to exist whether or not they 
are currently activated. Furthermore, Prinz argues that if someone claimed to be in 
love and yet never experienced any felt response, we would regard this person as 
‘disingenuous or confused’ (Prinz 2004a: 50) rather than actually undergoing the 
emotion. 
 
Compare these considerations to the proposed necessity of thoughts: Prinz argues 
that if emotions are essentially propositional attitudes then the possessor of the 
emotion must possess the concepts from which these attitudes are constructed. For 
example, to fear that there is danger looming (a propositional attitude purportedly 
essential to fear) requires the concepts of danger and looming, which also require 
concepts of potentiality and harm. The problem with this requirement is that we do 
not think infants and non-human animals possess these kinds of concepts, yet we 
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observe states in them that seem highly continuous with our own emotional states 
(Zajonc 1984). Lazarus has responded to this objection by claiming that for all we 
know, infants and animals could actually be making cognitive appraisals, though 
presumably this would severely restrict the sophistication of the cognitions involved 
(Lazarus 1984). 
 
There are other ways in which we may disconnect emotional states from cognitions. 
For instance, sometimes emotional states are triggered by appraisals; say anger that 
we have been deliberately deceived, that we later find were mistaken. Even though 
we now believe there has been no deception, it is possible for the state of anger to 
remain despite the change of appraisal. If this is the case then the appraisal is not a 
necessary component of the emotion. The cognitivist may respond that perhaps the 
appraisal hasn’t in fact changed. People are often recalcitrant in modifying their 
attitudes, even in the face of conflicting evidence. Yet in this case, the nature of the 
appraisal seems less like a detailed and explicit belief and more like an underlying 
intuition about one’s relation to the world, something that a set of bodily changes 
could potentially capture. 
 
Perhaps the most convincing evidence against the necessity of cognitions comes 
from studies showing that the neuro-anatomical processes involved in emotional 
states can function separately to those involved in conceptual thought. For example, 
an emotion such as fear can be triggered by a low level representation of a coiled 
snake-like object. In this case the image is received by the retina which sends a 
signal via the optic nerve to the thalamus, a part of the brain capable of registering 
basic visual properties such as shape but not capable of recognising objects. The 
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thalamus then sends a signal directly to the amygdala, which in turn organises a 
range of bodily responses such as fleeing or freezing, changes in heart rate, breathing 
as well as facial expression. The thalamus also sends a signal to the neocortex, which 
is finally able to recognise the object. When the object is finally recognised, it may 
turn out to be just a piece of rope. Yet the low level perception of the object is 
enough to trigger to full range of fear responses before the neocortex becomes 
involved (LeDoux 1998). 
 
Now someone may insist that these responses are not true examples of fear, but 
rather something like an ‘affect programme’ (cf. Griffiths 1997). Yet it seems that 
the subject would be able to report afterwards that it felt like fear, because all the 
bodily changes that generated the phenomenal feeling were present. Moreover, the 
subject would have reacted in a fearful way; their heart rate would have gone up, 
they would have frozen or run away and so on. So from both a first person and third 
person perspective there would be good reason to think it was a genuine episode of 
fear. Then since we can identify both cortical and subcortical fear episodes as fear, 
there must be something other than cognitive appraisals that is unifying these 
episodes. The obvious candidates are the bodily changes or feelings involved. 
 
Though there have been doubts about how distinctive or determinate the bodily 
changes involved in emotions are (e.g. Robinson 2006: 208), in general our ability to 
identify specific biological correlates for various emotional states is improving all 
the time. This is particularly true since neurological states have begun to be 
recognised alongside other bodily correlates. Thus Damasio boldly claims, 
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There is nothing vague, elusive or nonspecific about emotional responses, 
and there is nothing vague, elusive or nonspecific about the 
representations which can become feelings of emotions. The substrate for 
emotional feelings is a very concrete set of neural patterns in maps of 
selected structures. (Damasio 2000: 282-283) 
 
In order to justify this view, Damasio cites various neurological evidence showing 
that specific areas of the brain underlie particular emotional states. For instance 
Damasio describes the case of ‘S’ who as a result of damage to her amygdala lost the 
ability to feel fear. In this case the reasoning skills of S were intact except for her 
ability to judge faces as more or less trustworthy in a way that other people were able 
to (Damasio 2000: 62-65). Furthermore she was unable to recognise faces as 
expressive of fear as well as imitate these expressions, though her performance was 
unimpaired for other emotions such as anger or surprise. Now, the amygdala controls 
bodily responses, it does not seem to be involved in anything like cognitive appraisal. 
So it seems clear that this system for registering and organising bodily changes is 
most essential for the emotion. 
 
This argument is additionally backed up by empirical evidence (to which James also 
refers) that when people have lost sensational feelings due to spinal injuries, their 
ability to experience emotions has been correspondingly limited.3 However, the 
evidence here is conflicting and it is not the case that the subject’s emotions have 
been completely knocked out. Hence there is some debate over whether what 
                                                     
3
 Particularly relevant for my purposes, James cites the case of a woman who appearing to have lost 
her proprioceptive sensations and as a result her emotional responses, reports that she has also lost the 
capacity to enjoy music (James 1884: 200). 
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emotional capacities remain are as a result of their judgemental capacities or because 
other internal bodily systems are still functioning, as well as normal muscular 
feelings from the neck up (cf. Damasio 2000: 289-290). 
 
There is also another possibility for the non-cognitivist to appeal to here: Damasio 
(2000, 2004) argues for the existence of an ‘as-if body loop’ which is a system 
whereby the brain can create a map of the state of the body independently of actual 
bodily changes. The existence of this mechanism is plausible because the various 
bodily changes that generate emotions should be registered and organised at some 
level, or else the subject would never experience a unified emotional state but only a 
loose collection of distinct responses that did not add up to any particular content. 
Moreover, the subject may not be able organise a unified behavioural response to all 
these changes. Then, since the registering function, what I call the bodily pattern, is 
not identical with the bodily changes themselves, there is no reason to think that it 
cannot be activated independently of the bodily changes, in the same way as the 
neural registration of visual information can be activated independently of the eyes, 
as in visual imagination. Since the activation is not supported by actual bodily 
changes, but presumably by some other part of the brain (Damasio points to mirror 
neurons in the frontal cortex, which I discuss in chapter two), we may also expect 
that it will only generate attenuated somatic images, just like visual imagination. 
 
Damasio claims that the as-if loop functions to anticipate bodily changes by making 
the brain imagine or hallucinate that it is undergoing those changes. Susan Hurley 
(2005) argues for a similar anticipatory mechanism. Since the brain is presumably 
where the experience of those changes is most directly generated, the mechanism 
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therefore generates the phenomenal feelings of those bodily changes. The 
anticipation of the bodily changes involved in emotional responses then allows the 
generation of the feelings involved in those emotions. Hence this mechanism may 
explain the limited preservation of emotions in subjects with spinal injuries because 
we can effectively imagine or hallucinate bodily changes. The existence of the as-if 
loop is also helpful in solving another problem for the non-cognitivist; that we are 
able to have emotional responses more immediately than we would expect some of 
the bodily changes to occur (such as hormonal responses) (Damasio 2004: 118). I 
also cite this mechanism in chapter two because it is strongly associated with our 
capacity to simulate other peoples’ emotional states. All these capacities make the 
development of an as-if loop particularly useful for an organism, and so intelligible 
from an evolutionary standpoint. 
 
Meanwhile, we have grounds to suppose that bodily changes are necessary for the 
existence of emotions, but are they also sufficient? Some evidence that they are 
comes from the fact that drugs that alter bodily states such as alcohol or adrenaline, 
can correspondingly affect emotional states. In addition there are experiments where 
psychologists find ingenious ways to force participants into different facial 
expressions in order to see whether a bodily change can induce an emotional change. 
One example involved getting subjects either to grip a pencil between their teeth- 
producing a grin, or hold it with their lips- producing a grimace, and then had them 
rate cartoons. The grinning subjects tended to rate the cartoons as more amusing, 
indicating that their mood was elevated by their facial expression (Strack, Martin & 
Stepper, 1988). In a similar experiment conducted by Zajonc, subjects were given 
two different stories to evaluate. One of the stories contained lots of ‘ü’ sounds, 
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which forces the face into a slightly frowning expression where the other contained 
more ‘ee’ sounds which produces more of a smile. Subjects correspondingly rated 
the ‘ü’ story as less pleasant (Zajonc, Murphy, & Inglehart, 1989). 
 
It has been repeatedly shown that mechanically adopting the familiar muscular 
positions associated with the basic emotions can affect autonomic nervous system 
arousal levels as well as the subject’s own stated reactions. It is this fact that seems 
to underpin the phenomenon of emotional contagion, where by unconsciously 
imitating the bodily attitudes of others we come to adopt their emotional states as 
well (Hatfield et al. 1994, see also chapter two). It is this kind of consideration that 
grounds James’s famous declaration that “we feel sorry because we cry, angry 
because we strike, afraid because we tremble” (James 1884: 190). The bodily states 
involved seem to cause the emotional states rather than the other way round. It is 
hard to see how these bodily states could cause emotional states only by way of 
cognitivist style appraisals. 
 
Feelings with Meaning 
Thus bodily changes and the bodily patterns or feelings that register them seem to be 
intrinsic to emotions, whether they are generated by physical movements and muscle 
tension, or more visceral changes. However, even non-cognitivists agree that this is 
not all there is to emotional states. Jesse Prinz states for example: 
 
There is a deep intuition that emotions are meaningful. They are not 
simply arbitrary feelings. Instead they inform us about our relationship to 
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the world, they embody our convictions, and they factor intelligibly into 
our decisions in life. (Prinz 2004: 16)  
 
Moreover there are all kinds of bodily patterns that we undergo such as pain or 
tiredness that we do not class as emotional states. On their own, these bodily patterns 
are not sufficient for the occurrence of an emotion. Rather, what seems to determine 
whether these patterns are emotional patterns is the additional context in which they 
occur. For instance, a sensation like tiredness would have quite a different 
significance if it occurred just after having broken up with one’s girlfriend rather 
than after completing a long run. Thus we are driven towards incorporating some 
aspects of the cognitivist position. Yet this need not require an appeal to additional 
cognitive components so much as recognising the more complex role that bodily 
patterns can play. 
 
In order to account for the meaningful aspects of emotions, Prinz appeals to 
Lazarus’s appraisal theory and its notion of core relational themes. A core relational 
theme is a relation between oneself and the emotion elicitor that bears on well-being. 
For example, the core relational theme represented by anger is ‘a demeaning offence 
against me and mine’. Happiness is ‘making reasonable progress toward the 
realization of a goal’. Sadness is ‘having experienced an irrevocable loss’ and 
anxiety is characterised by ‘facing uncertain existential threat’ (Lazarus 1991). The 
wording of these descriptions may not be exactly appropriate to every emotional 
episode, but they seem to capture the gist of our emotional categories. They target 
what Prinz calls the formal object of an emotional situation, which remains constant 
between particular object situations (Prinz 2004: 62-63, cf. Kenny 1963). As such 
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they should be included within an analysis of the emotional state itself rather than as 
causes or effects of that state. 
 
The key difference between Prinz and Lazarus is that Prinz argues that bodily 
patterns rather than cognitions are able to represent these core relational themes. He 
claims “emotions are intentional in their own right, independent of any 
representations that happen to accompany them” (Prinz 2004: 62). They are thus 
what he calls ‘embodied appraisals’.  
 
In order to make sense of how the registration of bodily changes can be appraisals, 
Prinz makes use of Dretske’s (1981, 1986) notion of representation. According to 
Dretske, representations are states that carry information and which are also capable 
of being in error. If a state reliably co-occurs with a situation, then it can represent 
that situation. However, it must also be the case that the state in question has been set 
up by learning or evolution to have the function of representing what it represents. 
Otherwise smoke would represent fire because it is caused by fire and thus reliably 
indicates the presence of fire. In the case of emotions then, it would be rather odd if 
our emotions were set up by evolution simply to register bodily changes. What 
difference to a creature’s survival could it make to register a heightening of muscle 
tension for instance? Hence Prinz concludes that although our emotions reliably 
indicate both bodily changes and core relational themes, they are only set up to 
represent core relational themes, due to the utility of these appraisals for the 
organism. 
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Note that Prinz is not arguing for any kind of transitivity of representation here. 
Bodily patterns do not represent core relational themes by representing bodily 
changes. This would make Prinz vulnerable to counter-examples in which by 
representing clouds we also represent the chemical processes on the water surfaces of 
the earth that cause them (Hatzimoysis 2003a: 109). Rather bodily patterns represent 
themes by registering bodily changes. Compare this to visual perception: The visual 
representation of an object results from the stimulation of various lower level 
receptors for colours, light intensity and edges which we eventually perceive as a 
unified visual scene. However, it is not the case that our object perception represents 
this lower level activity, which then represents the object. 
 
 
Prinz’s perceptual model of emotions (2004: 69)
 
 
So the subject perceives the core relational theme in virtue of bodily changes, just as 
one may see a tree in virtue of retinal activity. The bodily pattern that registers these 
bodily changes is then analogous to the visual centres in the brain. So the bodily 
pattern and bodily changes supporting it constitute rather than cause the emotional 
state. Prinz then describes core relational themes as the ‘real contents’ of emotions 
(their representational meaning) where the bodily changes are their ‘nominal 
contents’ (like the words used to represent that meaning) (Prinz 2004: 68). 
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Now we might observe here that if the bodily pattern in the brain can independently 
generate the experience of an emotion, why not say that this is what really constitutes 
the emotion and not the bodily changes that it registers? First of all, I think there is 
an issue here concerning wide and narrow content. Whilst it is true that the bodily 
pattern is necessary to all cases of emotions and in some cases sufficient, it is not 
sufficient for all or even most emotional states. In particular the bodily pattern 
cannot by itself distinguish between anticipated, currently ongoing, or as I show in 
chapter two, simulated emotional states. 
 
Second as I mentioned above, the bodily pattern is likely to be highly attenuated 
where it is not supported by constant bodily changes. In general, the various bodily 
changes are what generate and maintain the content of the emotion, where the bodily 
pattern merely unifies that content. The bodily pattern is like the manager of a 
company, where the work done by the company as a whole is what constitutes the 
mental state. Certainly the bodily pattern is a very important stage in the system 
where various content converges. This is an important step before going on to 
interpret that content, direct the attention of the subject, stimulate behaviours and 
connect to other mental states. Yet the bodily changes are doing most of the 
representational work for that mental state. 
 
There is an analogy here with visual perceptions. It might be possible to have 
something like a visual experience when only the visual centres in the brain are 
active. Yet the functioning of the eyes is still needed to distinguish between real and 
imagined visual states. Moreover constant interaction is required between the visual 
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centres and retinal activity to generate and maintain the complete visual 
representation. Hence we should at least include retinal activity as part of a system 
that constitutes the visual state. 
 
If we take a direct realist view of perception here, then strictly speaking, only the 
system as a whole (including the core relational theme) is the emotional state. In this 
case, all the various stages of activity are supporting that mental state (by generating, 
maintaining or even distorting content). Yet this activity is still distinct from the 
vehicle of the mental state, such as the body or brain. So it is misleading to say that 
the various stages of activity are merely the causal substratum of the state. Rather the 
various stages of activity are where the content is instantiated. So they should be 
included in an analysis of the mental state in a way that the basic physical substance 
of the body and brain should not be. These considerations will be important when in 
chapter five, I argue that music can partly constitute a musician’s emotional state. 
 
Having fixed the ‘nominal’ contents of emotions, what kinds of things can count as 
instantiating the ‘real’ contents of emotional states?4 One of the observations 
motivating the cognitivist view was that emotions do not just respond to objects in 
the world, but also to cognitively complex states like beliefs or imaginings. However 
according to Prinz’s theory, these states remain as causes rather than components of 
the emotion. So in order to show how emotional responses to beliefs or imaginings 
are equivalent to responses to direct environmental objects, Prinz describes a process 
                                                     
4
 Due to my direct realist intuitions, I am uneasy about this distinction between real and nominal 
contents, which has indirect realist implications. Unfortunately I do not have the space to attack this 
distinction here. I would just like to suggest that perhaps the system of bodily patterns provides the 
subject with direct access to the core relational theme. So at the perceptual level, the actual core 
relational theme is part of the subject’s experience. See also my discussion of the appropriateness of 
specific bodily patterns to their contents below. 
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whereby emotional states may become calibrated towards more elaborate cognitive 
causes. This calibration process allows emotions to become more sophisticated as 
well as more or less warranted or irrational. In the most basic cases, we are innately 
programmed to respond emotionally to certain causes, such as fear in response to 
loud noises, looming objects or the sudden loss of support, all of which are reliable 
indicators of imminent danger. However, as we develop intellectually and have more 
experiences of fear, we come to unify the features that elicit that emotion using the 
concept of danger. Through repeated association, the concepts that were originally 
only associated with the emotional state can become causes in their own right. At 
this point an emotion of fear may be triggered by a realisation that we are in danger 
(which accesses that concept) even in circumstances lacking the original perceptual 
elicitors (Prinz 2004: 76). 
 
Prinz also claims that higher social emotions such as jealousy are the result of more 
basic embodied appraisals becoming recalibrated towards new types of situations. 
When a bodily response (such as anger) becomes set up to occur as a result of 
judgements of infidelity, the emotion may now represent infidelity as a core 
relational theme. Hence similar nominal contents may come to track different real 
contents. Another important consequence is that it is possible for different cultures to 
encourage the calibration of different higher emotions, whilst still being ultimately 
founded on the same basic bodily responses. Prinz describes a situation whereby 
cultures may ‘hypercognize’ a particular sort of emotionally eliciting situation, and 
distinguish a new emotion unique to that culture as a result. All that is required is 
that the new emotion reliably serves to pick out situations of a particular formal kind 
(Prinz 2004: 99, 141). 
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So is it the case that all emotional bodily patterns involve appraisals of some 
situation (real or imaginary)? One possible counter-example is moods, which usually 
seem to lack any particular content. A possible explanation for mood is that we are 
not aware of the real content of the emotional state. So for example a bodily pattern 
informs us that we anxious about something, yet the real cause is hidden to us. 
However, Prinz offers a different explanation; that moods are appraisals about how 
things are for us in general, and that they accordingly represent our more long-term 
goals (Prinz 2004: 182-188). Hence moods count as genuine emotional states, though 
they form a distinct sub-group within the class of emotions in virtue of their more 
generalised objects. 
 
Yet even if we restrict their content to the formal or general aspects of situations, the 
idea that bodily patterns represent situations may still seem implausible. This is 
because bodily patterns may just seem insufficiently complex to accurately represent 
those formal aspects. Prinz notes however that bodily states need not be as complex 
as the core relational themes that they represent, they simply have to be set up so as 
to reliably track these formal objects. Prinz uses the analogy of the devices placed in 
cars to warn drivers of the presence of police radars. The device emits only a simple 
beep, but in doing so is able to represent a complex situation. Similarly, a bodily 
state does not have to be able to describe the core relational theme it represents, nor 
does it necessarily have to be preceded by any cognitive representation of 
comparable complexity (Prinz 2004: 65). Hence bodily patterns are able to 
intentionally represent core relational themes despite their fairly unstructured 
character. 
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Whilst Prinz’s argument here seems satisfactory for explaining the overall capacity 
of bodily patterns to represent the formal aspects of a situation, it does leave a puzzle 
as to why the particular patterns represent the situations that they do. That is, how are 
the various emotional states distinguished as belonging to this or that formal object? 
Is there anything about the state itself that makes it appropriate to target that sort of 
situation? Certainly our phenomenal feelings do not seem like arbitrary or merely 
conventional signs of the situations they target. Rather there seems to be something 
distinctly sad about the feeling of sadness, and angry about the feeling of anger. We 
might respond that the appropriateness of these feelings may just be a consequence 
of having had the association between the feeling and the situation entrenched by 
experience. Yet feelings are not like words, where for instance, we can repeat a word 
to ourselves until it becomes meaningless. Rather repeatedly imagining the feeling of 
fear just underlines the rightness of that feeling for that situation. 
 
The appropriateness of feelings and the bodily patterns that underlie them seems to 
be a result of their natural meaning, having acquired their function for evolutionary 
and biological reasons rather than arbitrary convention. The most obvious way to 
then explain why the various patterns have their natural meaning is to look at the 
particular behaviours that they generate, at least in the most primitive instances of 
emotions. For instance, we saw how in the case of fear the amygdala caused the 
subject’s heart and breathing rate to increase, as well as cause him to freeze or to run 
away. These reactions are appropriate ways to deal with a situation that merits fear, 
since they either prepare the subject for a certain response (i.e. by increasing the 
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amount of blood flow to the muscles) or are the response itself (i.e. avoiding 
something dangerous). 
 
Of course we recognise that the subject need not necessarily act on their emotional 
state. In more developed cases of fear, such as a fear of public speaking, it may be 
completely inappropriate to run away. For this reason most theorists do not include 
the behaviours, or even the tendencies to certain behaviours as essential to emotional 
states (and why not also the tendency to suppress the behaviour?). Yet as I argue in 
detail in chapter two, this will not stop us from including the bodily changes 
involved in those behaviours or the preparation for those behaviours as essential to 
the emotional state. Moreover, it seems equally plausible for the bodily changes 
involved in suppressing certain behaviours to be part of the content of emotions. For 
instance, the tension involved in stopping oneself from striking could become part of 
the characteristic bodily pattern of anger. 
 
Furthermore I would dispute the notion that patterns of bodily changes have an 
unstructured character. First of all we can compare the relative levels of tension in 
the various emotional feelings, ranging from a calm flat feeling, to a sense of 
vibration, to explosive bursts of energy. We can also look at the various parts within 
the bodily pattern according to where it is located in the body and the range of 
simultaneous changes. Secondly it is important to emphasise that emotions are not 
just static representations, but constantly iterated dynamic processes, responding to 
an ever changing environment as well as our actions within that environment. I am 
not just afraid by the proximity of the bull, but also the fact that it is charging 
towards me. Hence we must also look at the overall temporal profile of that pattern. 
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Here we can distinguish the way that the different emotions begin and end, such as 
whether they fade in (like sadness or anxiety) or involve more sudden shifts (such as 
surprise and disgust). We can also see whether once the bodily pattern has become 
established, it remains relatively steady, comes in waves or pulses, or has contrasting 
sub-sections. This is why I call the emotional state a bodily pattern as opposed to say 
a bodily ‘colour’. Like colours, emotions may contrast with each other along various 
dimensions. Yet emotions also have distinct temporal and spatially oriented parts. 
 
Overall these kinds of profiles might not enable us to pick out a small number of 
distinctive emotion types. Rather we may only see gradual differences in degree 
along the various dimensions. Yet there is certainly enough contrast here to reflect all 
kinds of dynamic structural patterns. Then when we look more closely at the 
perceptual nature of emotions, I argue that we can more accurately specify what it is 
these patterns reflect. 
 
Emotional Perceptions 
So far I have explained why bodily patterns act like perceptual states of the body, 
relating the subject towards certain aspects of the environment. However, how far 
can this analogy with perceptual states be pushed? Prinz says for instance, “we can 
feel the offensiveness of external situations resonating through our flesh” (Prinz 
2004: 227). Yet I am unsure whether this characterisation is phenomenally accurate. 
I might certainly feel that my anger is a reasonable response to the situation I am 
faced with, but the bodily pattern of anger seems to be experienced as occurring 
within (Prinz 2004: 61). In contrast, the contents of other perceptual states, such as 
the perception of colour, place those qualities as existing out there in the 
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environment. One possible reply here is that we are more apt to locate the emotional 
content within our bodies simply because emotional reactions to situations are so 
subjectively variable. For instance we can ask “is it me, or is it hot in here?” and thus 
locate the sensation of heat accordingly. So perhaps if emotional reactions were more 
stable across different observers, we might be more inclined to experientially locate 
their content out in the world. 
 
Another possible disanalogy between emotions and perceptions is that emotions 
integrate the information from several sense modalities and involve a sense of the 
organism to which they belong. So in possessing dedicated sense organs and a more 
exclusive focus on the environment, our regular perceptual faculties are more direct 
and less relational than emotional states. However, some perceptual states do in fact 
register relational properties between organism and environment. Prinz uses the 
example of the perceptual quality of being ten feet away from something. In this case, 
there are many distinct sources of information (such as colours, heights, the 
sharpness of lines etc.) that are organised to form the perceptual content. Hence it is 
not the case that perceptions are always more direct than emotional states (Prinz 
2004: 226). In addition, the phenomenon of synaesthesia, where people report seeing 
sounds and hearing colours, shows that it is possible to receive perceptual sensations 
via other sense modalities (Prinz 2004: 231). Furthermore, despite the fact that 
emotions organise information from several sensual faculties, they do have dedicated 
input systems in virtue of the reception and organisation of bodily changes in the 
brain. Just because emotions don’t have their own sense organ on the surface of the 
body, it doesn’t entail that they are not a distinctive perceptual faculty. 
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From the point of view of the conscious subject, a more significant similarity 
between emotions and other kinds of perception are that both are perspectival and 
both can be hallucinatory (as when we fear that a situation is dangerous when in fact 
it isn’t). So as well as emotions having the same kind of epistemic status as other 
forms of perception, the information they provide also seems to share the same 
structure. To elaborate; both emotions and other perceptual functions have an initial 
stage of collecting raw data (such as edges in vision or hormonal changes in 
emotions). There is then a stage at which this data is organised, or bound into a 
unified picture, placing the subject at the centre of his experience of the world. 
Finally, there is a conceptual stage in which the object of the perception is 
recognised or stored apart from any particular perspective. For instance, the abstract 
idea of what sadness feels like or what a door looks like that enables us to recognise 
the object as an instance of that category. 
 
Again, in drawing this comparison with perceptual states, it might seem problematic 
that we can respond emotionally to purely imagined scenarios or considerations. This 
is because if a person imagines a situation that then triggers an emotional reaction, it 
seems that the bodily pattern is not mediating between the subject and the object 
anymore in a truly perceptual manner. However, we can accommodate this more 
complex case by saying that the perspective on an imaginary object is transformed 
when the bodily pattern gets involved. This is similar to engaging a different sense 
modality (such as touch instead of sight) and as a result getting a new perspective on 
an object. In the same way an embodied appraisal transforms the imaginary situation 
into an emotional object by revealing its formal property or core relational theme as 
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an emotion elicitor. Hence bodily patterns may still mediate between the person and 
this newly appreciated emotional object. 
 
However, the case of having a genuine emotion triggered by a purely imaginary 
scenario seems quite unlike other perceptual faculties. This is because of a general 
representational feature of our perceptual imaginations in which the only details we 
perceive in an imagined scene are details that we must consciously add to that scene. 
We cannot for instance, ‘discover’ the redness of the clothes that someone is wearing 
in our imagined image, or how hot it is, or how far away we are from an object, or 
how noisy it is, without making up those details as we go along. In contrast, we can 
‘discover’ a new emotional response. 
 
Prinz responds to this objection (personal communication) by claiming that there are 
some instances in which one may discover a perceptual quality as a result of 
imagination. He cites the case of imagining oneself standing on a high ledge, and 
then feeling a sense of wobbling (i.e. a proprioceptive perception). Now I am not 
entirely convinced that this isn’t a motor response rather than a perceptual response. 
Neuroimaging may resolve which is the case. Either way, the responses are still 
something focused on the body rather than outer representations of the world. It is 
comparable to feeling an involuntary twinge of pain as a result as imagining knee 
surgery. The body is reacting to maintain its integrity in some way. 
 
Overall, even if we have to say that emotions are unlike other perceptions in this 
particular respect, it still seems a strong case can be made for treating emotions as 
essentially another kind of perception. Yet I think that Prinz undermines the 
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perceptual nature of emotions where the core relational themes that they track are 
understood in rather conceptual ways. Instead, emphasising the strong connection 
that emotions have with physical movement and actions reveals what it is that 
emotions perceive in a more concrete way than the kinds of core relational themes 
that Prinz and Lazarus refer to. All perceptual functions help to locate the subject 
within his environment. Similarly, I claim that emotions locate the subject within his 
dynamic response to the world, or in other words; how things are going for him. This 
is not to say that emotions represent all kinds of shifting relations between subject 
and world, otherwise this would include clearly non-emotional situations such as 
walking around. Rather the dynamic relations involved are ones that impact on the 
bodily integrity or capabilities of the subject. This is the causal principle that makes 
them dynamic changes as opposed to changes simpliciter. For example, the 
phenomenal feeling of joy is a feeling of energetic capability. It represents the world 
as providing certain freedoms of movement, as something we can run, dance or skip 
through. We may then literally respond by running or dancing or skipping, or by 
more generally acting in such a graceful or energetic manner. 
 
In my view then, we should understand the core relational theme for an emotion like 
anxiety not as ‘facing uncertain existential threat’ but rather something more like the 
physical sense of losing support. The reason for this is simple; it is a simple way to 
sum up what fear actually feels like. In primitive cases of anxiety there may literally 
be a feeling that one is about to fall. But due to the same calibration that Prinz 
appeals to, what counts as support, and losing that support can be construed in more 
abstract ways. So one might be anxious about losing one’s job, in that the job acts as 
something that ‘supports’ one’s long-term material well-being.  
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There are even dynamic qualities to our thought processes. For instance, Malcolm 
Budd notes that, “[a] depressed state is characterised by relatively slow and confined 
mental processes, lack of energy, lack of determination, passivity, and difficulty in 
changing one’s state” (Budd 1995: 207). Equally, one may spend a sleepless night 
feverishly turning over in one’s mind different ideas about what will happen the next 
day. Or when one is ecstatically happy, one may be unable to concentrate on 
anything for more than a few seconds. Thus emotional representations, even when 
dealing with highly conceptual processes, seem to be well characterised by these 
dynamic qualities or contrasts.5 
 
This kind of understanding of the perceptual content of emotional states would then 
certainly affect the way we categorise and distinguish one emotion from another. For 
instance, we may class together various cases of fear as losing support either 
gradually (anxiety), or more suddenly (panic). But there may also be other kinds of 
fear that are better classed as the sense that something is approaching that may strike 
you, (which again could be understood either literally or more abstractly). 
Technically then, these would be two distinct emotions, though we might still place 
them close to one another in that they satisfy a more general sense of ‘losing 
stability’. 
 
Prinz’s final position is that emotions are valent embodied appraisals. He argues that 
the broad characterisation of emotions as either positive or negative corresponds to 
                                                     
5
 Dynamics could also include a sense of modal contrasts rather than purely temporal contrasts. 
Consider for instance the case of thankfulness. When one feels thankful, one’s actual situation may 
not have changed at all. But one may still consider how things might have been worse, and thus a 
sense of things proceeding smoothly in contrast to that possibility. 
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additional markers given to the emotion which dictate either approach or withdrawal 
behaviours towards their elicitors. Prinz admits that these aspects of emotions are not 
perceptual because they do not register bodily states so much as issue imperatives for 
action (Prinz 2004: 228). I am not so keen on the idea that emotions have simple 
valence markers such as these. I concur with Robert Solomon (2004a) that emotions 
have a variety of dimensional opposites such as healthy/unhealthy or virtuous/vicious 
rather than simply positive or negative. Accordingly, approach and avoidance 
behaviours would be just one of these opposites. Moreover, on my view of the 
content of emotional perceptions, a sense of oneself approaching or withdrawing is 
readily incorporated as a dynamic aspect of the bodily pattern itself. 
 
If we make this link to driving certain behavioural reactions, is it the case that in 
helping the subject to decide how to proceed, that embodied appraisals are more 
cognitive in character than our other perceptual states? In synthesising the cognitivist 
and non-cognitivist positions, Prinz may also have blurred the boundaries between 
the notions of sensation and cognition or percept and concept. The problem is that it 
is not especially clear how we should define cognition. Does cognition apply to any 
form of ‘thinking’ (conscious or not) or does it require the use of concepts? It would 
seem that making a judgement or evaluation is a paradigm cognitive process and 
embodied appraisals seem to fall into that category. Yet even Robert Solomon, who 
was erstwhile one of the more extreme cognitivist theorists, said recently that bodily 
states can potentially be characterised as judgements because ‘knowing’ something is 
often a matter of habits and practices performed rather than consciously articulated 
discriminations (Solomon 2003b). 
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Prinz defines cognitive states and processes as “those that exploit representations that 
are under the control of an organism rather than under the control of the 
environment” (Prinz 2004: 45). He concludes that emotional states are percepts 
rather than concepts because they are automatic responses over which we have no 
control. That is, they are processes that work from the ‘bottom up’ in reacting to the 
environment. There is some debate over the possibility of Machiavellian or 
pre-meditated emotional states (e.g. Solomon 2003b, Griffiths 2003), which on 
Prinz’s terms would indicate a degree of cognitive control. We can for instance, 
deliberately focus on an injustice in order to ‘work up a rage’ or allow ourselves to 
become upset in order to gain sympathy. Prinz seems to admit this much, yet he 
maintains that whilst it is possible to conceptualise emotions, the everyday 
experience of emotions need not involve any concepts. We can imagine being angry, 
recognise a state of fear or remember a happy episode. Yet we can equally 
conceptualise a state like seeing red without undermining its basic perceptual status.6 
 
My own position is that emotional states are genuinely perceptual but are more 
sophisticated than our other perceptual abilities. In the following chapter I present 
reasons for thinking we can potentially cognise our emotional states in a way quite 
unlike any other perceptual function. However at this stage, we can recognise that 
because emotions organise and respond to information from several sense modalities 
at once they seem more like a ‘meta-modality’ than a regular perceptual function. 
Most of all though, in encouraging certain behaviours and providing information 
about well-being, emotions seem to evaluate the world rather than simply map it. In 
                                                     
6
 According to Prinz (personal communication), recognition counts as perceptual because it is 
typically a passive reaction to the world. He qualifies however that it often uses resources that in 
general underlie cognitive processes (i.e. concepts). Hence again, there is some ambiguity in the 
distinction between perception and cognition. 
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this way the emotions signify the beginnings of a unified self. They seem occupy a 
middle ground between pure sensations, like colours or pain, and more definitive 
mental states like beliefs, memory and the imagination. Thus we can appreciate what 
de Sousa means when he says that, “emotions are like Descartes’ pineal gland: they 
function where mind and body most closely and mysteriously interact” (1987: xvi). 
 
The dichotomy between cognitive and non-cognitive is no longer particularly useful 
when traditionally non-cognitive states can occupy the role of cognitive processes. 
We may similarly have to accept that there is a rather vague boundary between 
feelings and cognitions, percepts and concepts. One of the guiding themes of this 
thesis is the extent to which our mental processes are actively engaged with, and 
potentially externalised or embodied within the environment beyond the individual. 
Both emotions and other forms of perception do not passively construct a picture of 
the world but rather actively interrogate it. As I argue in later chapters, we typically 
perceive the world in terms of affordances for action and our cognitive processes are 
often integrated with our physical manipulation of the environment. Understanding 
emotions as perceptions is just the first move away from viewing the mind and 
emotions as purely internalised cognitive processes. 
 
Awareness 
In order to round off this analysis I would like to explore the role that awareness 
plays in emotional states. So far I have maintained a distinction between bodily 
patterns and the phenomenal feelings of bodily changes, yet this distinction must 
now be properly justified. Intuitively we might think that awareness is essential to all 
emotional states. When we talk about our emotions for instance, we usually mean the 
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way things feel. However, throughout this chapter I have been emphasising a more 
functional understanding of emotional states. As such, I argue that as long as bodily 
changes occur in response to the appropriate objects, and are neurally registered in 
such a way as to orchestrate at least some of the characteristic behavioural responses, 
(including emotional expressions) then the emotion has been sufficiently 
distinguished for us to suppose its existence. 
 
Consider the following example: You are facing a firing squad, looking down the 
barrels of the guns pointing at you and waiting for the order to fire. You clearly 
recognise the imminent danger, yet you do not consciously experience any feelings 
of fear. You might even congratulate yourself on being so incredibly brave. Yet 
when you look down at your body you realise that your body is shaking and you 
have wet yourself. Accordingly you realise that actually you are terrified and you 
simply didn’t experience it at first. Now in this case, your body is representing the 
danger well enough. Perhaps we could argue that this is a mixed emotion, and that in 
some respects you are calm as well as terrified. Yet even if it is a mixed emotion, 
you are still partly undergoing fear that you are not conscious of. 
 
There are also times when we undergo an emotional response and then become 
unconscious of it for a while simply because our attention is fixed elsewhere. 
Imagine for instance that you are slumped in your chair, weeping over the death of 
your dog, when your eye happens to catch the shopping list you made earlier and you 
find yourself trying to remember the things you need to buy. A moment later your 
attention is drawn back to your dog and your sadness. During this period of 
distraction, tears still streamed down your face. Moreover, none of the bodily states 
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you are experiencing seems to have changed from what they were just a few 
moments before. So if one is still acting in an emotionally expressive way, and none 
of the elicitors of the emotion have changed, then there is no good reason to suppose 
the state ceased to exist whilst you were unconscious of it.7 Jesse Prinz takes a 
similar line here. He states: 
 
There is no reason why one cannot represent core relational themes 
unconsciously. They can prepare us for behavioural responses, they can 
initiate thinking processes, they can embody cultural values, and they can 
motivate moral conduct. None of these effects is intrinsically bound to 
consciousness. (Prinz 2004: 202) 
 
There is also empirical evidence in favour of unconscious emotional states. An 
experiment by Strahan et al. (2002) found that people were more likely to choose 
upbeat music to listen to after having being subliminally presented with pictures of 
sad faces. Yet when asked, the subjects did not report any change in their mood 
(Strahan, Spencer & Zanna 2002, cited in Prinz 2004: 203). In this case then, people 
appear to be unconscious of their own emotionally driven behaviour. 
 
The possibility of unconscious emotions is also made more plausible when we 
consider them as perceptual states. There may be emotional states similar to 
blindsight, in which subjects report no conscious visual experience and yet are able 
to identify the objects presented to them and successfully navigate around rooms. Of 
                                                     
7
 A similar argument is made for pain, which we might think is even more closely tied to its 
phenomenology. The example that Rosenthal (1991) gives is that one may forget a headache for a 
moment whilst reading an absorbing novel, though one continues to engage in pain behaviours, such 
as rubbing one’s temples (cited in Prinz 1994: 201). 
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course, we may achieve varying degrees of detailed awareness of the kinds of 
situations that typically arouse our emotions, as well as the impact our own 
personality, or the exact quality of the feeling involved. However, the self-conscious 
attention to our own emotional feelings is not the same as the basic occurrence of an 
emotional state. The idea of understanding emotions as perceptions is that we 
represent the emotionally eliciting situation in making an embodied appraisal. Hence 
there is a minimal level of awareness, or intentionality that simply is the bodily 
pattern. Though this is not necessarily the same as there being something that it is 
like, a particular phenomenal quality for that emotion. 
 
Overall, Prinz believes that consciousness targets just one stage of the neural 
processing of emotion. As I mentioned earlier, emotions are structured like other 
perceptual states in having three stages of processing; initial data, organised 
perspective, and then conceptual recognition. Prinz then argues that the conscious 
awareness of emotions tends to target the point when the various bodily changes are 
organised into what I’ve called the bodily pattern. Consciously experiencing this 
overall pattern rather than the individual components then facilitates discrimination 
of the emotional state. It also relates the subject to the emotional elicitor in an 
immediate way that can motivate action. Yet focusing the attention of the person 
onto the bodily changes or environmental situation counts as only one of the 
characteristic responses to an emotional state rather than an essential element. 
 
However, this is not to say that the focus of attention cannot have a significant 
impact on how the emotional state develops from that point on. One theory in 
particular accords awareness a central role in deciding which emotion one is 
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undergoing. Schachter and Singer’s labelling theory (1962) holds that our bodily 
feelings must be interpreted or labelled by us in order to determine what emotion 
they represent. They argue for this theory based on an experiment where subjects 
were unknowingly given adrenaline and then placed into two different situations, one 
involving an actor becoming enraged by a questionnaire, the other involving an actor 
playing childishly. The idea was that although subjects were in the same 
physiological states, their emotional states would differ according to the subjects’ 
different interpretations, which had been primed by the expressive behaviour of the 
actors. The emotional states of the subjects were gauged by observing their 
expressive behaviour as well as their self-reports after the experiment. Those in the 
anger-primed situation were observed to agree with the actor who expressed anger 
and those in the amusement-primed situation showed amusement. 
 
However in both cases, subjects afterwards reported their own states as amused. 
Schachter and Singer dismiss these reports as the result of a desire to please the 
experimenter. Yet it seems just as likely that subjects in the anger-primed situation 
were trying to placate the actor. In addition, even though the adrenaline injections 
would put the different subjects in a similar physiological state to begin with, these 
states may have changed over the course of the experiment. Jesse Prinz also criticises 
Schachter and Singer’s experimental design because it assumes that different 
expressive behaviours signal different emotional states. Yet it also assumes that 
different expressive behaviours may nevertheless signal the same physiological 
states (Prinz 2004: 70-71). There seems no reason why expressive behaviour would 
fail to track physiological arousal like this, so these assumptions not very plausible. 
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However there is an intuitive appeal to Schachter and Singer’s labelling theory. In 
my own experience I have often had feelings that I have been unable to definitively 
label one way or the other. By judging the situation more deliberately, I have then 
decided (or possibly misrepresented) for myself what emotion that feeling signals (cf. 
Goldie 2004: 93). Alternatively, when we are feeling tired we may be more easily 
upset or moved to anger. In these cases an unemotional feeling is transformed into an 
emotional appraisal based on the slightest excuse. So even if it is not the case that the 
conscious interpretation of feelings may differentiate the very same feelings as 
signaling different emotions, interpretation may still encourage congruent appraisals 
that can then arouse more distinct emotional states. This is also similar to other 
perceptual states, where for instance believing that one is looking at a person can 
cause one to interpret vague visual information to fit that interpretation, and thus 
identify eyes, a nose and so on even if one is not in fact looking at a person. 
 
Another consequence of conscious awareness of one’s bodily states is that it is 
possible to have emotions about one’s bodily states. For instance, I can be sad that I 
am sick. A more dramatic case are panic attacks, in which awareness of the heart 
beating faster causes the subject to panic that they are having a heart attack, which 
causes their heart to beat faster and so on. So an unfortunate feedback effect is set up 
that usually can only be resolved by consciously controlling one’s breathing rate. 
Future cases of panic may even be set off by a judgement that one is beginning to 
panic. Here we see one example of emotional recalibration, i.e. panic about panic, 
that although unwarranted seems to necessarily require the conscious attention of the 
subject to occur. 
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So it seems that consciously attributing an emotional state to oneself can potentially 
arouse or alter an emotional state. Moreover, the attention of the subject can focus on 
different aspects of the emotional state, such as the bodily feelings, the situation, the 
long-term context (e.g. is this love?) or how it reflects one’s overall character (e.g. 
am I a brave person?). Awareness can help to link these components together as well 
as to cause errors of misattribution. It is also certainly useful to us when emotions 
grab our attention because they cause us to focus our resources on dealing with the 
situation at hand. As such the role of awareness is another sign of the dynamic and 
iterative nature of emotions in locating ourselves within our relation to the world and 
helping to guide a response. However, it is quite possible for emotions to function 
independently of the awareness of the subject. In general emotional states are distinct 
from the phenomenal experience of those states. 
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Chapter Two: Expression and Empathy
 
 
In the first chapter I argued that emotions are bodily patterns that perceptually 
represent the subject’s dynamic relation with the world. In this chapter I develop this 
theory further and explain the nature of emotional expression and empathy. This is 
required for my explanations of how music can express emotions in the following 
chapters. Understanding how this is possible depends on how much musical 
expression can instantiate the same roles as ordinary types of expression. Thus my 
purpose here is to establish how ordinary emotional expression works, unmediated 
by special tools or training. In particular I am interested in how exactly expressions 
of emotion relate to the emotional states that they express. This involves finding 
properties or essential functions that all expressions share (given that expressions 
form a single coherent class). Possessing these properties should then explain what 
makes expressive behaviours expressive. 
 
Overall I argue that expressions of emotion such as facial expressions, non-verbal 
utterances and other bodily gestures are simply ways in which emotions happen, or 
surface level modes of the emotion itself. That is, we should consider expressive 
behaviours to be as much part of the emotional state as more internal bodily changes. 
The main reason for this is that behavioural expressions function in the same way as 
somatic changes to generate bodily patterns and feelings. Behavioural expressions 
can even replace more internal somatic changes as the main source of the subject’s 
emotional experience. As such, the role of expressions in communicating one’s 
emotion to others is secondary to this more central characteristic. This is not to say 
that the evolutionary reason for the development or preservation of expressive 
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behaviours is not dominated by their communicative role. The point is just that 
expressive behaviours are able to serve this role so well because they are parts of the 
emotion itself. At the same time, the fact that expressions are a means to generating 
emotions has important implications for our ability to directly control our emotional 
states. As a result I argue that emotions can sometimes be cognitive rather than 
purely perceptual states. 
 
Having established what expressions of emotion are, I then explore the way that they 
allow other people to recognise our emotional states. The central claim here is that 
when we perceive another person’s expressive movements, it triggers a simulation 
process in the brain, whereby that movement is processed from a first-personal 
perspective. As a result, seeing a person making an emotional expression causes us 
to simulate making that expression ourselves. Since expressions of emotion are part 
of emotional states in helping to generate bodily patterns, a simulated version of the 
emotion that the other person is undergoing is therefore aroused in the observer. This 
simulated arousal then allows the emotion to be recognised. 
 
Finally I look at more sophisticated forms of empathy, in which our ideas about the 
person who is undergoing the emotion and his situation come into play. Here my 
goal is not to explore the various intricacies of this kind of empathy in detail, so 
much as show how it relates to the more basic recognition of emotion. This also 
rounds off my analysis of emotions by identifying some additional factors that can 
influence an emotional state. Altogether my theories of emotion, expression and 
empathy then lay the grounds for showing how music can capture emotional states in 
chapters three and four. In the final chapters of my thesis, the model of emotions will 
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also be used to analyse simultaneous and related emotional experiences, ultimately 
enabling us to make sense of the possibility of shared emotions in music. 
 
Expression and Emotional Personality 
When trying to account for the nature of emotional expression, I am mainly 
interested in what are called ‘primary’ expressions. Examples of these are facial 
expressions and the tonal qualities of the voice as well as other vocal productions 
such as laughing, crying or sighing. I also include observable changes in posture and 
muscle tension, and very impulsive actions such as punching the air in triumph, 
jumping for joy, or clenching the fists in anger. Behaviours of increased attention or 
reorientation towards the emotional elicitor may also be regarded as expressive of 
emotion. Though these perhaps reflect the initial perceptual role of emotions more 
than their expression. Facial, vocal and bodily expressive movements are the most 
relevant to this analysis because they seem to be the most basic and direct; they need 
not be specially learnt, and may be found across many different cultures, amongst 
both infants and adults. Actions such as throwing or hitting something can also be 
considered in this light, but only in so far as the identity of what was thrown or hit 
has no special relevance for the person undergoing the emotion.1 
 
One of the reasons that Jesse Prinz argues that emotions are perceptions is because 
they are processes that we passively undergo. In contrast, since emotional 
expressions are a sort of behaviour they might be described as something that we 
                                                     
1
 There are more complex forms of expression where the subject tries to achieve some further end 
with these actions, such as smashing a favourite vase of someone who has made them angry, or hitting 
something that symbolises the other person. These more complex activities might be described as 
partly attempting to satisfy desires that result from emotional states (i.e. to injure the offending person) 
rather than purely expressive. 
 
 53 
actively do. However a distinction should be made between deliberately using one’s 
behaviour to express an emotion and having one’s behaviour reveal or betray an 
emotional state irrespective of one’s desire or intention to do so (cf. Vermazen 1986). 
Yet a purely binary distinction may be less appropriate than placing expressions 
along a scale of more or less deliberate behaviours. This is because even within the 
primary expressions there are several levels at which the motives and intentions of 
the subject can get involved (cf. Goldie 2000: 126).  
 
At the most deliberate end of the scale there are expressions of emotion that are 
completely insincere and reflect neither inner feeling nor genuine appraisal, such as a 
smile to a hated colleague with whom we want to maintain good relations. Other 
expressions may be genuinely aroused and yet calculated to serve a further end, such 
as crying in order to gain sympathy. In this case we may simply allow others to 
perceive the expression, or it may be exaggerated, or more subtly we may make a 
show of trying to repress the emotion. The ways in which the intentions behind this 
kind of communicative act may be obscured, distorted or revealed are potentially 
quite complex. 
 
Moving further towards the less deliberate end of the scale; differences to emotional 
expression may be caused by genuine attempts to hide our emotions from others 
when such expressions would result in undesirable social consequences. For example, 
to laugh when attending a funeral would be socially disastrous in most cases, at least 
in this culture. This is just one of the ways in which culture may legitimate or 
encourage certain forms of expression in circumstances that would not apply when 
we are alone. Another alternative is that an expression may have no further end or 
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motive and yet may still be permitted or repressed according to one’s background 
emotional personality (regardless of the current social context). For example a 
self-consciously masculine person may repress the urge to cry when he is sad. This 
phenomenon should be accessible to cultural influence, which can encourage certain 
types of emotional personality. Peter Goldie also claims that general emotional 
character traits may be signaled by habitual expressions or mannerisms. He describes 
for instance “the permanent expression of disgust at all of human nature in the face 
of the woman on the bus” (Goldie 2000: 150). This habitual expression is then 
reckoned to correspond to a generalised appraisal of the world. 
 
Finally we have completely sincere and uncontrolled emotional expression. One of 
the characteristics of this kind of expression is that it tends not to be self-conscious. 
In my own experience for instance, I find that as soon as I focus my attention on my 
own emotional expression, it seems somehow insincere to maintain it in just the 
same way. Part of the reason for this may be that by revealing the emotion to the 
person experiencing it, emotional expression can stimulate further emotional 
reactions. I mentioned in the last chapter how we may become angry that we are sad, 
or afraid that we are angry. It is also worth noting that non self-conscious expression 
is more likely when we are alone and so need not worry about revealing our 
emotions to others. 
 
Given the above possibilities, the way in which expressions of emotion may be 
communicative, or self-revelatory of emotional states seems to be one of variables of 
emotional expression. It does not seem to be essential to all expressive acts. Rather 
emotional expressions may just be ways in which emotions happen, or in insincere 
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cases where they appear to happen. However even if expression does not always 
occur in social contexts, it may yet have developed for that reason in evolutionary 
terms. In his famous cross-cultural and cross-species study, The Expression of 
Emotions in Man and Animals (1872) Darwin argued that our expressions of emotion 
could be explained by their social utility, if not for our species then at least for our 
evolutionary ancestors. For instance he claimed that the bristling of hair when we are 
afraid served to make our more furry ancestors look bigger. Similarly to bear the 
teeth in anger indicates the creature’s ability to fight back. Darwin struggled to 
convincingly explain other expressive behaviours such as shoulder shrugging or 
crying. However, these may simply have more direct communicative utility. So the 
purpose of crying is to signal distress, especially for infants, who are utterly reliant 
on their caregivers and lack other means to communicate. On the other hand, 
shoulder shrugging seems much more artificial. It expresses ‘giving up’ or 
supplication by making a show of raising the shoulders as if preparing to act, but 
only so that the release of the shoulders and thus the effort involved, may be signaled 
more effectively (cf. Dewey 1894: 568).  
 
Alan Fridlund (1994) also argues that facial expressions are predominantly 
communicative. So the expression of anger serves as a warning to others, smiling 
acts as an invitation to approach, and frowning is a sign of supplication. We should 
also note that some expressions of emotion are very hard to fake. The best example is 
the difference between a faked smile and a genuine smile, which involves certain 
muscle movements around the eye that are not amenable to conscious control. Thus 
expressions are generally reliable guides to the emotional state of the subject. 
Fridlund also cites the fact that our strongest emotional episodes are not always 
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expressed. For instance, Olympic athletes often do not smile just after they have won 
gold medals so much as when they are on the award podium in front of others (cited 
in Prinz 2004: 111). This would indicate an increased tendency to express emotions 
in social circumstances, and thus that expressions are generally geared towards a 
communicative role. 
 
Yet social situations may also lead to more expressive behaviours simply because 
they tend to be more arousing than solitary situations. In the case of the Olympic 
athlete, standing on the podium receiving the adulation of thousands of people may 
well be an even greater stimulus than winning the medal in the first place (and of 
course, they could be exhausted directly after winning). Paul Ekman (1997) also 
contests Fridlund’s theory by citing evidence that Japanese people are more likely to 
express negative emotions when in private. Since we may equally have a tendency to 
suppress certain expressions in public, our explanation of the communicative 
tendencies of expressions will have to be more complex. It would be better to say 
that our expressions of emotion may be modified by our communicative or social 
roles. 
 
It is still likely that a background awareness of the communicative nature of 
expressions is leading Japanese people to suppress them more. Moreover, although 
we often express emotions in private, this need not undermine the claim that 
expressions have generally evolved for communicative purposes. Their occurrence in 
social situations may simply have carried over into private situations because it has 
relatively little costs for the organism to do so. It does not do the organism any harm 
to express emotions in private, and even in regard to conserving energy, it may 
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require more effort to suppress emotions in private than just to let them happen all 
the time. 
 
Yet the point I want to raise is that if we use expressions to communicate our 
emotional states or related intentions, we may well do so because we recognise their 
natural meaning as modes of emotion. There is no reason to suppose that 
understanding emotional expressions as communicative is exclusive or even prior to 
understanding them as modes of emotion. 
 
Darwin was interested in proving that emotional expressions were universal across 
different cultures as a means to show that the emotions generating them were also 
universal. Ekman uses similar reasoning such that if the same expressions are used in 
the same circumstances then the inner emotion is likely to be the same as well. I am 
not so much interested in the universality of emotional expressions here as in 
exploring the link between the outer expression and the inner state. It does not seem 
immediately evident to me that similar expression guarantees similar emotion, unless 
that is, expressions directly contribute to the bodily pattern of emotional states. 
 
We have already come across some evidence that may indicate such a relation 
between expressions and emotional states in chapter one. The experiments in which 
subjects were emotionally aroused as a consequence of being forced into different 
facial expressions reveal that expressions can cause emotional states rather than the 
other way round. This at least suggests that emotional states and expressions have an 
especially immediate link. James makes a great deal of this kind of evidence and 
argues that it allows emotional states to be deliberately modified. He claims: 
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Everyone knows how panic is increased by flight, and how the giving 
way to the symptoms of grief or anger increases those passions 
themselves. [...] Refuse to express a passion, and it dies. (James 1884: 
197) 
 
James goes on to claim that persistently faking the outward appearance of 
cheerfulness can arouse the genuine emotion. Hence it is argued that not only can 
expression intensify an emotional state but can also arouse completely contrary 
states. 
 
The relation between emotional arousal and vocal expression has also been explored, 
although not in as much depth as facial expression. In general it is more difficult to 
deliberately control our voices than our facial expressions (although we cannot turn 
off our facial expressions the way we can our voices). However Ekman cites the case 
of one woman who was able to deliberately modify her vocal tone and as a result her 
arousal level (Ekman 2003: 36). Ekman (agreeing with expression theorist Silvan 
Tomkins) claims that we are inclined to make sounds whenever our emotions are 
aroused and that there are different sounds for each emotion (Ekman 2003: 59). As 
such vocal productions are likely to bear the same relations to emotional states as 
facial expressions in terms of arousal. Though our emotions may not be so amenable 
to conscious control via this means. 
 
In general, our ability to control our expressive behaviours may depend on which 
emotion one is undergoing and which feature of the body it involves. For instance, it 
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is generally far less easy to control one’s behaviours when one is scared as opposed 
to happy. Similarly in regard to specific behaviours, the facial expression of disgust 
may be more involuntary than clenching one’s fists in anger. Moreover, as in the 
case of the woman Ekman cites, some people may find it easier to control their 
expressions, or various aspects of their expressions than others. This may reflect a 
natural disposition of different people, but it should also be possible given practise to 
learn better control. This is one of the central methods of cognitive-behavioural 
therapy for instance. 
 
There have been various studies that aim to show whether expression intensifies or 
relieves internal somatic changes and whether as a result is it therapeutically 
beneficial to suppress or encourage emotional expression. Cacioppo et al. (1992) 
review a series of studies that show that increased expression corresponds to 
increased measures in various internal systems such as blood pressure, heart rate and 
skin conductivity. They conclude however, that individuals may differ in 
characteristic patterns of responses along all of these variables. In particular, some 
individuals show lower ANS activity relative to others in response to emotional 
elicitors, despite showing greater levels of facial expressiveness. Other individuals 
show no visible expression at all, and yet measures of their internal changes show 
intense activity. 
 
So although it is not the case that expressive behaviour is necessary for all emotional  
 
 60 
states, it may be sufficient.2 Drawing a similar conclusion to Cacioppo et al., Buck 
(1980) distinguishes between increases of arousal at the level of the individual 
subject, compared to that between different subjects. He concludes that as our 
expressions of emotion increase in response to emotional elicitors, in general our 
inner arousal levels are correspondingly intensified. This is according to the 
within-subject measure. However, it is not the case that those people who are rated 
by others as characteristically more expressive tend to undergo greater levels of inner 
stimulation. Rather the opposite is true. Different people may undergo comparable 
levels of emotional intensity, yet one manifests it as internal changes where the other 
manifests it as outward behaviours, and yet another has a more equal ratio of both. A 
distinction is made accordingly between internalisers and externalisers, with a 
category of generalisers in-between.  
 
But what allows us to say that these different kinds of changes (expression and ANS 
activity) are in fact comparable in terms of emotional arousal? The Cacioppo et al. 
study derives comparable intensity in terms of the gain, or rate of increase of activity 
in each variable. Having established the ranges for that variable in the population as 
a whole, they can then compare the relative extremes at which different people show 
activity. As a result they are also able to show that some people have lower levels of 
arousal both in expressiveness and ANS activity than others, and so tend to have less 
intense emotions. 
 
                                                     
2
 That expressions are sufficient for emotional states would indicate that completely insincere 
expression (where there is no corresponding bodily pattern at all) is actually impossible. As such our 
understanding of insincere expression should more accurately refer to a conflict between the arousal 
generated by the false smile (for example) and any other bodily changes or appraisals that the subject 
may have. 
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In order to account for the different patterns in which emotional arousal can occur in 
different people, we may wish to stipulate not just a close causal connection between 
emotions and expression, but a constitutive relation. If some people show a great deal 
of expressive behaviour with correspondingly little ANS activity, it is unreasonable 
to assume that the internal activity is merely causing the expression. For externalisers, 
the expressive behaviour may be the dominant characteristic of their emotional state. 
There is also a very plausible reason why expressions could partly constitute 
emotional states: What the set of emotional expressions I listed at the beginning of 
this section have in common is that they all generate feelings and directly contribute 
towards the overall bodily state of the subject. Since according to the perceptual 
theory, the contents of emotional states are essentially bodily patterns, we should 
include the bodily changes involved in expressive behaviours in these patterns. 
Clearly facial expressions, vocal productions, bodily posture and movements all 
involve bodily changes that can be directly felt. In the next section I will also look at 
ways in which the audible or visual aspects of expression may be automatically 
‘translated’ into bodily patterns. Finally, the acts of throwing or hitting something 
also provide a means to physical sensation. This more indirect method then allows all 
kinds of tactile sensations to potentially become incorporated within the emotional 
state.  
 
Hence even though expression is a type of behaviour, it is not necessarily performed 
for any further instrumental purpose. Rather I claim that expressive behaviours bear 
the same relation to emotional states as other bodily changes in generating bodily 
patterns and feelings for the subject. It is this aspect of expressions that is central 
rather than their communicative role, at least so far as the expresser is concerned. 
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The main function of expressive behaviour is then exactly the same as the function of 
emotional states, that is, to represent the dynamic relation between subject and world. 
Thus the answer to what it is that makes expressive behaviours expressive, what 
makes them reveal or provide evidence for the emotion of the subject, is simply that 
they are parts of emotional states. The main difference between emotions and 
expressions is merely that expressions occur in areas closer to the surface of the body 
(as opposed to say, visceral changes). 
 
This then has several important consequences: Firstly it allows emotions, and thus 
our appraisals of the environment, to be observable by others, and so available for 
social interaction in all the ways that were mentioned above. We can then admit that 
due to the great utility of this for the organism, evolution has preserved and refined 
this mode of emotion. A second important consequence is that it makes these aspects 
of emotion more amenable to conscious control. For that reason they may be used by 
the subject to satisfy various intentions, and can be tailored to fit the subject’s wider 
goals, background personality and social context. 
 
This consequence is particularly important because it implies that emotions have a 
cognitive aspect. Recall Prinz’s definition of cognitive states and processes as “those 
that exploit representations that are under the control of an organism rather than 
under the control of the environment” (Prinz 2004: 45). Since we can control our 
emotional expressions and as such our emotional patterns, this therefore entails that 
emotions can be cognitive processes. Moreover a striking result of including the 
expressions into the bodily patterns of emotions is that it allows for more complex 
emotions. From an experiential point of view, internally generated sensations are not 
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especially fine grained compared to the feelings that movement can generate. 
Expressions can enhance the force, temporal range and nuance of the feelings the 
subject experiences. So by controlling our expressions we can directly manipulate 
our feelings to have more complex emotional reactions overall. 
 
But in what sense does elaborating the bodily content of an emotion enable a more 
subtle or sophisticated emotional reaction? Well to begin with, many cases of 
expressive elaboration will be heavily mixed up with one’s resulting behaviour. For 
instance, instead of allowing oneself to be overcome with rage, deliberate expressive 
behaviour may channel or focus that feeling in a productive and highly controlled 
activity, which in turn generates a sense of power or capability. However not all 
appropriate emotional responses need involve some kind of immediate modification 
of one’s situation. Many involve contemplation of the emotional state and the 
struggle to accommodate it within one’s life projects. We may ask ourselves, is this 
emotion rational or beneficial to my goals? Should I therefore try to sublimate it or 
allow it to blossom? Expressive behaviour is a way in which we can ask ourselves 
these questions. By directly modifying the bodily pattern and monitoring the results, 
we can experiment with the emotional appraisal; adjusting one’s feeling as seems 
appropriate. Thus expression can allow the more sensitive appraisal of one’s 
situation. 
 
So to the extent that we can control and elaborate our bodily patterns, emotions are 
cognitive rather than perceptual processes. There are no perceptual states that we can 
elaborate at will in the same way. It is not like deliberately refocusing one’s attention 
onto some other object. It is not even like perceiving an object in a different way as a 
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consequence of one’s conceptual interpretation of what it is. A comparable 
occurrence in a perceptual function like vision would be making a red object appear 
to have green spots simply by deciding to ‘look’ in a different way. Overall then, we 
must conceive of emotions as more complex combinations of perceiving and 
cognising. Though the perceptual function of emotions is still central, since it is true 
of all cases of emotion, many emotional states have a cognitive function as well. 
 
Hence as I mentioned in chapter one, it again seems that the boundary between 
perceptions and cognitions is not especially sharp. In the field of emotions at least, 
we should regard the stages of perception and cognition as more integrated and 
overlapping processes. In general our perceptual faculties are actively directed 
towards exploring and interpreting the environment. Emotions are just a more 
cognitively sophisticated example of this. Again we should emphasise that emotions 
are constantly iterated dynamic processes; where the behavioural responses to 
emotionally inducing situations generate bodily patterns, which generate further 
behaviours, which also feel a certain way and so on. As such expressive behaviour is 
another way in which our emotions are pitted against an environment that is 
experienced as physically resistant to our goals. They are a significant part of 
shaping one’s dynamic response to the world. 
 
A third important consequence of the surface nature of emotional expressions is that 
it allows individual and cultural differences in emotional states to develop as a 
consequence of encouraging or prohibiting certain kinds of expressive behaviour. 
For instance Prinz notes that if we exaggerate a facial expression habitually, then that 
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bodily change will come to partially characterise that emotion (Prinz 2004: 143).3 So 
he claims that two people may have different bodily patterns that are elicited by a 
single type of emotional object and hence that different bodily patterns can represent 
the same core relational theme. Given my conception of emotions where bodily 
patterns are regarded as more directly appropriate to the situations they represent, I 
cannot agree with Prinz here. Rather, I would argue that two slightly different bodily 
patterns consequently represent the situation as having slightly different emotional 
meanings. They would indicate a different way of interacting with the world. 
Nevertheless, I think Prinz and I would agree that this fine tuning process means that 
the changes generated by expressions can determine, and be determined by the 
background character and cultural environment of the subject. For instance a brave 
man may habitually suppress expressions of fear, resulting in less intense 
experiences of fear generally. 
 
In general then, people can ‘wear’ their emotions in different ways, some undergoing 
their emotions more in terms of outward expressions than others. However, all these 
different forms of expression-emotion sit within a single arena of bodily patterns and 
feelings. There is no principled reason to distinguish an increase in heart rate from a 
pattern of facial tension in terms of generating bodily patterns. 
 
It should be noted however that incorporating expressive behaviour into emotional 
states does not make my theory of emotions a behavioural theory in the traditional 
sense, since it still concentrates on bodily patterns rather than dispositions towards 
certain instrumental actions. As I described in chapter one, the relation that bodily 
                                                     
3
 Both Prinz and Ekman agree that expressions are components of emotions rather than effects 
(Ekman 1977 cited in Prinz 2004: 134). 
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patterns have to various behavioural responses (which includes interactions with 
other people) are important in explaining the appropriateness of the pattern to its 
emotional object. However expressive behaviours are components of emotions only 
in terms of being a special kind of bodily change that generates feelings for the 
subject. In so far as they are instrumental in achieving certain goals, expressive 
behaviours are consequences rather than constitutive of emotional states. As 
instrumental actions, behaviours may even be the response to the world that the 
bodily patterns are representing. So instrumental actions can cause, and be caused by 
emotional states. They are not part of the emotion. Hence in some cases we could 
have two perspectives on the very same thing. In one respect an action could be part 
of the emotion, and in another, a cause or consequence of the emotion. Accordingly 
we should distinguish between behaviours that are purely expressive and behaviours 
that are purely instrumental responses, and those that are a combination of both. 
 
Recognising Another’s Emotion 
So far I have identified two main aspects of emotional states; the bodily patterns that 
are generated by both internal and expressive bodily changes, and the situations or 
thoughts that these patterns track. In any given emotional state, since both of these 
aspects may vary, they both need to be described in order to fully identify and 
distinguish that state. However a complete description of an emotion must also 
consider the person to whom the emotion belongs. Sometimes our experiences track 
the emotional states of other people. These are empathic states. 
 
When exploring how we recognise and understand other peoples’ emotions it is 
important that our explanation be compatible, and preferably complementary with 
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the account of emotions I have presented so far. The most immediate consequence is 
that if we do not recognise the bodily pattern that another person undergoes, we may 
not have properly grasped the nature of their emotion. So I will try to justify this 
claim, as well as to explain how it is that we can get an experience of the way 
another person’s bodily patterns feel. In addition, I have argued that emotions are a 
form of perception. So it seems that fully understanding the emotion of another 
would also require grasping the situation that their emotion is directed towards, 
whether this is real or imaginary. Yet emotional states affect the way in which we 
perceive the situations that elicit that emotion. For example, the emotion may cause 
us to focus more closely on the aspects of the situation that instantiate the formal 
object of the emotion (cf. de Sousa 1987). Hence it is not enough that I recognise the 
situation that the other is directed towards, then recognise the bodily pattern, and 
then simply add these components together. I have to somehow find a way into the 
loop where confronting a situation determines an emotional response, and the 
emotional response determines the situation one takes oneself to be confronted by. 
 
So we have three distinguishable considerations; the bodily pattern (which generates 
feelings), the situation, and the way the pattern and situation interrelate. There is 
however, a further level of complexity to grasping another’s emotion, which is when 
considerations of character (such as being brave) and non-psychological context 
(such as being the Prime Minister) come into play. In both this chapter and the last, 
we have seen ways in which the character and cultural background of the person can 
impact on their emotional state. Hence any given process of understanding another’s 
emotion will be more accurate and complete the more of these considerations are 
incorporated. 
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Now it is sometimes claimed that incorporating ideas of character and context is 
essential for empathy. This is because empathy is commonly defined as imagining 
being the other person, (or at least being in their position) and using this imaginative 
process to understand or anticipate the other’s behaviour. As such empathy is 
regarded as a highly developed imaginative capacity, apparently relying on rather 
more sophisticated cognitive processes than those required for the basic experience 
of emotions. However, at this stage I only concentrate on the direct recognition of 
another’s emotion and then develop my account to include considerations of 
character and context in the following section. I believe that the basic recognition of 
emotion is the core case of emotional empathy. It still provides a minimal sense of 
what it’s like to be another person, since we replicate a feeling of their bodily 
patterns. Unlike other cases of empathy however, this is not really an imaginative 
project, or a sense in which I relocate myself in another’s position or character. 
When recognising someone’s emotion, I generally retain the perspective that he is 
separate from me. Also I do not wish to deny that in more developed empathic 
projects, we may begin with the characterisation and then get a feeling of the bodily 
pattern involved. Nonetheless, if we have direct access to the bodily pattern of 
another, it is this that we will ‘check’ our imaginative process against to see if it has 
been reliable. 
 
So how do we achieve this direct awareness of the other person’s emotion? The 
simple minded answer is that we just see the emotion in the facial expression or 
bodily movements of the other person, or hear it in the tone of their voice. It is most 
faithful to the phenomenology of emotion recognition that the way these expressions 
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are presented to me in my experience is not as causal correlates of the emotional 
state, but rather as the emotional state itself externalized.4 It just doesn’t seem that 
the emotions of others are hidden (at least not always) as is sometimes assumed by 
theories of mind reading. Accordingly, it doesn’t seem like I have to decode of infer 
the emotion from the facial expression of another, where for example, a down-turned 
mouth ‘means’ sadness and an upturned one ‘means’ happiness.  
 
Inferring emotions from facial expressions would be similar to verbal reporting 
because it does not require any sense of how the emotion feels in order to recognise it. 
Even if I had never felt sadness or happiness myself, I could come to learn that 
certain causal inputs typically result in down-turned mouths, reports of “I feel sad” 
and various behavioural outputs like inactivity or crying.5 However, beyond the most 
basic emotional states, the visual (or vocal) expression of an emotion can be 
extremely complex and subtle. It would be very difficult to recognise many 
expressions as a clear sign of any emotional state without getting a feeling of the 
bodily pattern associated with them. This is true both in the sense that without a 
feeling of the bodily pattern, we are unlikely even to recognise many emotions, as 
well as the sense in which we cannot help but associate a bodily pattern with the 
perceived expression. 
 
So the view I wish to develop here is that our brains are organised such that they  
non-inferentially associate the visually and audibly perceived expressions of 
emotions with their corresponding bodily patterns. This association requires three 
                                                     
4
 This idea is also defended by J. L. Austin (1979). 
5
 This may in fact be how autistic subjects recognise emotions, and hence explain why they are so bad 
at it. 
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distinctive stages; first the visual or audible data must be perceived as patterns of 
bodily movement. Second, the subject must either imitate, or mirror at a neural level, 
the movement that he perceives. Finally, this imitation or mirroring must arouse the 
subject to some minimal extent, allowing them to recognise the emotion that the 
other expresses. Altogether this constitutes a simulation process, whereby we 
recognise the emotional state of another by replicating it in ourselves. This account is 
therefore allied to the Simulation Theory, which is a theory that we understand the 
minds of other by taking on pretend versions of their beliefs and desires (see 
following section). 
 
In order to see what motivates my account of emotion recognition, it is perhaps best 
to examine the stages involved in reverse order. Why for instance, should we think 
that recognising the emotion of another requires the emotional arousal of the 
empathiser? There are several reasons we can appeal to here: Firstly, if no arousal 
takes place, it is difficult to see what else could provide an appreciation of the bodily 
pattern of another person. If, as I claim, we are truly getting a feeling of the bodily 
pattern of another person, and given we don’t directly receive the sensations of 
others, what else could provide the phenomenology of the other’s feeling? Even if 
we employed a memory of our own past emotions here, recreating the felt quality of 
a bodily pattern would require at least a neural recreation of arousal. 
 
On the positive side, we know that it is possible to be aroused by another person’s 
emotional state purely by observing it. There are cases of emotional contagion in 
which simply observing another person undergoing an emotional state can cause the 
same emotion to be aroused in oneself, even when one is not aware of the cause of 
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the original subject’s emotion. Consider for example the infectious panic of a crowd, 
or laughing when those around you are laughing, despite not knowing the reason in 
either case (cf. Hatfield et al. 1994). Moreover if we can be aroused by the emotional 
states of other people, then we would also expect that such arousal would allow the 
recognition of that state, just as we are able to recognise our own emotional states. 
Hence to a large extent, emotional contagion and the recognition of our own 
emotions could already provide most of the mechanisms we need for empathy. It 
would certainly be surprising if empathy did not make use of these available 
processes. 
 
Of course, these cases could not be completely similar to empathy because when we 
empathise, we recognise the emotion as belonging to the other person, not ourselves. 
As I described above, phenomenally we seem to perceive the emotion in the other 
person’s body. Yet if the empathiser’s arousal is tracking the emotional state of the 
other, then we should expect it to represent the arousal as a property of what causes it, 
as described by Dretske’s theory of representation. Equally, if the empathic process 
is initiated with the explicit goal of determining the other’s emotional state, then it is 
reasonable to suppose the results of that process will be imputed to the other person. 
So the story we are developing here is that we have at least a minimal level of 
emotional arousal, which because it is set up to track the emotional state of another 
person, we don’t perceive as belonging to ourselves, but rather projectively perceive 
as belonging to the other person. This triggers a non-inferential judgement that we 
just see the emotion in the face or hear it in their voice. Moreover, since within this 
context the empathiser’s arousal accurately and reliably tracks the emotion of the 
other, it is a veridical perception of the other’s emotion. 
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Finally, the most conclusive reason for the connection between arousal and empathic 
recognition comes from empirical evidence that when people become unable to 
experience a particular emotion, they develop a corresponding inability to recognise 
that emotion in others. In chapter one I mentioned the case of ‘S’ who lost the ability 
to feel fear as well as recognise the expression of fear in others (Damasio 2000: 
62-65). A similar inability to feel disgust and recognise it in others has also been 
observed in patients with Huntington’s disease (Goldman & Sripada 2005). 
 
In addition, some of the best evidence comes from studies of subjects suffering from 
Parkinson’s disease, a disorder that affects the brain’s production of the 
neurotransmitter dopamine. Since levels of dopamine rise when engaging in 
aggressive behaviour, this neurotransmitter has been linked with the capacity for 
feeling anger. As such it has been noted that when Parkinson’s patients stop taking 
L-Dopa, the drug that enables dopamine production to be restored, they 
correspondingly lose the ability both to be angry as well as to recognise that emotion 
in others (Lawrence et al. 2006). Being able to selectively turn on and off both the 
arousal and recognition of anger by regulating one specific neurotransmitter strongly 
entails that it is a necessary pre-requisite of both phenomena, and hence that they 
share neural processes. 
 
Yet despite these considerations, it might still be objected that when we recognise the 
emotions of others we just don’t seem to feel aroused, at least in most cases. 
However, this objection assumes too strong an idea of arousal. Firstly, arousal need 
only be of a highly attenuated nature. There might only be the beginnings of muscle 
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tension, expressive movements, or other somatic changes. Alternatively we can 
appeal to Damasio’s as-if loop, which I described in chapter one, whereby the brain 
makes a map of the bodily pattern in the absence of any actual bodily changes. It 
may only be necessary for the brain to ‘plan’ to engage in the bodily changes or 
expressive behaviours involved in that emotional state to trigger the emotional 
arousal. This modeling of the bodily changes could also trigger associations of 
previous experiences of that emotional state. Finally as I described above, any 
feeling of emotion should be imputed to the person we observe. Hence provided the 
emotional arousal is fairly limited, we would expect that it would not be consciously 
attributed to oneself. Then on those occasions when empathy results in a stronger 
level of arousal this could simply lead us to attribute the emotion both to the other 
and ourselves. 
 
So we are gradually developing a picture of how empathic recognition can occur, in 
which limited arousal, or a neural model of the bodily pattern allows the emotion of 
the other to be recognised. Moving backwards through the process we should now 
explain how exactly this arousal comes about. Arousal requires that some of the 
same bodily changes (or a neural plan of those changes) that are going on in the other 
person be replicated in the empathiser. In addition, this process must be triggered by 
the perception of the other person. It is clear then that the empathiser must imitate 
those bodily changes that he is able to perceive in the other person. The most obvious 
perceivable changes will be the expressive behaviours of the other, such as their 
posture, bodily gestures and facial expressions. As I argued in the previous section, if 
the empathiser adopts these behaviours, this will generate a range of bodily changes 
that are characteristic of the overall emotional pattern. These in turn could trigger the 
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internal bodily changes that usually accompany those expressive behaviours. 
However whether or not these internal bodily changes are also imitated, the imitation 
of expressive behaviours should generate sufficient arousal to allow recognition of 
the emotional state. 
 
It has been observed that adult humans tend to tense the muscles required to perform 
an action when viewing another person performing that action (Fadiga et al. 1995). 
There is also subtle activation of people’s facial muscles when perceiving emotional 
expressions (Dimberg et. al 2000: 86-89, cited in Damasio 2004: 312). But how 
exactly is this imitation achieved? It is necessary that the visual or audible data of the 
other person’s behaviour must be somehow converted into motor plans for producing 
those same behaviours. It is also evident that humans have the capacity for this from 
birth, since it has been observed that infants are able to imitate facial expressions 
such as tongue protrusions within an hour of birth (Meltzoff & Moore 1983: cited in 
Meltzoff and Gopnik 1996). 
 
Since infants cannot see their own faces, this indicates an innate capacity to associate 
the proprioceptive sense of moving the muscles in the face with a presentation of that 
movement visually. This association primes the imitative action, which then takes 
several attempts to achieve. If imitation takes several attempts, the infant also 
requires a means to recognise whether imitation has been successfully achieved or 
not. This requires some representation to be held which incorporates both visual and 
proprioceptive aspects of the action. So when attempting the action, a motor plan 
uses the representation to predict what should be perceived and this is matched 
against the perception of what actually happens (cf. Hurley 2005). 
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There has also been an empirical discovery about what could ground these imitative 
tendencies. The existence of ‘mirror neurons’ has been observed in the brains of 
monkeys (and so presumably exist in humans as well). Mirror neurons have aroused 
a great deal of interest because they fire both when the monkey performs an action 
and when it perceives another monkey performing that same action (Gallese & 
Goldman 1998). Marcel Kinsbourne (2004) argues that what is happening here is 
that mirror neurons are involved in representing the action neutral of any particular 
perspective, and then another part of the brain must mark that action as belonging 
either to oneself or another (Hurley 2005 makes a similar argument). Where this 
action is of an expressive type then, it may be that we get an immediate sense of 
emotion regardless of who it belongs to and only at a later stage distinguish whether 
it belongs to oneself or another. 
 
Mirror neurons indicate a neural level of action mirroring, allowing the perceiver to 
recreate the motor plans of the other person. As such, mirror neurons most likely 
ground a person’s capacity to actually imitate the other’s actions. Assuming these 
mirror neurons are present from birth, they should also ground the innate imitative 
tendencies we see in infants. However, forming a motor plan of another’s visually or 
aurally perceived behaviour requires a translation of that information into a form that 
can be directly mirrored. One does not directly mirror the visual look of a person but 
a first person sense of behavioural movement. 
 
The fact that our own behavioural movements are presented to us in multimodal 
form can help explain how we make the same association when perceiving the 
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behaviour of others. We do not only see as well as feel our own bodily movements, 
we also hear as well as feel our own vocalisations. Moreover, our perception of the 
world is generally geared towards multimodal presentation. Physical movements, as 
well as the textures of surfaces are often presented to us visually, audibly and in 
tactile form. 
 
It is also known that the senses can influence each other in our recognition of objects. 
It has been observed for instance that when subjects are presented with a single 
visual flash accompanied by two audible beeps, or two tactile taps, they have a 
corresponding impression of two visual flashes. The illusion even persists when 
subjects know that only a single flash is presented, suggesting that it is a feature of 
early stages of perceptual processing (Violentyev, Shimojo & Shams 2005). 
 
A more extreme example of the connection between modalities is the phenomenon of 
synaesthesia, where subjects report sensations of colours when hearing sounds, or 
shapes when tasting food. These multimodal stimulations are fairly rare, however 
certain ‘pseudo’ synaesthetic associations seem to be universal. For instance, it is 
common to link a high sounding note with a spatially high location. In one test of 
this association, Vilayanur Ramachandran had people look at two pictures, one 
similar to an inkblot and the other like a piece of shattered glass and asked which one 
was called “bouba” and which called “kiki.” He found that 98% of people named the 
inkblot “bouba” and the jagged picture “kiki”. He says: 
 
Perhaps that is because the gentle curves of the amoebalike figure 
metaphorically mimic the gentle undulations of the sound “bouba” as 
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represented in the hearing centers in the brain as well as the gradual 
inflection of the lips as they produce the curved “boo-baa” sound. In 
contrast, the waveform of the sound “kiki” and the sharp inflection of the 
tongue on the palate mimic the sudden changes in the jagged visual shape. 
The only thing these two kiki features have in common is the abstract 
property of jaggedness that is extracted somewhere in the vicinity of the 
TPO, [an area of the cortex at a junction between the temporal, parietal 
and occipital lobes][...] In a sense, perhaps we are all closet synaesthetes. 
(Ramachandran & Hubbard 2003) 
 
Of particular relevance here, Antonio Damasio (2000) also describes experiments 
where subjects spontaneously described the movements of a chip moving on a screen 
in emotional terms: 
 
Some jagged fast movements will appear ‘angry’, harmonious but 
explosive jumps will look ‘joyous’, recoiling motions will look ‘fearful.’ 
A video that depicts several geometric shapes moving about at different 
rates and holding varied relationships elicits attributions of emotional 
states from normal adults and even children. The reason why you can 
anthropomorphise the chip or an animal so effectively is simple: emotion, 
as the word indicates, is about movement, about externalized behaviour, 
about certain orchestrations of reactions to a given cause, within a given 
environment. (Damasio 2000: 70)6 
                                                     
6
 Damasio also notes that damage to the amygdala inhibits the ability to attribute emotions to visual 
patterns. The patients instead describe them in an “accurate, matter of fact manner” (Damasio 2000: 
343-344 ft. 21). 
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Thus there is good evidence for all sorts of reciprocal connections between the sense 
modalities. Moreover, the different forms of sensory information can all be reduced 
to a sense of movement or shape, neutral between any particular form of presentation. 
This reduction, or convergence of sensory data is not achieved by any additional 
neural module. Although the brain is organised into linear columns of neurons that 
perform the various stages of sensory processing, there are also lateral connections 
between modalities at every stage. As such there is a continuous bi-directional flow 
of information within both these linear and lateral streams. The apparent result is that 
the input from different sense modalities is integrated right from the beginning of 
processing, not as a final stage. 
 
There is also evidence that the brain prioritises multimodal stimulation. Receiving 
stimulus from two modalities at once results in greater activation in both of the areas 
responsible for dealing with each kind of sensory input of its own. In addition, some 
individual neurons in the prefrontal cortex function solely to register the fact of 
coincident visual and auditory stimuli or visual, auditory and tactile stimuli (Aou et 
al., 1983, Tanila et al., 1992). This prioritisation is hardly surprising since the brain is 
adapted to deal with real objects and events in the world, which tend to possess 
multiple sensory aspects. 
 
So overall, it seems that our ability to empathise with another person’s emotion is 
grounded in the brain’s multimodal connections, which interpret the various sensory 
information as patterns of movement. The third-personal presentation of movement 
then triggers a first-personal imitation or neural mirroring of this movement. 
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Imitating the movement, or even just forming a motor plan to do so then results in 
the arousal of the observer. Furthermore, it should be noted that although this 
simulation process is triggered automatically, it is not always done unconsciously. 
This is where the recognition of emotions is distinct from emotional contagion. Both 
processes involve getting the feeling of another’s bodily patterns. However 
emotional contagion is caused by the unconscious mirroring of another person’s 
emotional behaviour which then arouses the same emotion in oneself, though the 
self-conscious reasons we then ascribe for that emotion may well differ (Hatfield et 
al., 1994). Emotional recognition in contrast is usually conscious and as a result we 
may well inhibit the tendency towards behavioural mirroring. 
 
For this reason, recognising another person’s emotion does not usually overtake one 
with that emotion. It also means that although we get a feeling of the emotional state, 
we experience that feeling as belonging to the other person and not oneself. Hence 
when I get the direct phenomenal impression of another person’s feeling of anger, I 
need not necessarily feel that I am angry myself. My overriding feeling could be one 
of fear, which I experience at the same time (and as a result of) getting a sense of the 
anger of the other. The existence of an as-if loop would explain this capacity well, 
since the as-if loop could process the simulated bodily patterns of another at the same 
time as our ordinary bodily changes generate another set of patterns. Thus we are 
able to hold a feeling of another person’s emotion quite separately from our own 
thoughts and feelings. In his novel Enduring Love, Ian McEwan describes a vivid 
example of this. A woman experiencing intense grief and jealousy confronts the 
main character. He says: 
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I felt that empty, numbing neutrality that comes when one person in the 
room appears to monopolise all the available emotion. (McEwan 
Enduring Love 1998: 112) 
 
Despite the fairly metaphorical tone of ‘monopolise’ here, which implies that 
emotion is the kind of physical stuff that might be shared out amongst people, this 
description seems to accord well with our phenomenal experiences of empathy. One 
can have a sense of another person’s emotion whilst simultaneously ascribing a 
different feeling to oneself (in this case a numb feeling, or just no feeling at all). 
 
Imaginative Empathy 
Having acquired a feeling of the other person’s bodily pattern, a more complete 
understanding of their emotional state will require some idea of the situation that the 
bodily pattern is tracking. An appreciation of the emotional feeling should intuitively 
suggest some likely candidates; anything that fits the core relational theme 
represented by that state. Alternatively, the shared social context may immediately 
provide such information. The other may be reacting to something I have said, or 
some object in the common environment, to which I can track his gaze. In this way, 
if I am already ‘tuned in’ to the cognitive state of my friend, then emotional 
responses are likely to be relevant, and interpretable as such, in just the same way as 
if my friend verbally communicated with me (cf. Sober and Wilson 1993). So the 
general strategy we are developing here is one where I constantly track the emotional 
state of the other, and then search for ‘appropriate’ elicitors of emotion to fit them. In 
this case, my own current reactions, previous experiences, or general theoretical 
knowledge of emotional causes will be important. 
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Of course, emotional expressions are not always deliberate in the way that verbal 
utterances are, and without this communicative intent behind them, the defeasibility 
of the ‘most relevant interpretation’ increases. It is quite possible to be talking with 
my friend about one thing, whilst he thinks of quite another emotionally eliciting 
situation. Moreover, deliberate emotional expressions are often less than sincere. So 
although the emotional state may be presented to me directly, we do not always take 
such information as given without the kind of supporting evidence supplied by an 
appropriate causal reason. If an appropriate reason is immediately available then we 
may well be satisfied. But if no such reason is obvious we are inclined to probe for 
something more personal to the other, such as some private thought or an 
idiosyncrasy of character (like a phobia). 
 
At this point we begin to see another important strategy for understanding another’s 
emotional state. In this alternative case, I simulate pretend versions of the desires or 
beliefs of the other and then see what emotional feelings result in consequence. As I 
mentioned in the previous section, this is the idea behind Simulation Theory (e.g. 
Currie & Ravenscroft 2002). Here the pretend beliefs and desires are held ‘offline’ in 
that they do not affect my actual beliefs and desires. However I am still using my 
own background beliefs to help draw inferences from these simulated states. In 
general, the strategy of Simulation Theory will be of most relevance in situations 
when the other is not actually present, or if I possess information that the other is 
about to gain, and I wish to predict their emotional reaction. Here we begin to 
develop a more sophisticated empathic process. 
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However, it is not clear whether this strategy is likely to replace the first strategy 
described in more immediate interpersonal circumstances. Take for example emotion 
recognition tests where we are asked to match a picture of a facial expression with 
one of four possible descriptions. Is it the case that you get a feeling the emotion and 
then check each of the four descriptions to see which one matches, or do you 
simulate a set of beliefs and desires and then see if it results in the facial expression? 
There may not be a definite answer to whether the reason or the feeling comes first in 
the process. On the one hand, since we are often aware of the reason for our 
emotions prior to actually feeling them, we may be likely to simulate a reason and 
then check the results of that simulation against the picture. On the other hand, the 
direct recognition of emotional feelings is automatic. 
 
Yet either way, a loop could be set up where once I am aware of the feeling, I refer 
back to the reason to gauge any further responses. As I have emphasised several 
times, emotions are dynamic processes that function to drive sustained behavioural 
responses. These responses are likely to change the subject’s relation with the object 
of emotion, which are in turn likely to change the emotional reaction. For instance, if 
I flee from a predator, my feelings of fear should eventually turn to relief if my 
actions have been successful. 
 
However as our understanding of the emotion of the other becomes more 
sophisticated, the feeling of the emotion becomes more of an end result than a 
starting point. Although the basic recognition of another’s emotion requires a first 
person simulation process, the feeling we sense is immediately projected or 
perceived in the other person’s body. In contrast fully empathic processes require the 
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empathiser to centrally imagine being the other person in a far more radical way. It 
may not be enough to simply imagine myself, with all my current beliefs and 
attitudes, in a situation similar to that of the other. Rather, I may also include in my 
simulation a sense of the background character traits, or long-term emotional 
dispositions of the other, that will subtly affect my interpretation of any emotional 
feeling, and more significantly affect any resulting behaviour. Thus the project of 
imagining ‘being in another’s shoes’ can incorporate various degrees of detail. 
 
Overall, when understanding the emotion of another person, we can stipulate that the 
following series of accounts should show a gradual increase of complexity, from a 
basic feeling of the other’s bodily pattern to a complete empathic simulation. If this 
is a fair description of the various stages of understanding then we see that additional 
information provides a refinement of the initial feeling-based understanding, rather 
than a radical shift: 
 
I sense that: 
• Fred is feeling annoyed, (via facial, vocal or postural expression). 
• Fred is feeling annoyed due not getting what he wants, (core relational 
theme). 
• Fred is feeling annoyed because he missed his train, (particular object of 
emotion). 
• Fred is feeling annoyed because he missed his train, but only by a few 
seconds, (focus of particular object). 
• Fred is feeling annoyed because he only just missed his train and he had an 
important meeting to get to, (background non-psychological context). 
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• Fred is feeling annoyed because he only just missed his train, and he had an 
important meeting and because he is generally an irritable sort of person 
(character traits). 
 
Yet is it possible that some additional information could completely shift our 
understanding of the nature of Fred’s emotion? Suppose: 
 
• Fred is a Martian who expresses profound joy with facial expressions similar 
to those we interpret as annoyance. 
 
Or alternatively: 
 
• Fred knows that I am trying to understand his emotional state and is really 
pretending to be annoyed in order to undermine my efforts. 
 
It seems that we cannot rule out cases such as these and that in order to engage in 
empathic projects, we must assume that the other shares some common ‘form of life’ 
or is not radically deceiving us (cf. Goldie 2000: 183). However, I do not think that 
these possibilities should overly trouble us, since they are general epistemological 
worries that would undermine any process of understanding another person. 
Empathy is not a process that is likely to deliver certain judgements of the emotional 
states of others. It is a skill that is gradually developed throughout life, and which 
improves the more contact we have with the person with whom we empathise. 
Accordingly, any ‘knowledge’ we gain of the emotions of the other will be of a 
highly defeasible nature. 
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So overall, the basic capacity to recognise the emotions of other can then be 
supplemented imaginatively with more theory like considerations that take into 
account the situation to which the emotion is directed, as well as the background and 
character of the other person. The reverse is also possible, where I begin by 
considering the emotionally eliciting situation and then see what feeling results. 
Given a perceptual theory of emotions, empathy is a lot like any other process of 
imaginative perspective shifting. Only instead of trying to see from another person’s 
eyes the most salient object in the environment, I can feel from the perspective of 
their body and character the most salient aspect of the situation to their well-being.  
 
This general skill will be vital when explaining how people can adopt each other’s 
viewpoint in acts of joint attention and approach the environment as a joint subject, 
which I describe in chapter six. The perception and dependency of one’s bodily 
arousal on another’s involved in empathy is also vital for the existence of shared 
emotions. However, in this chapter the ability to recognise or understand another’s 
state has been predicated on replicating those states. In contrast shared emotions will 
involve a coordination of potentially different individual states. 
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Chapter Three: Music and Emotion
 
 
The aim of this chapter is explain how music expresses emotions. A considerable 
amount of research has already been devoted to this question both historically and in 
recent years, and fairly exhaustive analyses of the various theories can be found in 
Budd (1985) and Davies (1994). So although I provide an overview of the problem 
and its proposed solutions here, I focus my attention on a few of the most prominent 
current theories. In particular those of Derek Matravers, Stephen Davies and Bruce 
Vermazen. 
 
Overall, there are three main types of theory which deal with the relation between 
emotions and music; expression, arousal and resemblance theories. These theories 
principally differ according to where they locate the emotion expressed. That is, 
either in the responses of the listener, the connection the music bears to the composer, 
or in the music itself. My account is a development and synthesis of these theories 
rather than a radical rethink. My main concern is to use the theory of emotions that I 
outlined in chapters one and two to provide a framework that unifies the ways we 
encounter emotions in music with the ways we encounter emotions in more everyday 
contexts. In doing so, I hope to emphasise what I see as the especially intimate 
connection between music and emotional states. 
 
Ultimately I argue for the kind of direct connection between music and emotion that 
is summarised by the slogan, ‘the music sounds the way the emotion feels’ (Pratt   
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1931, Budd 1995).1 However, I do not agree that consciously tracking a resemblance 
between sound and feeling is necessary to recognising the emotional character of 
music, as might be implied by the above slogan. Rather, I argue that our recognitions 
are best characterised as imagining or having an illusion that a person is in some 
manner responsible for the musical emotion. As such, my claim is that our 
recognition of emotion in music is causally similar to our empathic activities. Given 
that my analysis of empathy is based on the neural simulation of bodily patterns, we 
might accordingly call this a simulation theory of musical expression. 
 
Now I do not wish to commit myself to the view that when people recognise 
emotions in music, they are necessarily able to articulate what emotion it is that they 
perceive. It even seems possible to unconsciously recognise the expressive qualities 
of music, or at least respond in a manner that indicates sensitivity to its expressive 
qualities. So it is important to distinguish between the causal basis of recognising 
emotions in music and the conscious experience of recognising emotions in music. In 
this chapter I mostly focus on the causal story and then finish by describing the 
minimal form of conscious experience that recognition tends to lead to. This involves 
a basic sense of a person’s body either attached to, or embodied by the music. In 
chapter four I then elaborate on the conscious experience of musical expression. This 
is part of a wider discussion on whether the music really has the expressive qualities 
that we perceive in it. 
 
 
                                                     
1
 Note that this indicates a connection to the phenomenal experience of emotion rather than the bodily 
patterns that generate that feeling. Since however, phenomenal feelings directly track bodily patterns 
this should not preclude the idea that music equally captures bodily patterns. The main contrast here is 
with resemblance theories that claim that music sounds the way emotions appear (e.g. Davies 1994). 
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Initial Evidence 
Before I discuss the main theories of musical expression, it is useful to get a clear 
grasp of the kind of thing we are talking about (as much as that is possible 
pre-theoretically). The ways we ascribe emotions to music might at first appear to be 
quite subjectively variable. Yet when general emotion labels are used (such as sad, 
happy, angry etc.) there is often much agreement as to which emotions are being 
expressed. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that one person would characterise a piece 
of music as joyful where another characterises it with a quite contrary emotion, such 
as sadness. It is more likely to be in the details that the differences between listeners 
will show up. The variability of responses to music is one of the issues that I discuss 
in chapter four. For now however, my aim is simply to point out that at some basic 
level of description there is sufficient unanimity in response to indicate that the 
musical expression of emotion is a real phenomenon. 
 
Empirical investigations into musical expression confirm this idea. In one study by 
Patrick Juslin (1997), professional guitarists were instructed to play a familiar 
melody (When The Saints) according to different emotional interpretations; either 
happy, sad, angry, fearful or without expression. Changes to the pitches of the tune 
were not permitted, but the performers could use significant variations in dynamics, 
articulation and tempo. Despite the melodic restriction, listeners were able to 
accurately judge (using scales of intensity) which emotion the performer had 
intended to express with a success rate comparable to decoding ordinary vocal 
expressions of emotion. This effect was also independent of any musical training on 
the part of the listener. Interestingly, most listeners did not apply the non-expressive 
label to even the deliberately neutral performance. Rather people simply judged this 
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performance as low on each scale of emotion. This may be a result of a bias in the 
experimental design towards applying emotional labels, but could also reflect a 
general expressive quality inherent in the melody itself. 
 
The above experiment supports our intuition that the average untrained listener is 
able to recognise distinct emotions in musical pieces. Of course, these kinds of 
forced choice studies push the listener into treating the music in emotional terms. In 
an ordinary listening situation, the associations that a listener may make could also 
include imagery or narrative events. However it is clear that listeners often freely 
locate emotional content in musical works and that at least on some occasions, 
composers write their music with the specific intent that it should be understood in 
this way.2 Requiems typically demand a sad emotional character for instance. In 
these cases the emotional character of the music may well give meaning and unity to 
a work. Thus if a listener does not recognise the emotional character they may 
seriously miss the point. 
 
In addition it is not as if works of music vaguely remind us of some emotion. Rather 
they often seem to strike at the very heart of the emotional experience (particularly in 
great works). As one is carried along by the progress of the music one also feels 
carried along by the development of an emotional state. This is the particular 
expressive advantage that music enjoys over art forms like painting or sculpture in 
that both music and emotions are temporally developing processes. However it is not 
just the broad developmental aspects that music seems to capture, but also the minute 
                                                     
2
 In a questionnaire of 135 expert musicians from England, Sweden and Italy, 99% agreed that music 
expressed emotions (cited in Juslin 2003: 291). Hence in general musicians think of music in 
emotional terms, whether or not they seek to exploit that capacity in their work. 
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nuances of the emotional state. For instance, Peretz et al. (1998) have reported that 
an ordinary adult listener can distinguish whether a piece of music is happy or sad 
within a quarter of a second. To a sensitive listener, a single chord is often sufficient 
for expressive effect. 
 
Yet despite the manifest immediacy and intensity of the expressive character of 
music, it is not the case that a piece of music is automatically recognised by every 
listener as having the emotional quality that it has. There are cases when the 
emotional character may seem to creep up on us unconsciously. For instance, we 
may be watching a film in which the hero is heading into danger and find ourselves 
gripped with tension. We may then realise that the background music has been 
generating this sense of danger. Moreover, it is also possible that a listener just does 
not recognise any emotion in the music. Some listeners may be simply insensitive, 
but it also seems possible for listeners to switch listening styles, concentrating at one 
moment on purely technical features of the music and at another on its expressive 
character (cf. Cook 1990). 
 
Thus this initial review points to some of the features of musical experience that a 
successful theory must account for. The directness and intensity with which music 
expresses emotions indicates that it expresses something that the listener hears as an 
actual occurrent emotion rather than merely a symbol or description of an emotional 
state. This raises a conceptual problem because emotions are the kind of things that 
can only belong to sentient beings, not sounds. From one perspective, an abstract set 
of sounds is not even remotely like the bodily evaluation of the impact of the 
environment upon an individual. Hence as much as possible, the successful theory of 
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expression should explain exactly what are the properties of music, and what are the 
characteristics of the listening experience, that enable this strange connection with 
the emotions. The theory should explain the immediacy of musical expression yet 
also reveal why the effect may not be automatically recognised. It must allow for the 
near universality of some judgements of emotional content yet also show where 
subjective differences may arise. And it should hopefully do this in a way that makes 
sense of why humans have developed the capacity to hear music as expressive at all. 
 
Realist Expression Theory 
As mentioned above, my own theory of the connection between music and emotions 
is derived from my analyses of the principle alternatives offered; the expression, 
arousal and resemblance theories. In my view it is not that these different theories are 
mutually exclusive of one another, except in their more specific formulations. In fact, 
I argue that the basic resemblance between music and emotion is what can cause 
listeners to be aroused, and allow the composer or performer to successfully express 
their emotions in music. However, I do not agree that the listener necessarily 
recognises the emotional content of music in terms of recognising their own arousal, 
noting a resemblance, or having ideas about the composer. 
 
First of all then, let us look at the expression theory: In one sense, any theory 
concerning the expressive content of music must be an ‘expression theory’, so in 
order to avoid any confusion, I call the theory I present at this point a ‘realist’ 
expression theory. This is because the central claim is that the emotional content of 
the music is there as a result of the actual emotional state of the composer. (We may 
also include the emotional state of the performer or the conductor as possible 
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alternatives.) So the realist expression theory attempts to solve the problem of who it 
is that owns the psychological state perceived in the music by identifying it as the 
state of the composer. This seems a reasonable choice if one must be made, since the 
composer is usually responsible for the expressive character of the work. Hence the 
realist expression theory states that when we hear a piece of music as emotionally 
expressive, we recognise the activity of the composer in conveying their emotion in 
the music. Now it is unclear whether the composer must intend to express their 
emotion in the music or whether it can happen by more natural or automatic means. 
For the moment, let us assume that the composer intends the music to express his 
emotion. Then, as much as it is possible for the listener to recognise the emotion, the 
composer has been successful in their expressive intent.3 Technically, expression 
would be achieved in the music even if there were no listener, but by recognising that 
expression the listener completes an act of emotional communication. 
 
Whilst works of music do seem to have quasi-linguistic attributes in their ability to 
express emotions, there are several obvious problems with the realist expression 
theory. Clearly works of music retain their expressive content in the physical absence 
of their composers, and so the realist expression theorist must mean that the 
composer has somehow managed to capture a record of their emotional state in the 
music. But then in order to reveal that emotional record, is it really necessary for the 
listener to recognise the past emotional state of the composer? This seems unlikely 
because there is often no way of knowing whether the composer was in fact 
undergoing the emotion expressed at the time of composition. We know that 
                                                     
3
 Cf. the expression theories of Benedetto Croce or R. G. Collingwood. I attack a general realist 
expression theory here rather than any specific version, since I explore both Croce’s and 
Collingwood’s theories in detail in chapter five. 
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composers produce their works in all kinds of ways and for all sorts of reasons. An 
expressive work may be motivated by the desire for fame or money rather than an 
inspired outpouring of emotion. In addition, it is not unknown for composers to write 
happy music when they are sad and sad music when they are happy. 
 
An alternative formulation of this theory is that perhaps the composer didn’t simply 
pour out an occurrent emotion but rather remembered one that he once had and then 
expressed that in the music. It might be as Wordsworth (1802) said of poetry, a case 
of emotion ‘recollected in tranquillity’. In this case, it may still be necessary to 
recognise the expressive intent or imagination of the composer. This view has some 
attractions because if the composer has deliberately set out to capture an emotion in 
the music, he may well call to mind the way that the emotion felt and use this as a 
model on which to base the music. Yet it seems likely that the emotion in this case, 
particularly when stripped of all the details of its context situation, will be heavily 
idealised and transfigured by the demands of the music. An initial emotional impetus 
may be taken over by purely musical concerns, such as developing a theme or 
achieving tonal closure. In the end, it even looks like we must give up the necessity 
of the composer’s expressive intent, because it seems possible that a composer could 
produce a work expressive of emotion as the result of complete serendipity. He 
might only have been interested in the application of a musical rule, or a work based 
on chance decisions, which quite unintentionally produces emotional qualities as 
well. 
 
If an expressive piece of music can be created merely by the systematic application 
of a musical rule, then the realist expression theory is in real trouble. Moreover, 
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given that we are analysing musical expression from the perspective of the listener, 
must the listener have any idea at all about how the music was produced? Probably 
in order to hear it as music the listener should be aware that the sound is the product 
of human agency (though I do not have the space here to go into the definition of art). 
Yet perhaps to hear it as emotionally expressive the listener need not be aware that a 
human produced the music. Maybe the listener could regard it as a natural 
phenomenon in the same way as we are able to see willow trees as expressing 
sadness. The problem with this idea however is that we may well have to imagine 
some human agency behind the drooping of the willow trees in order to perceive 
them as sad. Once again we are brought back to the problem that if the music is 
heard as an actual occurrent emotion then there should be some person to whom it 
belongs.  
 
An alternative is that the listener could instead treat the music as the mere 
appearance of an emotion. I explore this below when I look at the resemblance 
theories of Davies and Kivy. For now however, let us hold on to the notion that some 
person must be expressing the emotion we hear in the music. If so, we are led to 
another alternative, which is to treat the expression of the composer as a useful 
fiction. That is, the listener must imagine that the composer is expressing their 
emotion (or emotional intent) in the music in order to hear it as expressive. So even 
though composition is often a meticulous and drawn out process, the music may be 
heard as if it is the spontaneous outpouring of emotion. In this case we would no 
longer be talking about a ‘realist’ expression theory in the strict sense, but rather an 
‘imagined’ expression theory. This theory seems far more plausible, and is very 
similar to the persona theory that I defend at the end of this chapter. However at this 
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stage it is worth noting that it does not seem necessary for the listener to imagine the 
composer or performer or anyone else actually responsible for producing the music. 
Once we give up control to listener to the extent that the imagined expressive theory 
allows, it is clear that the listener could imagine anyone they like spontaneously 
expressing the emotion in the music, even themselves. 
 
So even if the listener can imagine of the music that it is the expression of the 
composer’s (or performer’s or conductor’s) emotion, it is neither causally nor 
experientially necessary that the listener do so. In addition, we might argue that the 
listener’s perception of the music can only be treated as fictionally the direct 
expression of an emotion if it already possesses characteristics appropriate for such a 
treatment (cf. Davies 1994: 180-184). So we should be interested in finding out what 
characteristics of the music (or the listener) could trigger this imagination. Then once 
we have these, we might find that it is no longer necessary to appeal to a fictional 
person that expresses himself. It is with this in mind that we now proceed to the 
arousal and resemblance theories. 
 
Arousal Theory 
If the composer or performer is not the owner of the emotion expressed in the music, 
then perhaps it belongs to the listener instead. The listener is at least present on any 
occasion in which the emotional content is perceived. So maybe the listener is able to 
apply an emotional label to the music on the basis of his own emotional reaction to it. 
This is the view of arousal theory, of which one of the most sophisticated versions is 
offered by Derek Matravers in his book Art and Emotion (1998). His analysis of 
musical expression runs as follows: 
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[A] piece of music expresses an emotion e if it causes a listener to 
experience a feeling α, where α is the feeling component of the emotion it 
would be appropriate to feel (in the central case) when faced with a 
person expressing e. (Matravers 1998: 149) 
 
Matravers qualifies his analysis with the phrase ‘component of the emotion’ because 
he holds that feelings are only part of an emotional state. He subscribes to a broadly 
cognitivist theory in which a propositional attitude towards some situation, in 
combination with a phenomenal feeling, is necessary to distinguish one emotional 
state from another. According to the theory of emotions I presented in chapter one, 
feelings (as generated by bodily patterns) are sufficient for complete emotional states, 
so long as they tend to track the dynamic qualities of certain situations. Either way, 
the problem for any account of musical expression is that abstract instrumental music 
does not obviously provide any situation for the expressed emotion to be directed at. 
 
The key insight of the Matravers’ theory is to make an analogy between our reactions 
to emotionally expressive art and emotionally expressive people. In cases where we 
perceive that another person is undergoing an emotion, Matravers claims that we 
typically mirror their emotion or feel an emotion complementary to it. Against an 
idealised background (in which neither the context situation, nor the identity of other 
will make a difference to the way we react) certain felt responses are appropriate (or 
more central) to the expressions of certain emotions. For instance it is appropriate to 
feel sadness or pity in response to another’s sadness. Yet we can do this without 
having to take on the propositional attitude that is part of the other’s emotion. So in 
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Matravers’ view, I only respond with a feeling rather than a full emotion. But being 
aroused by this feeling is sufficient to cause a belief in me that the music is 
expressing whichever emotion that feeling is normally a response to when I 
encounter an expressive person. 
 
The difference between responses to expressive music and expressive people is that 
an expressive person possesses their emotion independently of another’s response to 
it. In contrast, the emotional qualities of music must be understood in terms of its 
capacity to arouse feelings in the listener. This capacity to arouse emotions is due to 
more basic properties of the music, which are not fully specified by Matravers. Yet 
whatever these properties are, their expressive quality is entirely dependent on the 
aroused response that they generate. Here it should be noted that Matravers’ theory 
(and arousalism in general) is a realist theory of emotion in music. As I discuss in the 
following chapter, realist theories claim that we should treat the expressive qualities 
of the music like a secondary quality. So like an object’s colour, the music is 
characterised as objectively possessing a dispositional property to cause a suitably 
sensitive listener, under suitably normal circumstances, to perceive it as having the 
emotional quality that it has (cf. Matravers 2003). But the way that the listener 
recognises the emotional quality of the music is in recognising their own felt 
response, not necessarily in being able to pinpoint which features of the music are 
responsible for their feeling. 
 
Since the feelings of the listener are logically distinct from the properties of the 
music that cause it, the arousalist account seems vulnerable to counter-examples in 
which anything that arouses the right sort of feelings may be seen as emotionally 
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expressive. For instance, if I am perturbed by a violinist’s horribly out-of-tune 
performance, is the music thereby expressive of pain or sorrow? Matravers rules out 
these cases on the grounds that the feeling is caused by a belief about the music 
rather than the music itself. So it is just like any straightforward emotional response 
to a situation in which (on the cognitivist view) a propositional attitude has caused a 
feeling. If we were to allow cases like these then we would be in the absurd position 
that late trains are expressive of anger because they arouse anger in us. Rather 
Matravers insists that, “[i]t is only feelings which are not simply components of an 
emotion that cause the belief that their apparent cause is expressive” (Matravers 1998: 
169). 
 
I criticise this response in depth below. But first we should note Matravers’ point that 
the music must cause the feeling in the right sort of way. That is, the feeling and the 
music should be intimately bound up in the consciousness of the listener, such that 
the feeling aroused is only sustained by continued attention and sensitivity to the 
organisational features of the music (Matravers 1998: 178-179). In order to maintain 
this intimacy between the music and the feeling, Matravers is led to claiming that the 
feeling must follow the stresses and strains aroused by the particular details of the 
music. This drives him towards a structural arousal theory such as that of Leonard B. 
Meyer (1956), who argues that music arouses emotions in us due to our acquaintance 
with various musical conventions (such as tonality). These conventions cause us to 
have expectations about how the music will continue at any given point, as well as 
what harmonies count as more or less stable. The idea is that the composer skillfully 
manipulates our expectations, (particularly of returning to a point of stability) 
frustrating them at one moment and satisfying them the next. This then arouses in us 
 99 
corresponding feelings of tension and release. The pattern of these tensions and 
resolutions then add up to the various different emotional states. 
 
Whilst his discussion of conventions in music is extremely insightful, and some 
distinctive effects of musical expectations have been empirically confirmed,4 there 
are a number of problems with Meyer’s theory. First of all, it seems that we could 
still appreciate the emotional character of a work that was completely predictable to 
us and so did not delay any expectations. If in response Meyer appealed to more 
imagined tensions, then we would no longer have a direct arousal theory, and would 
need some account of what features of the music dispose us to imagine these tensions 
(perhaps a resemblance theory of the kind I introduce below). Moreover, Meyer’s 
theory is not readily applicable to non-Western styles of music such as Javanese 
Gamelan, which don’t tend to involve any form of structural resolution. 
 
However the main problem with Meyer’s theory is that it is grounded in an overly 
simplistic view of emotional states. Let us grant that expectations are always aligned 
with bodily patterns of tension (which I doubt). Still it seems that the two elements of 
tension and release are insufficient to properly describe the most basic emotions, 
even if we restrict emotions to their temporal profiles. For instance, there is a 
difference between the emotions of fear and anger that is not fully captured by 
profiles of tension and release. Although difficult to describe in words, the way these 
                                                     
4
 See for instance Sloboda & Juslin (2001a: 91-93). One particularly strong effect that seems to result 
from musical expectations is the phenomena of musical ‘chills’ or ‘shivers down the spine’ when 
listening to music. This distinctive sensation most often occurs when the music is either approaching a 
peak of tension, or begins to release that tension. This phenomenon has been empirically verified by 
Blood & Zatorre (2001), who have shown that some listeners are reliably stimulated in this manner 
every time they hear certain passages of music. However, listeners differ according to which passages 
or pieces it is that reliably cause these sensations in them. 
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emotions feel involve different senses of heat, visceral texture, space and action. It 
seems that music has many more resources at its disposal to capture these qualities. 
 
Matravers does not demand that the feelings of the listener must stand in a 
completely isomorphic relation to the music (although he says that they tend to) and 
so he is not particularly damaged by these arguments. But without specifying exactly 
how the music arouses feelings, his theory still permits cases in which by closely 
following the music, a listener may have a feeling aroused without the music being 
genuinely expressive. So let us return to the example of feeling perturbed by the 
out-of-tune performance. Why is it necessary that this music must arouse the feeling 
via a belief about the music? The out-of-tune scraping on the violin may simply jar 
my feelings, arousing a sense of great unease, which in a central case would be an 
appropriate response to somebody expressing pain or great sorrow. Matravers cannot 
rule out this case by insisting that the jarring feeling is part of an emotion about the 
music, because it seems no more about the music than a case of feeling contentment 
when the theme returns at the end of a sonata. In one case the notes violate my 
intuitive sense of correct tuning. In the other the return of the theme satisfies my 
expectations that it would return. In either case the arousal is dependent on my sense 
of how the music should be, though the sonata example seems genuinely expressive 
of contentment. 
 
The problem is that the very same jarring feeling could be aroused in two people, one 
of whom recognises that it’s caused by the poor performance of the musician, and 
another who is completely unaware that the poor tuning is unintentional. Since this 
second listener’s feeling is not a component of a belief based emotion, the music 
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must be genuinely expressive of great sorrow. This might not be such an unwelcome 
consequence, since there are similar cases in which the sad character of a piece 
seems to derive from the hesitant and pathetically stumbling quality of the melody. 
However this possibility leads us to the absurd position that the familiar listener is 
wrong about the (non) expressive quality of the music, or else both listeners are right 
and we are left with an unfortunate degree in subjectivity in expressive judgements. 
This would seriously undermine the realist claims of Matravers’ theory. But it seems 
we cannot say whether the piece is truly bad rather than expressive of sorrow. Even 
though the familiar listener is more expert, it does not make him the more suitable 
listener without imposing unreasonable demands on what makes a suitable listener 
(i.e. to be already familiar with a work’s true emotional content before being able to 
judge its emotional content). So it seems that arousal is insufficient to guarantee that 
the piece is genuinely expressive of emotion, because the presence of an additional 
(true) belief can render the work inexpressive. 
 
Of course the most common criticisms of arousal theories attack the necessity of 
arousal for judging the expressive quality of music. Many critics complain that they 
are perfectly capable of recognising the emotional quality of a piece of music 
without actually being aroused by that emotion, or any other emotion complementary 
to it. Certainly we might admit that people can be aroused by music, but that it is far 
from saying that it is necessary for us to be aroused.5 It does not even seem to be the 
paradigm case of musical expression.  
                                                     
5
 For a review of evidence showing listeners’ arousal responses to music, see Scherer & Zentner 
(2001). Apart from direct self-reports, arousal can be detected by physiological responses and facial 
expressions (2001: 374-376), the tendency to remember autobiographical episodes of the same 
emotional type (2001: 373), as well as compatible self-evaluations (2001: 380). Yet none of these 
studies prove that arousal is necessary for all recognitions of emotions in music. Better evidence for 
this comes from cases where both the capacity for arousal and the ability to recognise emotions in 
music is lost, as in the anecdotal example given by James that I cited in chapter one, footnote three. 
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Matravers claims that arguments of this kind assume too strong an idea of arousal, as 
if the feeling must overwhelm the listener. Instead he says that merely an incipient 
feeling, the barest beginnings of feeling, is sufficient for arousal. Then in many cases 
the natural felt response of the listener is inhibited, or the listener is jaded by 
overexposure to the work. In these cases the listener is not in a suitable circumstance 
to properly judge the expressive character of the music. 
 
Yet it just does not seem plausible to me that the vast majority of listening 
experiences to music are unsuitable for proper appreciation. I agree with Davies 
when he says: 
 
Simply, there are many cases in which the listener attends to the work, is 
fully acquainted with the conventions of the work’s style, identifies the 
style and genre correctly, approaches the work when he is not jaded, or 
preoccupied, or tired, or distracted, but nevertheless in which the listener 
fails to feel the same emotion as that all experts, including himself, hear 
expressed in the work in question. (Davies 1994: 195) 
 
In response to this sort of objection, Matravers concedes that it is possible for the 
critic to have a non-aroused recognition of the emotional character of the work, 
perhaps when trying to discern how it achieves its expressive effect. He compares 
this to a doctor who recognises the pain of a patient but inhibits his natural 
sympathetic response for the sake of professional competence. Yet as Davies rightly 
complains, this analogy implies that thoughtful attention to music is an inhibitory 
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factor rather than a condition for an appropriate response (Davies 1994: 197). The 
arousalist cannot simply explain away the frequent lack of an aroused response in 
listeners by insisting that there must always be some inhibitory factor without 
making the theory unfalsifiable. 
 
However we should be clear about what it means to be aroused here because on the 
basis of the empirical evidence that I presented in chapter two it is necessary to be 
aroused by a neurally based simulation of an emotion in order to recognise that 
emotion in another person. Yet this arousal can occur quite unconsciously. If, as a 
result of our simulation, we recognise the emotion the other person is undergoing, it 
is usually experienced not as something we feel in ourselves, but as something 
belonging to the other person. If our recognition of the emotional content of music is 
like this, then we should similarly get a sense of the emotion belonging to the music. 
Since the listener’s arousal is supposed to track the expressive qualities of the music, 
it is perfectly intelligible by Dretske’s theory of representation that the perceptual 
state should represent the original cause, the music, as having the emotion rather than 
any of the intermediate stages involved. This is I think, phenomenologically accurate. 
Just as when we recognise emotions in people, we do not need to infer from their 
expressions to their ‘hidden’ inner feelings, but rather get a direct impression of the 
feeling in their face or body, so equally we get a direct impression of the emotion in 
the music. 
 
I argue below that our recognitions of emotions in music are indeed like our 
recognitions of emotions in people, so I think that Matravers is on the right track 
when he compares the two kinds of reaction. Yet it seems clear that feeling 
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personally aroused is not a necessary part of the experience of perceiving the 
emotional content of music. At most, arousal is just a necessary component of the 
process of simulation. 
 
Ultimately, both the realist expression and arousal theories fail to account for our 
recognition of emotion in music because in attempting to solve the problem of who 
possesses the emotion perceived, they focus on the people that surround the 
production of music rather than the music itself. As such these theories do not 
provide a very informative explanation of exactly what it is about the music that 
encourages its treatment in emotional terms. I think however, we should admit that 
non-conscious arousal is a necessary component of the causal process of recognising 
emotion in music. Yet in order to justify that story we need a fuller account of what it 
is about the music that triggers that arousal, and how exactly the emotional content 
of the music shows up in our experience. 
 
Resemblance 
Arousal theory claims that the music is sad because we respond in such a way. Yet 
maybe this gets things the wrong way round, and we should rather say that we 
sometimes respond with sadness because music can possess some of the same 
properties that sad people possess. Resemblance theories try to make sense of this 
perspective by showing that properties of the music resemble properties of the 
emotion. 
 
There are several types of resemblance theory according to what it is that music is 
said to resemble. One possibility is that music resembles the ways in which humans 
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give expression to their emotions. Since bodily gestures and vocal utterances can be 
perceived as expressive of emotions, then things that seem like bodily gestures or 
vocal utterances could also be perceived as expressive of emotions. This is the view 
of Peter Kivy and Stephen Davies. Kivy and Davies both solve the problem of who 
possesses the emotion heard in the music by drawing a distinction between an action 
that expresses or reveals an emotion, and one which merely has the appearance of 
expressing an emotion. The famous example that Kivy uses is the face of a Saint 
Bernard dog, which looks sad though we don’t believe it actually feels sad. In the 
same way, music need not express an actual occurrent emotion, but merely present 
the appearance of one. Moreover, the appearance of an emotion need not involve any 
propositional attitude or be directed towards any situation. 
 
So what exactly does this resemblance to the appearances of emotions rely on? Let 
us first of all look at the resemblance between music and vocal utterances.6 We can 
see that the contour of a melody may directly resemble the rise in pitch at the end of 
a question, or the emphasis on certain words. Yet this would imply that since 
operatic recitative most accurately imitates the forms and rhythms of the speaking 
voice, it should be the most emotionally expressive form of music, which it clearly is 
not. However it is not the verbal aspects of vocal expressions that provide their 
emotional effects but rather their more detailed tonal qualities. It is also known that 
infants respond to the emotional inflection in their mother’s voice without having to 
understand the propositional content of her words. Psychologist Mechthild Papousek 
(1996) has shown for instance that when speaking to infants, mothers will use sharp, 
staccato contours to express disapproval and slower, falling pitch contours to soothe 
                                                     
6
 Kivy more than Davies emphasises this possibility, taking inspiration from the 17th and 18th 
Century musicians who deliberately imitated the emotional patterns of the voice for expressive effect. 
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(cf. Storr 1992: 23). The expressive qualities of these kinds of details have been 
verified in empirical studies (see Scherer, Johnstone & Klasmeyer 2003 for a review). 
For example, increases in the fundamental frequency (F0) of the voice and its degree 
of variation, an upward F0 contour, increased articulation rate and intensity all 
indicate greater arousal. Specific emotions can also be distinguished by the particular 
pattern of variables. For example, anxiety is characterised by an increase in F0, but 
low variation and low intensity. 
 
Music is clearly able to imitate as well as to exaggerate all of these basic non-verbal 
features. Music also has the capacity to imitate other specific cues such as sighs, 
tremors, hoarseness, weeping or laughing, though only in a highly stylised way, and 
as such not particularly accurately. Davies for instance, claims that Penderecki’s 
Threnody for the Victims of Hiroshima is so expressive “because it so closely 
resembles a prolonged, wordless scream of agony, wrung simultaneously from 
countless throats” (Davies 1994: 207). Yet this is the exception rather than the norm. 
In the vast majority of cases, music does not need to resemble the overall 
characteristics of a vocal utterance to have expressive effect, but merely highlight the 
small cues that occur within expressive speech. 
 
Though the resemblance to vocal utterances goes some way towards explaining the 
expressive qualities of music, it is insufficient to account for all cases of musical 
expression.7 For example, the broader melodic, harmonic and rhythmic features of a 
piece of music seem expressive in a way that does not resemble any of the variables 
                                                     
7
 Also it is easier to recognise the emotions of others from faces rather than voices. So why is music 
more expressive than painting? And why for that matter is abstract painting often more expressive 
than realistic portraiture? The emotional expression of art is not just a matter of picking out which 
emotion it expresses, but getting a vivid impression of the character of that emotion. 
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mentioned above. As a consequence Davies and Kivy also appeal to resemblance 
with bodily movements and posture. Melodic lines can seem graceful or heavy, they 
can jump or droop and chords can seem tense or gentle. Even Eduard Hanslick, the 
theorist who notoriously argued that music cannot express emotions, agreed that 
“motion is the ingredient which music has in common with emotional states and 
which it is able to shape creatively in a thousand shades and contrasts” (Hanslick 
1986: 9-11).8 The means by which music may resemble motion includes variations in 
volume, articulation, rhythm, texture and differences in pitch. These combined 
resources seem sufficient to capture virtually any movement imaginable.  
 
However the perceived resemblance between music and motion is more problematic 
than that between music and vocal utterances because it must operate between 
different sense modalities. Movement and position is typically presented to us 
kinaesthetically or visually. Although motion can also be presented to us aurally, as 
when a car zooms past, or when we locate the source of a sound, this is not the kind 
of movement that music suggests. Music does not literally move (though a decrease 
in volume can present the appearance of increasing distance) and the location of the 
performers is not usually relevant to its effect. Yet in order for music to appear to 
jump or droop there must be some element perceived to persist through spatial 
change relative to fixed spatial positions. 
 
It seems to be a matter of Gestalt psychology that we treat melodies and rhythms as 
single processes rather than the mere succession of tones, in just the same way as we 
see a sequence of flashing lightbulbs as one continuous movement. But why is it that 
                                                     
8
 Hanslick’s worry was just that this is insufficient to express definite emotional states. 
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we attribute spatial positions to pitch? Kivy claims that this is due to constant 
associations gathered from everyday life: 
 
The “rise” in pitch, like the raising of a physical body against gravity, 
requires, at least in a great many of the most familiar cases, increased 
energy. And the rise of pitch, both in natural organisms and machines, 
betokens a rise in energy level. The faster the wings beat, the shriller the 
sound; likewise, the more energy expended, the higher the engines whine. 
(Kivy 1980: 55) 
 
However, we also hear deep booming sounds from the sky when it thunders. So why 
should the association between low sounds and low positions be so consistently 
perceived? It seems that the way we describe pitches as spatially higher or lower just 
seems entrenched in our language (and hence in our thought). In other cultures, high 
and low pitches are described as weak and strong (among the African Bashi), white 
and black (among the Lau of the Solomon Islands), or small and big (among the 
African Basongye) (Merriam 1964, cited in Davies 1994: 231-232). Despite the 
differences here, these alternative descriptions make sense to us. They are both 
highly analogous to our descriptions of high and low, and indicate a universality of 
applying intermodal metaphors to musical pitch. Davies also argues that because it is 
so commonplace for us to describe temporal processes in terms of spatial movement, 
(such as the ‘rise’ and ‘fall’ of share prices, or empires) we need not particularly 
worry about the case of music (Davies 1994: 234-235). An initial natural association 
has simply been solidified by linguistic convention. 
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I think we can also provide a slightly deeper explanation for this convention. In the 
second chapter I described the pervasive intermodality of neural processing. In just 
the same way as we naturally label a jagged visual shape “kiki” and an inkblot 
“bouba” our brains systematically link sounds and spatial movement or shape. It 
seems conceivable that we could link high sounds with low positions and dark 
colours rather than the reverse. Yet I would agree with Kivy that the greater amount 
of real objects and processes that link high sounds with high positions and light 
colours makes it more likely that our normal intermodal associations will develop. 
And once these associations are neurally fixed, they will be applied across the board. 
 
So we have grounds for automatically perceiving a resemblance between music and 
movement. However, it is a philosophical truism that anything can resemble 
anything else. What makes it the case that sounds heard as movement should be 
particularly taken to resemble human expressive gestures? Part of the reason for the 
resemblance can be explained in terms of the kinds of movement required to make 
these sounds. Levinson uses the example that the aggressiveness of the timpani in the 
Scherzo of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony is partly due to recognising the way it must 
be struck (Levinson 2002: 144). Davies also gives a more phenomenal reason why 
we see movement as expressive saying: “Musical movement is invested with 
humanity not merely because music is created and performed by humans but because 
it provides a sense of unity and purpose” (Davies 1994: 229).  
 
Finally, Kivy points to the general animating tendency of humans to imbue natural 
objects with human characteristics. We are prone to see faces in clouds and regard 
storms are angry. As he says, “far from being difficult to hear or see things as 
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animate, it is, apparently, difficult not to” (Kivy 1980: 59). The likely reason for this 
is that humans are hard-wired by evolution to be sensitive to the emotional 
expressions of other humans (or animals). It confers survival advantage to be able to 
recognise (and to communicate) when you are about to be attacked for instance. So 
like Matravers, both Kivy and Davies believe that the capacity to hear music as 
expressive is a by-product of our capacity to read the emotions of other people. 
 
Overall I think Davies and Kivy go a long way towards explaining the expressive 
capacities of music, and I am prepared to accept that music may resemble both 
bodily movement and vocal utterances. However, I think that these resemblances are 
a means for music to provide a deeper resemblance to the essential inner character of 
an emotion, not merely its outward appearance. Part of my motivation for this is that 
according to the analysis I presented in the first chapter, bodily patterns are central to 
emotional states. Given this, it is intuitive to suppose that if music is so good at 
expressing emotions, then it should be because it captures the bodily patterns that 
centrally characterise them. So the main problem I have with Davies’ and Kivy’s 
appearance theories is that they do not seem to be true to the directness of the 
musical experience of emotion. This is unlikely to persuade however, since 
appearances can sometimes be especially convincing. The point that Davies and 
Kivy make is precisely that there need be no actual emotion behind that appearance. 
 
However, an especially convincing appearance makes us believe that there is an 
emotion behind it. It seems to me that the phrase it looks sad or it seems sad, which 
Davies relies on as an ordinary secondary usage of the attribution of expression, 
more commonly reveals a lack of certainty on the part of the utterer. He is 
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unconvinced, as Davies says, because he does not really believe that there is an 
actual emotion behind the expression. A more convincing appearance however (as 
music provides) is simply described as sad. Recall that when we are confronted with 
the emotions of other people, it seems that we perceive the emotional state itself, not 
just its symptoms. So the problem with Davies’ and Kivy’s theories is that they fail 
to recognise that what makes sad faces expressive of sad emotions (even when not 
actually driven by emotion) is the connection they imply to the inner characteristics 
of emotions. Our process of simulation, whereby we recognise emotional expressions, 
utilises some the same neural mechanisms as are involved in actually undergoing the 
emotions we perceive. This causes arousal, at least on an unconscious level, and thus 
gives us a sense of the emotion, not merely its appearance. 
 
In addition, by restricting the resemblance capacity of music to the outward 
appearance of emotions, Davies and Kivy unduly restrict the facets of emotions that 
music is able to capture. One example is the visceral sickly feeling that is so well 
captured by the quiet unsynchronised glissandi of a violin section. In general, the 
expressive effects due to the timbral qualities of instruments do not seem adequately 
captured by the appearance theorist. I can think of no vocal expression or physical 
gesture that captures the peculiar nutty quality of a bassoon for instance. Moreover 
there are several additional dynamic aspects to the experience of emotions that music 
could be taken to express. As I noted in chapter one, sometimes the thoughts we have 
during emotions have characteristic dynamic qualities such as being unable to 
concentrate on one thing for more than a few moments, or the inability to change 
one’s mind when depressed. In recognising this Malcolm Budd (1995: 207) extends 
the resemblance of music to the whole phenomenology of the emotional state. 
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Ultimately it seems just as reasonable to characterise the inner phenomenology of an 
emotional state as languid, restless or clumsy as it does a behavioural gesture (Pratt 
cited in Budd 1985: 39). So why should we limit music’s resemblance to just the 
outward form of emotions? 
 
On the basis of appearance theories, we may also wonder why music is commonly 
accorded the distinction of most emotionally expressive art as opposed to 
(unaccompanied) dance, which can resemble the gestural aspects of emotions far 
more accurately. The appearance theorist may respond that music has the advantage 
over dance that it can resemble vocal utterances in addition to bodily gestures. Yet 
the quality of the expressiveness of music seems far deeper than an extra sort of 
resemblance could account for. It seems that music can absorb the listener and carry 
them along with the progress of an emotional state in a way quite foreign to other art 
forms. 
 
There is I think, a very simple reason why music is superior to the other art forms in 
its expressive capacity. It is because sound is more like feeling than any other sense 
modality. In many ways the two senses overlap one another. It is worth noting that 
our sense of hearing evolved from a refinement of our sense of touch. The 
evolutionary ancestor of the eardrum is a bone in the sides of fish that functions to 
sense pressure variations in water. Sound, more than sight, is experienced in terms of 
vibration (although sight also relies on vibrations, it is not experienced as such). A 
loud sound literally feels a certain way. In addition, friction and movement typically 
generate sound, meaning that sound is a constant accompaniment to our kinaesthetic 
and tactile experiences. Most importantly both feeling and hearing parse the world in 
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similar ways. They share similar qualities of abstraction and immediacy. The way 
that feelings structure experience is not in terms of separated objects, but in terms of 
the dynamics of action, points of contrast and the visceral qualities of sensation. 
Similarly sound (and particularly music) is understood in terms of pulse, contrast and 
timbre. We are much more likely to get emotionally involved in sounds if only 
because we don’t objectify and distance ourselves from them the way we do with our 
visual experience. As a result, music literally resonates with feeling. 
 
Overall then, like both Malcolm Budd and Carroll Pratt, I argue that music sounds 
the way that emotions feel. Via a variety of resources, music is able to fully capture 
the dynamic and visceral qualities of emotional feelings. Since I argued in chapter 
one that feelings track bodily patterns, and bodily patterns are the primary 
characteristic of emotions, this means that music strongly resembles the primary 
characteristic of emotions. It is no wonder then that music is the pre-eminent art form 
of emotional expression. 
 
The Persona 
So the direct resemblance between music and feelings or bodily patterns is 
responsible for the expressive powers of music. However we not yet properly 
accounted for the experience of emotions in music. All we have provided so far is 
justification for saying that the expressive capacity is grounded in real properties of 
the music. As I explore in the following chapter, this allows us to distinguish aroused 
responses that track the music’s actual expressive features from those that result from 
the listener’s more subjective beliefs or associations. The problem is that just like 
arousal, even if the resemblance between music and emotion is part of the causal 
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story of musical expression, it does not seem necessary that this resemblance filter 
through to our conscious experience of music. As Aaron Ridley says:  
 
[It] would be like offering an account of pictorial space wholly in terms 
of the perspectival devices contained by a picture: It might be true that we 
experience pictorial space in virtue of the perspectival devices that a 
picture contains; but the experience itself is not merely the experience of 
perceiving perspectival devices (which could be done without ever 
experiencing pictorial space). (Ridley 1995: 121, cf. Budd 1995: 205) 
 
If the listener reflects for a moment on their experience, they may well be inclined to 
admit that they hear a resemblance, yet when we listen to music we don’t generally 
have an idea of how an emotion feels plus an idea of how the music sounds and then 
a third idea about how the two map against each other. Somehow, we simply get an 
impression from how the music sounds of how the emotion feels. At the same time 
we do not forget that the music is music. We continue to follow its formal structure. 
To compare what is happening now to what has gone before and to have expectations 
about how it will continue. And it is unlikely that every feature of the music we 
perceive (at whatever scale of description) is at the same time a feature of the 
emotion we perceive. So how exactly does the experience of the emotion combine 
with the experience of the music? 
 
In addition, my rejection of the appearance theories of Davies and Kivy leaves my 
account open to the fundamental problem that their theories resolved. If the music 
expresses the actual feeling of an emotion rather than merely its appearance, then 
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there must be someone to whom that emotion belongs. Arousal and the realist 
expression theories were rejected for unnecessarily appealing to the emotions of 
those involved in the production or reception of music, rather than the music itself. 
So how is it that we can properly focus on the music itself whilst still holding that it 
expresses an actual emotion? Persona theory is our answer here. It argues that when 
we hear a piece of music as emotionally expressive, we necessarily imagine or have 
an illusion that a person is appropriately connected to that emotional expression. We 
came close to this idea earlier when discussing the ‘imagined’ expression theory. The 
refinement of persona theory is that the person we imagine need not be any actual 
person; it may only be connected to that specific piece of music. 
 
Persona theory as presented by theorists like Bruce Vermazen (1986) still treats an 
expressive object as the utterance of the imagined persona. And in this respect I 
believe the theory should be modified (at least in the case of music) to incorporate 
some additional possibilities, such as identifying the music as the embodiment of a 
persona. I still retain the central insight however, which is that the music expresses 
an emotion if it presents evidence for the mental state of a person. Vermazen’s 
complete definition, which is intended to apply to all forms of expression, is as 
follows: 
 
An object expresses a mental property if and only if (subject to certain 
constraints) attributing that property to an utterer of the object would 
explain the objects having the features it has, and the property is not 
presupposed in the attempt to interpret. (Vermazen 1986: 207) 
 
 116
It should be noted that the last clause in the definition is meant to rule out cases 
where perceiving that there is an emotion serves as grounds for imagining a persona. 
Instead the grounds for the persona must be derived from the music. The purpose of 
the persona is to make the recognition of emotions in the music intelligible. It should 
therefore be impossible to hear an emotion in the music without having also 
imagined a persona. But it is a little unclear exactly what the causal story is that 
Vermazen is implying. What makes a listener think of a persona? 
 
There are two possible strategies here: The first is that it is a fairly automatic illusion. 
The second is that it is a more deliberate imaginative activity. As justification for the 
first possibility, it is likely that whenever we approach works of art we have a 
background belief that it has been deliberately constructed by a human being. As 
such we will tend automatically to interpret that work as the product of certain 
mental states, and derive the nature of those mental states from the characteristics of 
the work. In neurological terms, this means that we confront works of art in just the 
same way as we confront people, utilising our simulation capacity from the start. For 
example, if I see a person stub his toe, I don’t have to deliberately engage my 
simulation mechanism in order to appreciate the pain that this will engender. Rather I 
immediately get a sense of the painful consequences of this action. This is because 
some of our simulation mechanisms are always active whenever we perceive people. 
As I mentioned in chapter two, it is what allows babies to engage in imitative actions 
within hours of birth. It’s just that normally the behaviours we perceive others doing 
are not intense enough for the feelings they generate to attract our attention above the 
normal everyday ‘chatter’ of personal concerns and sensations. 
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Hence when we listen to music, our background belief that a person is responsible 
for the work primes the simulation mechanism. The music then only need give us the 
merest hint of a person (i.e. by resembling person-like movements) to trigger the 
illusion of a persona. To elaborate: The simulation mechanism utilises the intermodal 
connection between the sounds and movement that the brain makes at all times. 
These movements are then mirrored from a first person perspective which, if they 
display an emotional pattern, will arouse a simulation of that emotion in the listener. 
So far all of this can happen unconsciously. The listener may even be fully aroused 
by an emotion without recognising that it is caused by the properties of the music. 
This would be like a case of emotional contagion. If however, the listener is paying 
conscious attention to the music then they will perceive that music as having the 
properties of feeling that their simulation process has generated.9 They will then be 
disposed to verbally identify the expressive content of the music accordingly. 
 
The second strategy is to assume that the listener does not approach the music with 
the background belief that it is produced by a human. This is more common when 
listening to purely natural sounds such as a tap dripping. Again, we still immediately 
get a sense of movement from the sound of the dripping water, and if we concentrate 
upon that sound we can even get a tactile sense of the vibrations that this movement 
would generate. However we do not perceive any emotional qualities in this sound. 
At this point then, the listener may now deliberately imagine that a person is 
responsible for producing this sound. For instance, that a person is flicking the drops 
                                                     
9
 Neuroscientists Istvan Molnar-Szakacs and Katie Overy (2006) similarly hypothesise that 
recognising emotions in music is grounded by the mirror neuron system (which underlies our 
empathic activities). However they focus on mirroring the intentional actions required to produce the 
movements we perceive in music rather than the more generalised mirroring of bodily patterns (some 
of which could be generated by deliberate actions). 
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of water from a brush. This will then trigger the simulation process, and generate a 
sense of the way it feels to perform those actions that would produce those sounds in 
that precise manner. Depending on the properties of the sound, this may seem to 
have emotional qualities or not. For instance, the sound of the tap dripping may now 
appear to have a nonchalant quality it didn’t have before. 
 
The pattern of feeling is perceived as a property of the music. We don’t require two 
ideas; one of the music and another of the feeling. This is because the brain 
automatically makes an intermodal connection between the two forms of sensation, 
combining them into a single percept of the dynamic qualities of the music. The 
phenomenology is I think best compared to perceiving the solidity of an object. Just 
as when I see a wooden beam I also perceive its solidity, so when I perceive the 
music I also perceive its feeling. This is also analogous to the way we perceive 
emotional feelings in the facial or vocal expressions of other people. There are of 
course discernible features within those faces, which it is possible to attend to in a 
purely technical manner. That is, it is possible to distinguish the facial expression 
and the feeling. But the more common experience is just to perceive the emotion in 
the face. Similarly we hear the emotion in the music. 
 
So far I have concentrated on the experience of the emotional feeling, but that feeling 
is also a sense of a person. In particular, the primary experience of emotions in music 
involves the sense of a person’s body connected to that feeling. This is because 
emotional feelings are primarily characterised by bodily patterns (though as I 
mentioned above certain patterns of thinking are also distinctive characteristics of 
emotions). Hence the kind of persona that music suggests may not be quite the same 
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as the kind of persona suggested by other art forms such as sculpture or paintings. 
These art forms may instead provide a sense of more disembodied mental attributes. 
But the persona in music, if it gives us a sense of emotional feeling, is one primarily 
characterised by bodily attributes. 
 
So the listener will get a sense of the solidity or the grace or the energy of that body, 
as is suggested by the feeling that it is currently undergoing. Depending on the nature 
of the music and the listening situation, the music may be heard as the production of 
this body, where the body is imagined as ‘behind’ the music in some manner. 
Alternatively the sound itself may be imagined as the body, which then possesses 
certain detailed emotional features (see chapter four for a complete description). In 
either case, there is a still a person, a body, which is responsible for the expressive 
qualities of the music. Moreover, in cases of recognising the emotions of people, 
although their expressions provide a direct sense of their feelings, these features need 
not exhaust the characteristics of the emotion we perceive. Rather we may also 
anticipate certain actions they might make, as well as have ideas about situations, 
beliefs or desires that might typically accompany their emotional state. The same is 
true of the persona in music. We may anticipate the way the musical persona might 
behave and imagine the kinds of situations he is confronting. 
 
In general, the persona is wherever the emotion is perceived to be. Thus if the 
emotion is perceived in the music, then so is the persona. If the emotion is perceived 
as behind the music, then so is the persona. But this is as separate as the persona’s 
emotion and the music ever get. Any other imagined separation between the music 
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and the emotional state it expresses is a distortion caused by erroneous theory (i.e. 
‘it’s merely an appearance of emotion, because music just can’t be feelings!’). 
 
Here we come to what I regard as a terminological dispute. It seems to me that the 
animating tendency that Peter Kivy appeals to when explaining why we perceive 
music as resembling human movement is the same thing as the process of simulating 
a persona that I have just described. Yet Kivy does not equate the animating 
tendency with the imagination of a persona, and Davies (1997) explicitly opposes the 
two ideas. The cause of the dispute really concerns how fleshed out this persona is. 
One of the central criticisms of persona theory is that it puts too great a demand on 
the contents of the listener’s imagination. It doesn’t seem as if we always imagine 
people when we listen to music. Yet first of all, this objection does not recognise the 
fact that the persona can be an automatic perceptual level illusion. And secondly, I 
agree with Jerrold Levinson (2005) that the persona (at least as it is necessarily 
invoked) is of the most minimal kind. Levinson suggests that it is constituted only by 
the emotion and its particular form of expression. My claim is slightly different in 
that it requires a sense of a body that possesses the emotion. Likewise I think the 
difference between Davies’ and my conception of the animating tendency is that I 
believe it gives us the sense of an inner life. This is for all the reasons I mentioned 
earlier about music connecting to feelings rather than mere appearances. 
 
To reiterate, Davies believes that hearing an emotion in music is no more involved 
than seeing as sad looking the mask that traditionally denotes tragedy (Davies 1997: 
97). But this is precisely where our interpretations differ. If the mask is taken as 
naturally resembling behaviour expressive of sadness rather than operating merely as 
 121
a symbol for it the way the word ‘sad’ does, then it does so by suggesting the sense 
of living person. Of course I can simply think of the word ‘sad’ or a schematic 
picture of sad face without thinking of a persona. But this would be a case of 
reference rather than expression. Cases of expression are concerned with the 
particular character of the mental state suggested by the particular character of the 
expressive object. In these cases we utilise greater imaginative resources, we imagine 
what it’s like to have that mental state. We therefore invoke our background sense of 
personhood, and as a result the kind of perspective employed when understanding 
people rather than inanimate things. 
 
In addition, Davies claims that we attribute emotions rather than other kinds of 
movement to music because we experience the music as displaying unity and 
purpose. Yet an appearance cannot express purposiveness. Since purposiveness is a 
mental state, a persona must be invoked to express it. Perhaps Davies had a thinner 
concept here, referring for instance to the purely formal way in which a melody may 
be perceived to be approaching closure. Yet the idea of purposiveness seems to 
involve a sense of driving towards something, of having a goal or desire, which must 
necessarily involve the sense of a persona. Only a persona could provide a sense of 
intentionality within the emotion expressed in the music, though we need not be 
aware of what it is that the persona is intentionally directed towards. 
 
The main motivation for invoking a persona in music is that it explains the directness 
with which music expresses feeling. The thin conception also means that invoking 
the persona does not require the listener to look beyond the scope of the music. 
Vermazen seems only to worry about outward expression signaling the idea of an 
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inner state, which as Davies correctly points out, could be captured by appearance 
theory. Yet the real advantage of persona theory is that it makes sense of getting 
inside that mental state. By grounding an act of emotional simulation, the music is 
used to get a sense of the emotional feelings of a person. 
 
Finally, with this particular theory in mind, there is potential for empirical 
verification. If our understanding of the emotional qualities of music relies on our 
basic empathic abilities, then we might expect that people incapable of empathy are 
thereby unable to understand expressive music.10 In particular, people with autism 
are usually characterised as lacking the ability to understand other minds. This is 
attributed either to a lack of a theory of mind or an inability to simulate the internal 
states of others. Yet in one experiment measuring their ability to recognise emotions 
in music, autistic subjects have in fact been able to successfully identify the emotions 
presented (Heaton, Hermelin & Pring 1999). The problem with this experiment 
however, is that the emotions the autistic subjects were asked to identify were no 
more complex than the emotions they were able to identify in other people. If they 
can recognise when a person is sad or happy then we should expect them to 
recognise the same in music. 
 
It is uncertain what it is exactly that autistic people are unable to do, and there are 
likely to be several interacting factors that lead to the disorder. If autism is caused by 
a dysfunction in the simulation mechanism (such as a lack of mirror neurons) then 
autistic subjects should not be able to process the emotional content of music at all 
beyond a level they are capable of achieving for people. If instead the problem is 
                                                     
10
 Similarly where people with Huntington’s disease confuse expressions of fear and anger, we should 
expect them to also confuse music that expresses fear or anger. 
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more to do with attributing the results of simulative processing, then we may expect 
that whilst autistic subjects can be aroused by the expressive qualities of music, any 
conscious recognition of emotion would be phrased in egoistic terms. Autistic 
subjects would not ascribe the emotion to some other person, and possibly not even 
as caused by the music. With these rather speculative suggestions then, I am satisfied 
that my account is at least possible to falsify. 
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Chapter Four: The Real Properties of Music
 
 
The simulation theory of musical expression outlined in chapter three explained how 
we perceive emotions in music. Various features of the music resemble various 
features of emotional states. These resemblances are then processed by the listener’s 
simulation mechanism, resulting in at least a simulated form of emotional arousal. 
The feeling of this emotion is then perceived in what causes it, the music. This 
creates an illusion that there is a person responsible for the emotion in the music. It is 
also possible to trigger the simulation process by consciously imagining that a person 
is responsible for making the sounds we hear. 
 
Since the music does not have its own mind it is reasonable to argue that the emotion 
is not really in the music, despite the way it seems. The music may possess certain 
dynamic or structural features that resemble emotional states, yet this resemblance 
relation is entirely dependent on being treated as such by the listener. In general, the 
music relies on the simulation mechanism of the listener to be expressive at all, and 
the simulation mechanisms of some listeners may potentially not be triggered by the 
music, or may function abnormally. Hence we might claim that the emotions we 
perceive are essentially a feature of the listener, and though they might be caused by 
the music, the emotions themselves are logically independent of the music. 
 
However, there is a long-standing practise in metaphysics of identifying certain 
properties (e.g. fragility, solubility) as dispositionally held by objects so long as they 
are reliably generated in appropriate circumstances. A similar account is given of 
phenomenal qualities such as colour. According to many traditional accounts (e.g. 
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Locke) colours are secondary qualities, which are dispositional powers of objects to 
cause experiences of that quality in normal observers under normal conditions. So 
saying that an object is red amounts to saying that it reliably stimulates the 
impression of redness in all normal human observers under normal lighting 
conditions. An observer is then normal just so long as he isn’t suffering from any 
affliction that might affect his colour perception such as jaundice or colour blindness. 
So whilst the object by itself is not a colour experience, a disposition to generate 
colour experiences is in the object, and to have colour just is to have this 
dispositional power to generate colour experiences. 
 
Perhaps then a similar claim can be made about the emotional qualities of music. We 
could say that a disposition to express emotions is in the music, and so the music 
really does have an expressive quality.1 However, the main problem is that unlike 
colours, we do not have well-established criteria for what counts as a normal 
observer or normal circumstances for perceiving the music’s expressive qualities. 
Our experiences of music are far more variable than our experiences of colour, as 
evidenced by the different ways we talk about and react to musical works. Hence in 
this chapter I will try to establish what the criteria are for a dispositional account of 
expressive qualities in music. This will then allow me to specify in detail which 
expressive qualities may be said to be really had by the music, and which are simply 
extraneous and potentially variable elaborations made by different listeners. 
 
                                                     
1
 Dispositionalist accounts are very popular in aesthetics (e.g. Matravers 2003, Levinson 2005, Davies 
1994 and Walton 1994). My account bears similarities to all of them, particularly to Matravers (2003). 
However I cannot rely much on any of these theorists because I disagree in some or other respect with 
their accounts of how music expresses emotions. 
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Since the overarching goal of this thesis is to show how people can share their 
emotions using music, it is important to delineate the ways in which people may 
differ in their emotional responses. It needs to be possible to reconcile these 
differences in some way if even the numerically distinct responses of listeners are to 
be non-fortuitously aligned. So as part of identifying the distinction between the real 
qualities of the music and the listeners’ more subjective responses, I will explore 
what some of these common variations are and the extent to which they are 
encouraged by the background of the listener or the listening context. Overall I will 
argue that many of our subjectively variable responses to music are refinements of a 
more basic and universal response, and thus that many responses should at least be 
intelligible to other listeners (especially experts) if not actually shared by them. This 
then sets up the argument of chapter six in which I show how sharing a listening 
context with others can enable a convergence in our responses to music. 
 
A Principle of Dispositional Realism 
Based on my account of musical expression, there is I think a general principle 
which we can use to determine whether an expressive quality is really a dispositional 
feature of the music or not: 
 
The music dispositionally expresses an emotion x if and only if a 
resemblance between the music and x can be grounded by standard 
simulative processing, and gaining expertise or true beliefs about the 
music does not prevent that resemblance from being grounded. 
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By ‘grounded’ I mean that the resemblance between musical features and emotional 
features must be capable of being processed by the simulation mechanism of the 
listener such that it results in a sense of emotional feeling, which is then perceived as 
a property of the music. Regarding the specific resemblance claim; we could 
alternatively say that music bears an epistemic resemblance to emotionally 
expressive people in that both can trigger a simulation process in the perceiver. 
However, as I argued in the previous chapter, this is based on a metaphysical 
resemblance that music bears to the emotional state itself. The music puts you in 
mind of a person by virtue of its resemblance to an emotion. In other respects, music 
isn’t much like a person at all. So I think it is less confusing to refer to the more 
intrinsic resemblance to the emotion itself (which is perceived as belonging to a 
person). Note also that music does not resemble the experience of the emotion, since 
it is not an experience. Rather we should say that the experience of the music 
resembles the experience of the emotion. Yet again, these experiences resemble each 
other because the music resembles certain features of the emotion itself. 
 
Overall, my notion of the dispositional properties of music is both causally and 
psychologically reductive, and as such fairly restrictive. If for instance, one thought 
that the music was ironic due to its anachronistic style, this irony could not be 
considered an expressive property of the music unless certain features of the music 
could actually be felt as ironic in the manner I have indicated. Perhaps for instance, 
one could recall some other musical works of a certain historical period and note a 
resemblance between those works and the current work, as well as a contrast with 
more contemporary works. Concentrating on the features of these works may then 
trigger a simulation process, resulting in a sense of contrast or conflict in the listener 
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that might be characteristic of a feeling of irony. We should note however that if this 
process were used, the expressive quality would not technically be a feature of the 
‘ironic’ work alone, but must include the features of the works it relates to as well. 
 
The clause about the increase of expertise or true beliefs is supposed to refer to 
gaining knowledge about production rules, historical context, composer intentions 
and the like. I will explore the notion of expertise in detail below. For now, the goal 
is to rule out the kinds of cases that I raised against the arousal theory in the last 
chapter. Here it was noted that the jarring sensation caused by an out-of-tune violin 
performance could be equally perceived as expressive of pain or great sorrow as well 
as plain bad. Hence, I wish to rule on the side of the expert who knows that it is a bad 
performance and accordingly does not attribute the jarring feeling as an expressive 
quality of the music. The expert’s true belief inhibits his simulation process, or at 
least inhibits the results of his simulation process from being attributed to the music. 
 
One important consequence of this clause is that where music relies on ‘genuine’ 
surprise or shock for expressive effect, it is unlikely that this quality is a real property 
of the music. According to my principle, the jaded listener must be considered a 
completely valid judge of the music. Note however that sudden contrasts in the 
music, even if completely predictable to the listener, should not undermine the 
potential to be simulated as sudden contrasts, as if they were an emotion of shock.2 
So although sudden contrasts may not arouse the jaded listener to the same degree as 
the completely naïve listener, a simulated version of shock should be aroused even in 
him. 
                                                     
2
 This is comparable to Kendall Walton’s (1990) notion that when watching films or plays that we 
already know the outcome to, we recreatively make believe that the outcome is uncertain. 
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As I mentioned in the previous chapter it is also clear that the resemblance that 
certain features of the music bear to an emotional state need not be consciously 
recognised as such by the listener. My point is simply that it should be possible to 
note those resemblances in such a way that they trigger the simulation mechanism. 
For instance, a listener may not perceive the subtle timbral contrasts in the music 
when they first listen to it. However, they could come to be sensitive towards those 
timbral contrasts, and as a result be caused to simulate them as expressive. Various 
methods for increasing sensitivity are then available, (e.g. greater attention, 
conceptual expertise or sensitivity to emotions in non-musical contexts) which I 
discuss at various points below. Meanwhile the listener might still not know why it is 
that they get such an effect from the music, or even recognise which detail of the 
music expresses that quality. The justification involved is more one of basic 
perceptual access than being able to articulate reasons for the effect.3 So the listener 
may just be disposed to verbally ascribe the expressive quality to the work as a 
whole. 
 
Finally, my principle clearly relies on the normality of the listener’s simulation 
mechanism. Yet the normality of the simulation mechanism is fairly easy to establish 
by recourse to its use in recognising the emotional expressions of people. In 
particular, the listener should be able to recognise what emotion people intend to 
express to a degree of accuracy as is currently standard, (see Scherer, Johnstone & 
Klasmer 2003 for statistics). Of course, certain counter-examples can be imagined in 
which everybody in the world has a simulation mechanism that operates in manner 
                                                     
3
 This seems to me to be in line with Sibley’s (1959) views on the ability to justify the presence of 
aesthetic properties in artworks. 
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abnormal by our own standards. However, due to the likely overlapping nature of the 
simulation mechanism with the actual arousal of human emotional states, I would be 
prepared to accept that if in that world expressions of fear are typically simulated as 
feelings of joy, then those expressions really do arouse feelings of joy. Moreover as I 
argued in my second chapter, those expressions may be considered as one of the 
constitutive parts of the bodily changes involved in generating that emotional state. 
Hence similarly in that counterfactual world, music that resembles the emotion of 
fear by our standards, actually dispositionally expresses the emotion of joy for that 
world. 
 
So by the standards of metaphysical essentialism, the music can only contingently 
possess the expressive qualities that it does. This is the same under secondary quality 
accounts of colour however, since in another possible world, a molecularly identical 
surface could trigger different colour experiences due to biological differences in the 
perceivers of that world. However unlike colours, our sensitivity to musical 
expression is situated within our broader sensitivity to emotions in everyday cases. If 
arguments can ultimately be made that certain expressive features of humans are 
essentially tied to certain emotional states (which I doubt) then a stronger case could 
equivalently be made for music. However one of the lessons we should draw from 
the case of musical expression is that emotions may not be essentially tied to bodily 
changes at all, but rather tied to substance neutral dynamic patterns that may be 
instantiated in a variety of mediums. This thought is pursued further in chapter five. 
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Harmonic Relativity 
Having articulated a principle for the dispositional expressive qualities of music, we 
may now put this principle to the test. In particular, one aspect of music that I did not 
explore much in the previous chapter was harmony, which in some pieces of music is 
the most intensely effective source of emotional expression. This is because harmony 
seems particularly sensitive to cultural influence, given the different tonal systems 
that different cultures use. Many theorists agree that the basic effect of harmony is to 
provide a sense of tension or release, stability or instability. As I noted in chapter 
three, Meyer thinks that tension is aroused by the expectations we have about the 
music, and Davies thinks that the appearance of tense movement is presented. It 
seems to me that harmony functions just like timbre, and is another case of direct 
resemblance to bodily patterns. Yet the main point of contention here is whether the 
dissonance of a chord, or the ‘darker’ quality of a minor scale is due to it genuinely 
resembling features of darker emotions or the result of culturally arbitrary 
associations. 
 
Davies claims that all harmonic dissonance is relative. A major seventh only seems 
dissonant to us in comparison to the other chords like perfect fifths, because fifths 
are more frequently used as points of stability within music. Similarly the minor third 
only sounds sadder to us than the major third because it is used more frequently in 
music that expresses sad emotions by other means. The reason it is used in this way 
is because hundreds of years ago it was heard as discordant, and hence restless. As a 
result it was used more often in pieces resembling the darker emotions (utilising 
other expressive features of music such as tempo or melodic contour). Nowadays, 
even though the minor third is no longer experienced as particularly discordant, 
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relative to the much more unusual chords that are commonly used in modern music, 
it still retains its negative associations due to this historical convention (Davies 1994: 
241). 
 
This implies that if someone were brought up in a culture where minor thirds were 
not conventionally used more frequently in music with sadder expressive content, 
then they would not experience the minor third as sadder than the major third. Yet 
we are left with the puzzle of why, historically, the minor third was ever experienced 
as more discordant than the major third. It may be a consequence of the tuning 
systems used prior to the adoption of equal temperament around 250 years ago. But 
even if this is the case, what was it about that tuning that caused the minor third to 
seem more dissonant? 
 
Ultimately, it seems the expressive difference between the major and the minor third 
(and their various different tunings) can be objectively grounded in the different 
positions these intervals occupy within the natural harmonic series. To explain: The 
octave interval (which is exactly double the frequency of the root) is cross-culturally 
experienced as the ‘same’ note though higher in pitch. The octave is also the first 
natural harmonic (followed by the fifth above that, then the octave again, then the 
major third, fifth, minor 7th, octave etc.). So this explains why the octave is heard as 
a particularly stable interval; the overall frequencies contained in the interval lie in 
simple ratio to each other. Then as we move along the harmonic series, the ratios 
between the intervals involved become more complex, and so more discordant or 
unstable sounding. Thus the second harmonic is an interval of a fifth above the 
octave, and so the fifth is experienced as the next most stable interval, then the fourth 
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and so on. If this is the case, then the major third may be experienced as more stable 
than the minor third because it appears sooner in the natural harmonic series 
(between the third and fourth harmonics as opposed to between the fourth and fifth).4 
So overall, the tension in an interval can be aligned with the complexity of its 
frequency, in just the same way as the sound of an oboe playing an A has greater 
expressive tension than the same note played as a pure sine wave. 
 
We may equally be able to find objective grounds for the expressive difference 
between the major and minor scales. The harmonic minor scale contains three 
semitone steps and an augmented 2nd (effectively another minor 3rd) where the 
major scale has one less semitone and no step bigger than a whole tone. As such, it 
seems principally because of its unevenness that the minor key is taken to be darker 
than the major. The minor key is more angular and more complex than the major key. 
This, combined with the slightly more dissonant minor 3rd makes the minor scale 
more suited to express the darker emotions. 
 
Introspectively it is hard to be sure whether one’s sense of a tonality can be 
disassociated from all the pieces of music that one has heard in that tonality. So it 
may not be possible to conclusively demonstrate that the expressive difference 
between the major and minor tonalities is grounded in the properties I have described. 
Yet music psychologists Marcel Zentner and Jerome Kagan report that 4 month old 
infants preferentially look towards the source of sounds and are less motorically 
active when the melodies are composed of parallel major thirds (consonant) as 
                                                     
4
 Moreover, this major third relates to the root tone (e.g. if the fundamental is a C, the fourth harmonic 
is an E natural), where the minor third only relates to another, far less prominent, harmonic (e.g. G to 
E). To find an interval a minor third above the root (e.g. Eb to C), we must go all the way up to the 
nineteenth harmonic. 
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opposed to parallel minor seconds (dissonant). They also fretted and turned away 
from the dissonant music more (Zentner & Kagan (1996, 1998) cited in Scherer and 
Zentner (2003): 367). This suggests an innate preference for more consonant sounds. 
 
Whether the same could be said for the more subtle difference between major and 
minor tonalities is less clear. One empirical study found that even three year olds 
were able to consistently assign either positive (happy or neutral) or negative (sad or 
angry) schematic faces to pieces according to the major or minor harmonic modes 
(Kastner & Crowder 1990, cited in Dowling 1999). However, a similar study found 
that children could not assign emotion (based on only two choices of schematic faces) 
according to tonality until the age of eight (Geradi and Gerkin 1995 cited in Dowling 
1999). Clearly more evidence is needed here. Yet it certainly seems plausible that a 
natural tendency to find certain harmonies slightly more dissonant may then have 
been intensified by historical musical tradition, until we reach the situation we find 
ourselves in today in which the minor mode has developed an almost symbolic 
association with darker emotions. Thus people may find it easier to recognise such 
qualities when absorbed in this tradition. 
 
I do not think that the major and minor modes would inevitably be associated with 
generally lighter or darker emotions. It is possible to write music in a major key that 
sounds strident and aggressive. Recall the experiment I discussed in chapter three 
where guitar players were able to express fear and anger with When the Saints, a tune 
in a major key! Moreover, it seems clear that if one had only ever heard pieces in the 
major tonality, then some of those pieces would seem darker, sadder or more 
aggressive than others. Not just because of other features such as dynamics, but 
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because the particular harmonies within the scale that were favoured in that piece 
would help to give it that character. 
 
So although I agree with Davies that the expressive effect of any chord or interval is 
only generated relative to other chords and intervals, there seems to be a plausible 
natural reason why one is experienced as more dissonant than another. However, this 
is still enough to permit differences in listener’s responses to music according to 
their different familiarity with the harmonies used within that music. To a listener 
who has only heard medieval church music, a tritone (the so called ‘devil’s interval’) 
will seem more intensely dissonant than it will to a listener acquainted with more 
contemporary works. Moreover, the same effect operates not just according to the 
listener’s acquaintance with the wider cultural context, but also within single works. 
A tritone will seem more dissonant in a piece that otherwise uses only major third 
harmonies than one in which far stronger dissonances are frequently employed. 
 
Given that dissonance is aligned with darker emotions, what then should we say is 
the real expressive quality of the work when the same interval can be experienced in 
different ways? The problem is less troubling in the within-piece case, since we 
could stipulate that a normal listener is one who has had their parametres for 
dissonance set by that particular piece. We could accordingly stipulate that all works 
should be treated on their own terms in this way. However, this would undermine the 
idea that some works as a whole are more intensely sad or happy or angry than other 
works. So we are driven to the opposite view; that the normal listener’s parametres 
should be set by all other works of music. Of course, this puts implausible demands 
on the experience of the normal listener. Yet finding some balance within these two 
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extremes such as a reasonable acquaintance with works within a particular genre, 
culture or historical epoch seems fairly arbitrary. 
 
This problem could be quite deep, since the same argument can also be made for 
relative ranges of pitch, dynamics, timbre, tempo, and complexity. Resemblance to 
feelings across all the expressive parametres will be sensitive to the ranges of those 
parametres that the listener is accustomed to. This kind of thought suggests that 
perhaps all music is in fact expressive and that some historical styles which were 
expressive to their contemporary audiences, have just been rendered comparatively 
neutral by our current forms of expression. For example, despite its name, the ‘Sturm 
und Drang’ (storm and thunder) style of some of Haydn’s symphonies no longer 
strikes the modern listener as particularly intense. 
 
If we are looking for a standard for the expertise of the listener that will set the 
absolute expressive value of a work or features within the work, then we will never 
be satisfied. We should rather settle with a claim that works and their detailed 
features can only be more or less sad or happy or angry. These qualities will 
gradually shift according to the experience of the listener, though their expressive 
‘location’ relative to other works will remain constant. Furthermore, the overall 
ranges for these qualities will increase as more and more works are composed 
(though the intensity of a particular feature could increase if the majority of works 
slowly become more conservative). If we accept this relativity then, we really only 
need the most minimal set of criteria for the cultural familiarity of the normal listener, 
i.e. that he should simply be aware of other pieces of expressive music and thus be 
able hear works as more or less sad or happy accordingly. This is not to deny that 
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some listeners can be more sensitive to the expressive qualities of a work or to music 
in general. This sensitivity is a form of expertise. Yet as I argue below, sensitivity is 
more about the ability to discern features in the music than to be able to judge the 
‘correct’ intensity of emotional expression. 
 
Finally, we should also note that the same relativity can be discerned in our everyday 
emotional episodes. To someone who has suffered incredible loss, like the murder of 
their children, the loss of a shoe will be accordingly less intense than for someone 
who has never lost anything before. Similarly, the objectively same set of bodily 
changes may be felt more keenly by a child than by an adult. Hence I do not think we 
should worry unduly about the relativity of the expressive qualities in music. 
 
Expertise 
The case of harmony provides a guide to what criteria we should demand of normal 
listeners when recognising emotions in music. Though the sensitivity of listeners 
might vary from case to case, as long as that sensitivity is grounded in the 
resemblance the music bears to emotional states, their recognitions are valid. At the 
same time, we can also rule out certain expressive effects on the grounds that they do 
not target such a resemblance. 
 
For instance, it is commonly recognised that listeners may associate a piece of music 
with a particular feeling based purely on associations with the context in which they 
first heard that piece, (also known as the ‘darling, they’re playing our tune’ effect). 
For example, Mahler is said to have had a strong personal association between 
anguished emotions and brass bands as a result of a childhood experience in which 
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he fled into the street from an argument between his parents at the very moment 
when a brass band was passing. This personal association is likely to have deeply 
affected his compositions. So some of the brass figures in Mahler’s symphonies, 
even if they resemble a joyful emotion, may have had for him an anguished 
undertone that is simply not discernible by most listeners.5 For this reason, we should 
not accept such associations as the basis for judging the real expressive quality of the 
music, even though such an association might have been Mahler’s specific intent. 
Similarly, expert knowledge about the composer’s intent is irrelevant to judging the 
expressive qualities of the music if it only points to associations of this kind.  
 
We can also rule out expressive effects due to arbitrary associations with words, 
images or situations. If for instance, an opera contains a motif that appears several 
times whenever the villain appears, we might come to associate repetitions of that 
motif with an aggressive mood. Yet if that motif does not independently resemble an 
aggressive emotion, then we should not say that it is genuinely expressive of 
aggression. Of course, it is likely that a composer would only choose to make such 
an association if it was already appropriate to do so based on the motif’s intrinsic 
expressive qualities. Several cases of historical associations are equally validated in 
this way. For example, there is a historical association between a falling minor third 
and a troubled sigh. Similarly, trumpet fanfares are associated with royalty and thus 
with a sense of power or pride. Yet the natural resemblance that trumpet fanfares 
have with bold and powerful movement makes it appropriate to make such an 
                                                     
5
 Some theorists have argued that the entire expressive content of music is the result of private 
associations like this (e.g. Descartes, Hanslick). Yet the analysis of chapter three has shown that the 
basic resemblance between sounds and feelings is sufficient for music to be expressive without 
associations of this kind. Moreover, explaining the expressive qualities of music on this basis would 
not explain the wide levels of agreement we find on the general expressive character of musical 
works. 
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association. Hence an association such as this may serve to underline an expressive 
effect due to resemblance. Accordingly it might help to draw the attention of the 
listener to that quality where it might otherwise have gone unnoticed (cf. Kivy 1980: 
chapter 8 and Davies 1994: 242). Yet such associations cannot create a genuine 
expressive effect where none already existed. 
 
Another potential source of unjustified responses is our personal preferences, i.e. 
finding the music good or bad or indifferent. Loving a piece of music could cause us 
to judge its expressive quality as particularly joyful. Moreover, it may be difficult to 
properly divorce one’s recognition of emotion in the music from one’s evaluation of 
its quality, since presumably, judging that the music is good or bad can significantly 
affect one’s level of emotional arousal. We might also value a work just because it 
expresses an emotion so well. Yet the simulation capacity of the listener should be 
capable of operating independently of whether the listener likes the music or not. As 
such it may be possible for some expert critics to disassociate their judgements of 
expressive properties from their personal tastes. However it would be far more 
reliable to appeal to what expressive qualities different experts could agree on, where 
they nevertheless have differing judgements about how good the music is. 
 
In general the principle of dispositional realism that I articulated above is intended to 
preserve the idea that one can become an expert in the expressive properties of music. 
However, this expertise is not about making inferences based on one’s knowledge of 
the music or its cultural context, but more about training one’s perceptual faculty. In 
particular, one of the main ways that one can gain expertise about a piece of music is 
simply by repeated listening. Familiarity with an individual work often allows the 
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listener to pick out details that are not immediately apparent to the first time listener. 
These details may include counter-themes or subtle shifts in timbre or 
instrumentation. Familiarity also enables a listener to anticipate and appreciate more 
long-term structural qualities of the work, both as they extend before and after the 
current musical moment. As I argue below, some of these long-term features may 
allow the expression of more complex emotional states. In general it is quite possible 
for the additional details perceived within a piece of music to alter its expressive 
character. For example, a piece of music with a passionate theme may be heard on 
closer inspection to be articulated in a rather mechanical fashion. Noticing this detail 
will lead one to simulate the music as having a more subtle or ambiguous expressive 
quality. 
 
The appreciation of details is also affected by the attention level of the listener. On 
some occasions, the listener’s attention may wander in and out of the music so much 
that the expressive content of entire sections is missed. This may be the result of 
performing other activities whilst listening to the music, some complementary to it 
such as dancing, others not, such as cooking. Or it may be that the music triggers a 
private reverie that distracts the listener for a time. Completely undistracted and fully 
attentive listening is a fairly rare thing. My principle allows these distortions to be 
overcome because gaining expertise as a result of repeated listenings will tend 
towards attention to all the details of the music. It is also clear that repeated 
listenings help to rule out distortions caused by temporary differences in the 
listener’s background state, such as being drunk or preoccupied by a private emotion. 
These conditions can cause the expressive qualities of the music to be mixed or 
blended with one’s own current emotional state, distorting its real expressive quality. 
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Yet even given that the listener is in a sober and emotionally tranquil state, 
undisturbed by private associations and paying close attention to the music, 
significant differences may still result due to the ways that listeners organise the 
music perceptually, that is, how they prioritise certain features above others. 
Knowledge of the means by which a piece was produced, or theoretical awareness of 
resemblance effects, can allow the expert listener to more distinctly pick out the 
expressive features of a work. But more significantly, different styles of music 
recommend different ways in which the music is to be perceptually organised. For 
example, a listener to a typical Classical era work is likely to concentrate on the 
theme and the way that it develops. In contrast, a listener to a Serialist composition 
may concentrate on the textural and atmospheric qualities of the work. Again these 
different forms of attention may reflect the expertise of the listener concerning their 
familiarity with the genre and the conventional ways it is appreciated. 
 
All of these different attentive attitudes could affect whether or not an emotion is 
recognised and the intensity with which the emotion is expressed. However I would 
not expect this to result in different basic types of emotions being recognised. Rather 
I would expect a refinement effect where listeners tend to agree on the basic 
expressive quality of the music but disagree on its more subtle, complex, or 
long-term features. Now it is possible that non-expert listeners could validly use their 
simulation mechanisms to recognise contrary expressive properties in the music as a 
result of attending to different detailed features, and then attribute those properties to 
the work as a whole. Yet an expert should be able to reconcile or synthesise these 
contradictions by being able to specify more exactly which features of the music 
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display which emotion. Thus there is still a definite sense that even very fine-grained 
expressive qualities can be really held by the music. 
 
This claim is backed up by empirical evidence of the wide levels of agreement about 
the expressive content of music that I cited in the previous chapter. There is also 
evidence of cross-cultural agreement on basic expressive properties. In one 
experiment by Balkwill and Thompson (1999) for instance, Western listeners were 
asked to identify the emotional character of four Hindustānī ragas, which had been 
classed by Indian experts as expressing either joy, sadness, anger or peace. It was 
found that Western listeners tended to make the same judgements as the experts, 
though they performed slightly worse for angry and peaceful ragas. A follow up 
experiment showed that Japanese listeners were equally able to discern intended 
expressions of joy, anger, and sadness in Western, Hindustānī and Japanese folk 
music (Balkwill, Thompson & Matsunaga 2006). A similar experiment by Adachi, 
Trehub & Abe (2004) found that both Canadian and Japanese listeners were able to 
accurately judge whether songs by Canadian children were either happy or sad 
(though Canadians tended to perform slightly better than Japanese listeners for 
expressions of happiness). 
 
According to these results, expressive cues in music appear to transcend cultural 
differences of tonality, genre and cultural associations.6 However these studies are 
limited by the extent to which people all over the world are exposed to the same 
influences through mass media film and popular music. In addition, these studies 
                                                     
6
 Stephen Davies similarly claims that Western listeners to Javanese Gamelan music (which employs 
a radically different tuning system to our own) would be unlikely to mistake their battle pieces for 
funeral music (Davies 1994: 244). 
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only look at very basic emotion labels. They are not sensitive to detailed changes in 
expressive content throughout the music which may reveal more disagreement. Some 
research has been attempted where arousal responses have been measured 
continuously throughout the music (Vaitl et al. 1993, cited in Scherer & Zentner 
2003: 377). This study found that physiological responses did vary according to 
particular musical features such as melody and rhythm, though interestingly there 
was a weak correspondence between physiological responses and arousal ratings 
made by the listeners. Clearly more studies of this kind will be extremely useful to 
verify the particular role that various features of the music have. Our everyday 
recognitions of emotions in people are sensitive to quite subtle changes in expression. 
The same should be expected of musical expression. 
 
In general however, music psychologists have been able to note several variables in 
music that reliably indicate the real expressive quality of the music; verifiable by 
using these features to accurately judge the expressive intent of the musician as well 
as what emotions listeners will recognise. These include some of the features that we 
have conceptually recognised as affording resemblance to emotions such as 
dynamics, tempo, timbre and articulation. Unfortunately larger scale details such as 
overall rhythm, melodic contour and tonal progression are too piece specific to draw 
many general conclusions. Verifying the effects of these features will require the 
kind of continuous measurement that I mentioned above. At any rate, Juslin 
organises some of the basic features that indicate emotional states into a lens model. 
In this model, the music is conceptualised as a filter comprising various expressive 
features through which the expressive communication between the listener and 
performer is mediated. 
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A Brunswickian lens model for communication of emotion in music performance 
(Juslin 2001: 324) 
 
Juslin notes that as in interpersonal expression, since several variables may equally 
indicate the presence of the same emotion, there is some redundancy as to whether a 
specific cue is required to communicate a specific emotion. Rather each cue acts as a 
probabilistic indicator of expressive intent such that where several cues are present it 
more reliably indicates the presence of a particular emotion. Hence although more 
sensitive listeners may be able to pick up on more expressive details, and thus make 
more reliable judgements, fairly non-sensitive listeners should also be capable of 
identifying the expressive content of a work. 
 
This probabilistic model is helpful in articulating an account of the resemblance 
between music and emotions. That is, we can locate specific features of the music 
that causally contribute to which emotion we perceive in it. However, it will not fully 
capture what is going on in the music, even at the level of the cues identified. This is 
because these various features must still be blended together to have their particular 
expressive effect. For instance, being slow may often be reliable indicator of a sad 
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expressive quality, yet sometimes it is not (consider a slow high whining siren for 
instance). The slowness of a work may not even consistently make it more sad, it 
may sometimes contribute to a fearful quality instead. Rather in order to express 
sadness, we must combine slowness with other features such as pitch, harmony or a 
falling melodic contour. This is why each cue can only be a probabilistic indicator, 
and why in general we identify the music as having the expressive quality, rather 
than simply its component features. In addition, the presence of several interacting 
cues can indicate the presence of more specific or subtle emotional states, i.e. not just 
anger, but anger of a greater intensity or anger mixed with a slight sense of 
melancholy. It is this kind of subtlety that is important for the composer or listener in 
determining the special aesthetic quality of the work. 
 
In general a more accurate idea of the expressive qualities of music would better 
focus less on basic emotional labels and more on dynamic emotional variables such 
as degrees of activation, ‘darkness’, or power (cf. Zentner & Scherer 2003: 381). 
These are the kinds of variables that can be continuously measured throughout the 
music. They are what will reveal fine-tuning in listeners’ responses, and hopefully a 
more accurate indication of expertise. They also allow us to identify more consistent 
effects of certain features. For instance, being loud generally contributes to the 
work’s expression of power. Hence more empirical evidence that looks at continuous 
responses is required to determine the specific features within musical works that 
underlie its overall disposition to express emotions. 
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Differences between Music and Real Emotions 
Having identified what the real expressive powers of music amount to, we are now in 
a position to judge exactly how much music is like emotions. Our argument has been 
that when we listen to music, some of the same epistemic conditions are satisfied as 
enable us to recognise emotions in people. The reason this can be done is because 
music bears some metaphysical similarities to emotional states. However, these 
similarities need only necessarily be of the most minimal kind to enable the listener 
to pick out an emotional state. 
 
Yet in the previous chapter I noted that music, in terms of intensity and immediacy, 
is generally superior to other art forms in expressing emotions. It is even possible for 
musical expressions of emotion to affect us more deeply than expressions of 
emotions in people. I explained that this is because music bears considerable 
sensational and structural similarities to feelings and the bodily patterns that generate 
them. Thus music captures the most central component of emotional states. I also 
argued in chapter one that what makes a certain bodily pattern appropriate for a 
certain emotion is partly the behavioural responses that it underlies. Music can 
resemble behavioural gestures as much as inner changes. So the various bodily 
aspects of emotions are vividly captured by music. Moreover, these movements and 
feelings are not merely conventionally interpreted as emotional movements and 
feelings. They have a complexity, duration and intensity that are unique to emotional 
states. 
 
However, there is more to emotional states than bodily patterns and the behavioural 
movements that accompany them. In particular, the primary function of emotions is 
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to represent general relations between subject and world (the core relational theme). 
Similarly, our behavioural responses only make sense in so far as they react to and 
manipulate those themes. By generating the illusion of a persona, music can generate 
a sense of the intentionality of an emotional state. Yet a more complete resemblance 
to emotions should capture the situations that the bodily patterns are tracking. This is 
precisely the aspect of emotions which, it is widely believed, pure instrumental 
music is incapable of expressing. 
 
It is this consideration that grounded Eduard Hanslick’s famous attack on the 
expressive powers of music. Since Hanslick held that emotions are distinguished by 
their situations and music cannot capture these situations, it followed that music 
could not express distinct emotional states. Hanslick’s most vivid example was to 
show that an aria from Gluck’s opera Orfeo ed Euridice seemed to appropriately 
match words of passionate love as well as words of anguish. Yet we might complain 
that Hanslick can only do this by extracting the aria from its full musical context. 
Similarly, we could extract the most heart-rending line from a tragedy and place it in 
a context that makes it amusing instead. So what Hanslick really needs to show is 
that whilst preserving the very same musical context, the aria could be expressive of 
both joy and sorrow. 
 
Yet even if this was possible, Hanslick’s example has been criticised by Kivy (1990) 
because in both cases the emotion is still a passionate one. Hence the expressive 
character of the music is definitely passionate even if that passion is of an 
indeterminate kind (cf. my comments above on experts reconciling contrary 
interpretations). Sometimes ambiguity is a valued aspect of artistic expression. 
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Meanwhile it is still the case that other pieces of music can more unequivocally 
express joy or sorrow. 
 
Despite the problems with Hanslick’s example, we may still agree that music is 
lacking a feature that often helps to distinguish emotional states. Of course, my 
argument is that we recognise emotions in music the way we recognise emotions in 
other people, and we equally do not need to know what the object of another’s 
emotion is in order to tell which emotion they are undergoing. Yet part of the project 
of fully empathising with another is to try and get inside their mental state and 
appreciate its details from a first person perspective. In short, we often try to grasp 
the reasons for their emotion. As I mentioned in chapter two, the everyday situations 
in which we empathise with others are often full of contextual clues about what the 
other’s emotion could be about. Abstract music in contrast just doesn’t seem to 
supply those contextual reasons. 
 
So if we want to specify how much musical works are like everyday emotional states, 
then perhaps we should claim that music only expresses moods rather than regular 
emotions. I claimed in chapter one that moods are about everything rather than 
nothing. So as long as music invokes a general sense of aboutness, it could capture 
such a mood. However, I think we can articulate a better defence of the emotional 
accuracy of music than this. Recall my claim in chapter one that the contents of 
emotions are certain formal or general qualities of situations (cf. Prinz 2004: 62-63, 
185). The particular object of the emotion (say the loss of a child) is represented as 
having emotional relevance in virtue of instantiating a general core relational theme 
(loss of something valued). Otherwise emotions are blind to colours or shapes or 
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even the identity of objects in so far as they do not contribute to this core relational 
theme. Similarly the visual perception of colour only need capture surface qualities, 
not the identity of the object. So I think it is unreasonable to demand that music 
capture the complete details of a situation that might accompany an emotional state. 
Many details of that situation are just not part of the emotion’s representational 
content. We can then admit that music typically lacks the particular object of the 
emotion. But what really matters to the content of the emotion is the general theme 
which the particular object instantiates. 
 
Now as I discuss below, certain ‘higher’ emotions such as jealousy are more 
essentially tied to a certain sort of conceptual content. For the moment however, 
even if we stick to basic emotions, we must still account for how music captures their 
general content. Yet in what sense is this general content anything more than the 
dynamics represented by the bodily pattern? I argued in chapter one that emotions 
represent the self’s relation to the world, so we might complain that the music lacks a 
self and a world. However music captures a subject by invoking a sense of a persona. 
Moreover, as Malcolm Budd says, it is not typically the case that every single detail 
of the music is responsible for determining the character of the emotion (and thus the 
persona) expressed (Budd 1995: 145). So it is quite possible for other details of the 
music to even provide a ‘world’ with which the persona interacts.7 Music can 
provide a sense of a persona conquering that world (e.g. Beethoven’s Eroica 
symphony), or one overwhelmed by the forces that surround it (e.g. Birtwistle’s 
Melancholia I). So there is no reason to suppose that music cannot properly capture 
at least some core relational themes. 
                                                     
7
 Alternatively, the world of the persona could simply be the actual world. I explore this possibility 
when considering how a performer can identify with the emotion they express. 
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Another apparent consequence of lacking an object situation is that musical emotions 
do not capture the valency of emotions, i.e. the broad sense that emotions are 
positive or negative or stimulate approach or avoidance behaviours. This is suggested 
by the fact that we often seek out and enjoy sad or angry music, and even allow 
ourselves to be fully aroused by such emotions. But why would we do this if these 
emotions are normally unpleasant to experience? However it is clear that the very 
same problem arises for our enjoyment of sad books or films, which do at least 
provide imaginary situations. Hence this lack of valence is more likely due to the 
simulated nature of the emotion expressed rather than anything necessarily 
concerning the abstract nature of music. Moreover even if we agree that music can 
express generalised moods, the problem still arises because normally we are just as 
averse to sad moods as we are to sad regular emotions. 
 
Overall there may be many different reasons why we enjoy sad art works (see 
especially Levinson 1997). Yet I think for the case of music at least, the simplest 
answer is that to feel tears welling up, to feel heavy and drooping, even to feel a pang 
of the heart, is not essentially a bad feeling. Remove the need to actually do anything 
about it, and there’s no reason why the feeling of sadness can’t be quite pleasant, 
especially when music dignifies it with formal elegance.8 This does not seem like a 
pathological or masochistic attitude to take. Though, if one were inclined to 
repeatedly arouse oneself with sad music we might suspect some deeper personal 
issue at work. So the valence of an emotion does not seem to be an essential part of 
                                                     
8
 Kendall Walton (1978) makes a similar argument; that it is not the feeling of the emotion that is 
unpleasant but actually being in that state of affairs. Though we might jump out of our seats (an 
avoidance reaction) when watching a scary film, this is because we make-believe that we are actually 
in the situation. 
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its phenomenology in every case (though in some cases, to suffer or enjoy the feeling 
may be a pervasive part of its character). Of course, if we recognise that a piece of 
music sounds sad, we can infer that sadness is normally ‘a bad thing’. But ultimately, 
it is how much we like the music that determines whether we avoid it or seek it out, 
and as I mentioned in the previous section, preferences like these are not strictly 
relevant to the music’s real expressive properties. 
 
So although it is true that music fails to capture the particular situations that typically 
cause emotional states, I do not think that this detracts too much from the 
resemblance that music bears to emotions, even the meaningful content of those 
emotions. The main difference is the simulated nature of the emotion expressed. And 
as we see in the next chapter, there are cases when even this is overcome, as when 
the music constitutes part of the actual emotional reaction of the performer. Also, 
given the lack of a specific emotionally inducing situation, it might be fair to say that 
the music does not express a particular instance of the emotion in the sense that the 
happiness I feel when I meet my friend is a particular emotion. Yet it is particular in 
the sense that it’s happening right here and now and typically to a specific imagined 
person (see below). So I don’t think it’s right to say that music captures happiness 
itself (e.g. Budd 1995 and Schopenhauer 1907). It would be more accurate to say that 
certain extraneous features of the causes and consequences of the emotion have been 
stripped away. 
 
However as I mentioned above, the fact that music does lack particular object 
situations to which the emotion is directed does limit which emotions music is able to 
capture. In particular, it is often claimed that music is unable to express the more 
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complex social emotions such as embarrassment, jealousy, envy, hope and guilt. I 
argue below how with the aid of an imagined persona, a sequence of several feelings 
within a piece of music may give the distinctive sense of a more complex blended 
emotion. Yet no such technique seems available to express emotions such as jealousy 
or guilt. 
 
Davies argues that the distinctiveness of these higher emotions relies on the 
particular sorts of thoughts or situations that cause them. Similarly, he argues that 
thoughts are often required to distinguish between emotions within the same general 
type, such as grief, despondency, dejection, gloom, moping and broken-heartedness 
within the category of sadness (Davies 1994: 226). These forms of sadness are 
distinguished by what they are directed towards. Without the context of the death of 
a loved one for instance, the expression of grief is indistinguishable from one of very 
intense and prolonged sadness.  
 
In order to fully understand why music cannot express these states, we need to look 
more closely at our theory of emotions. According to Prinz’s perceptual theory, the 
same or very similar feelings, what he calls the ‘nominal’ content, may track 
different kinds of situations. For instance, the feeling of jealousy may only be 
distinct from the broader feeling of anger because it is directed at romantic rivals. 
And it is only because some cultures hypercognize the general qualities of certain 
emotion inducing situations that such emotional states are distinguished at all. In 
these cases then, the more specific object of that emotion is necessary to distinguish 
that hypercognized emotional state. Since music cannot provide that specific object 
(at least without additional imaginative input from the listener) it cannot express 
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those states. If however, the bodily pattern associated with jealousy only 
accompanied situations of that induce jealousy rather than general states of anger, 
then that bodily pattern, expressible in music, would be sufficient to distinguish that 
state. 
 
Levinson suggests a slightly different possibility however; that the music may 
provide just enough information to ‘hook into’ a complex emotional state without 
capturing its key distinguishing feature (Levinson 1990: 344-346). By way of 
example, he refers to a passage in Mendelssohn’s Hebrides Overture which 
expresses happiness after a relatively darker period, and which in particular 
resembles a reaching gesture. This Levinson claims, is enough to pick out hope. Yet 
on carefully listening to this passage several times, even whilst guided by Levinson’s 
description, I simply don’t get the sense of anticipation or future directedness which 
would enable me to pick out hope. It seems at least as reasonable to suppose that it 
expresses a sense of relief from the earlier darker period, with a particular swelling 
of joy at the point Levinson believes is expressive of hope. 
 
Now it may be that the feelings of hope have a distinct nuance all of their own, 
which are never the same as feelings of mild happiness. I must confess however, that 
I don’t have a clear sense of what hope feels like. I am not sensitive enough to this 
particular feeling to distinguish it from happiness, though Levinson may be. 
Moreover, it may be that hope need not involve a particular thought. It may be 
possible to have a hopeful mood wherein one’s life in general appears to have a 
hopeful quality. Without even a general idea of the future however, I doubt that it 
could be distinguished from a mere sense of well-being. 
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Yet I think it conceivable that a piece could suggest thoughts of the future to a 
listener who was very familiar with that piece. For instance, Sibelius’ 5th Symphony 
delays the full exposition of its main joyful theme until the very end. So in a similar 
case, when listening to earlier passages that seem close to this theme, perhaps 
involving reaching gestures similar to the Hebrides, the listener may be led to 
anticipate the thematic climax. They could then say that the current passage 
expresses a feeling of anticipation for this climax, it seems to reach for it. If it then 
also seems happy after a period of sadness (perhaps when musically speaking, the 
climax was becoming ever more remote) it could therefore be suggestive of the 
emotion of hope. 
 
Levinson himself implies such a possibility, but only demands an awareness of 
earlier passages to express any complex emotion, and so such a climax (when it is 
actually heard) could only confirm an earlier impression of hope (Levinson 1990: 
370). However, such an idea of a later part of the piece seems essential to me in 
order to convey the necessary sense of future directedness. Of course, it is 
unreasonable to confidently judge the capacity of such a piece to express hope 
without actually hearing it. Also the problem with this case is that it requires the 
listener to perceptually organise very long term characteristics of the music in a very 
specific way. Nevertheless, under very limited circumstances, it seems possible that 
music might adequately express some of the higher emotions. 
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Imaginative additions 
Overall music has genuine dispositional properties to express virtually every aspect 
of emotional states, though it is limited in regards to which emotions it expresses as a 
result of not expressing some more specific contents. Of course, there is nothing 
stopping the listener from imaginatively providing those contents for himself. It is 
just that additional imaginative projects may detract from the real expressive content 
of the music. Schopenhauer recognises this point when he says: 
 
Certainly we have a tendency to realise [the emotions] while we listen, 
and to clothe them in imagination with flesh and bones, and to see in 
them scenes of life and nature on every hand. Yet taken generally, this is 
not required for their comprehension or enjoyment, but rather imparts to 
them a foreign and arbitrary addition: therefore it is better to apprehend 
them in their immediacy and unity. (Schopenhauer 1907 Vol. 3: 235) 
 
Yet even if we restrict our imagination to the emotions expressed, the ways in which 
people conceptualise emotions can differ. Of course, the whole thrust of these last 
two chapters has been to show how in all cases the experience is based on a feeling 
of bodily patterns. Yet there is nothing to prevent listeners from elaborating that 
experience to themselves in different ways. In particular, the imaginative addition 
that I want to explore here is the different ways that listeners can ‘flesh out’ the 
persona they hear in the music. It is important to explore these different imaginative 
possibilities because in these cases the imagination is still very much caught up with, 
or guided by the expressive qualities of the music. It seems that if the listener must 
imagine a person, then they often imagine the persona in some quite definite form. 
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There then seem to be various contextual reasons why a listener might imagine one 
form of persona rather than another. However, it should be noted my predictions of 
these contextual factors are rather speculative, though they should be susceptible to 
empirical investigation. 
 
The two main kinds of persona that I briefly indicated in chapter three concerned 
whether the persona was imagined as somehow ‘behind’ the music or embodied by 
the music itself. In the first scenario listeners imagine that some person is producing 
the music, either in a conventional manner, such as by playing an instrument or 
singing, or simply by making the music emanate from their body in some magical 
fashion. In this case then, the persona is imagined to undergo an emotional state that 
is directly responsible for the sounds that the persona produces, and in which the 
quality of the sound reflects the character of their feeling. This first kind of persona 
seems most likely to be imagined when it is easier for the listener to perceive how 
the music may be produced by a person, for example, if it is obviously a piece for 
solo instrument. Moreover, if the listener has background experiences of the 
production of that kind of music, either because he is a musician, or because he is 
currently observing musicians in the very act of producing the work, then this form 
of imagined persona is more apt. 
 
In the second scenario the music is imagined to be a person that exists in musical 
form. Saam Trivedi describes what I take to be this possibility when he says we 
imagine the music as “the very being that is animate and whose emotions are being 
expressed musically” (2001: 414).9 Malcolm Budd similarly describes cases where 
                                                     
9
 Though Trivedi claims that this does not count as a persona because he adopts a rather restrictive 
view of a persona as something automatically distinct from the music itself. 
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you imagine the music to be an instance of the feeling (1995: 148). Both descriptions 
pick out a persona who possesses the feeling, and though this persona is embodied 
by the music, it is still imagined to have roughly human characteristics, or at least to 
move in human-like ways. Yet the main feature of this persona is that by hearing the 
expressive music we imagine that we directly perceive its emotional feelings, as if 
we were hearing inside its body. 
 
It seems to me that this kind of imagined persona requires a little more imaginative 
work on the part of the listener, given that it is quite unlike the creatures we perceive 
in everyday life. Yet this persona also seems more likely when the music is one of 
large-scale orchestral forces, i.e. the sound has the kind of solidity and continuity that 
makes it more appropriate to hear it as a single living thing. Note also that the 
relation of the persona’s emotion to its musical body could vary according to which 
features in the music are perceived as directly bearing on quality of the emotion 
expressed. For instance, if the emotional quality of the work only seems to be 
expressed by the particular emphasis or attack on the notes, then the other features of 
the work may be imagined as the overall body that bears those particular emotional 
signs, analogous to a facial expression on an otherwise unexpressive body. On the 
other hand, if a large number of the work’s features all seem to contribute to its 
emotional quality then the whole work may be imagined as a body leaping about in 
an expressive manner. In general the two main forms of persona I have identified 
could be mixed such that some features of the music embody the persona, and other 
features are imagined as produced by the persona. 
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A third possibility that Budd suggests is that the listener may imagine undergoing the 
emotion himself. This is also a case of a persona, since the listener utilises a 
self-conscious idea of his own person or at least his own body, to make sense of the 
emotion in the music. The particular way in which the music’s expressive qualities 
are identified (as an expression or instance of the feeling) can then correspond to 
either or both of the two major types of persona I outlined above. 
 
Identifying oneself as the bearer of the music’s expressive content is a particularly 
interesting variety of musical experience because the listener allows himself to 
become deeply personally absorbed in the music. In these cases the listener may also 
imagine some scenario or think about some specific situation in his own life that the 
emotion represents. It seems that this form of imaginative engagement is most likely 
when performing because the musician should have a sense of control over the 
features of the music that enables a corresponding sense of personal ownership over 
the expressive content. However, we see an interesting contrasting view in an 
interviewee in Evan Eisenberg’s book The Recording Angel: 
 
When I play a record... it’s as though someone else were expressing my 
feelings. When I play piano, it’s as though I were expressing someone 
else’s feelings. (quoted in Eisenberg 1988: 132) 
 
Depending on the context, the listener imagines two different sorts of persona (either 
himself or another). Perhaps when playing a piece composed by someone else, the 
listener feels like they are controlled by that composer, or channeling the composer’s 
emotional state. In contrast when they put on a record, they are more able to identify 
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emotionally with the music because the composer or performer seems more distant, 
though they still have a sense that another person mediates the emotion. 
Identification with recordings is also plausible because listener can become 
extremely familiar with the content of the music and so is able to anticipate its every 
nuance. In all these cases there are variations according to the sense of control and so 
in general I would expect the higher the degree of control, the more likely the listener 
will personally identify with the emotion expressed.10 Accordingly in the next 
chapter I analyse the case of improvising musicians as paradigm examples of 
identifying with the music they produce. 
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning a quite common variety of musical experience in 
which the listener imagines a visual scene, as if the music were accompanying a film. 
Now the abstract nature of music lends itself to more than emotional interpretations. 
Sometimes listeners even imagine conceptual arguments to fit the music. Yet the 
reason I mention this particular imaginative addition is because it seems possible for 
that visual scene to be taken as an emotional interpretation of the music. That is, the 
listener has an implicit sense of a person (probably themselves) confronting that 
particular scene and having an emotional response as a result. 
 
This imaginative project seems most likely when the emotional personality of the 
listener is such that when they have emotions, they tend to focus more exclusively on 
the object or event causing that emotion than on the way their body feels (cf. Laird & 
                                                     
10
 Whether or not the listener identifies with the subject of the emotional music may potentially affect 
how we label the emotion perceived. One interesting possibility is that when listening to the kind of 
music we typically call scary, taking a first person perspective may make it appear threatening (angry), 
where a third person perspective may render it threatened (i.e. fearful). It is still the same feeling that 
is being expressed, it’s just that the perspective on that feeling differs. Perhaps this could explain the 
occasional confusions between these two forms of musical expression that have been found in 
empirical studies (e.g. Terwogt & Van Grinsven 1991 cited in Dowling 1999). 
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Bresler 1992). As such they may have developed very strong associations between 
certain emotions and certain scenes. Clearly listeners who engage in this sort of 
imaginative project will have quite different experiences. Yet if that visualisation is 
based upon the proper emotional qualities of the music, then although the potential 
variety of scenes that the listener may imagine is vast, it should be possible for other 
listeners to accept the appropriateness of that scene for the emotion in question. 
 
Having now identified the various forms of the persona in music, there are then 
several ways in which the listener’s more developed imaginative construction of the 
persona can differ. Perhaps most dramatically, the listener might identify the music 
with the emotions of several personae rather than just one, either all simultaneously, 
or sequentially one after another. This is a possibility that Davies raises when he 
complains that a persona cannot provide unity to a work of music that has none 
already (Davies 1997: 106 cf. Vermazen 1986: 202). The persona theorist should 
admit this at least. The only necessary role of the persona is to allow the expression 
of mental states at all. 
 
Yet if by its formal or thematic unity, the music suggests that a single persona stands 
behind several emotional transformations, it seems possible for music to express 
more complex emotions. For instance Ravel’s Piano Concerto for the Left Hand 
expresses feelings of sorrow transforming into feelings of anger and then joy. When 
the listener imagines a single person undergoing all these successive states the music 
may express the more complex blended emotional state of defiance. By developing 
my imagination of the persona I am then able to fill out this emotion in a variety of 
ways. Since I know that Paul Wittgenstein, who lost his right arm in the First World 
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War, commissioned the piece, I can imagine how awful it must have been for a 
concert pianist to lose his arm. So I ascribe the sorrow and anger in the music to the 
sorrow and struggle of Wittgenstein when trying to overcome his disability. Then, 
since he is still able to overcome his disability and perform a great piece of music, 
the following joyful feelings express his feeling of joyful defiance. Joy succeeding 
sorry becomes joy about overcoming sorrow. 
 
Similarly, when the listener is well aware that a particular person is responsible for 
the music, their understanding of that person’s character may lead them to interpret 
the emotions they perceive in the same way as we do when empathising with people 
we already know (see chapter two). For instance, knowing that Beethoven composed 
the music, the listener may think ‘Beethoven was a bad tempered but passionate man 
who overcame his loss of hearing’. This information then feeds back into the sense 
of the emotion expressed, and a sense of joy becomes one of heroism. 
 
Of course, it is by no means necessary to imagine such elaborate programme notes 
attached to the music. Yet once the persona conception is invoked, the imagination 
of the listener may develop it however they wish, and as a result experience the 
expressive content of the music with all kinds of additional nuances. Moreover, in 
any given listening situation, which of the above elaborations are employed will 
largely depend on the listener’s background attitudes and beliefs about musical 
experience. Yet as in the case of imagined situations, we would expect the personae 
that listeners imagine to be appropriate to the expressive content of the music. For 
instance, one would not typically imagine a punk rocker embodying Bach’s 
Goldberg variations. In addition, it seems that certain aspects of the listening 
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environment will push that elaboration in one particular direction rather than another. 
As such, alignments in the listeners’ background attitudes and listening situation may 
well result in a corresponding alignment in their imaginative engagement with the 
music. Unfortunately, there do not appear to be any empirical studies that try to 
confirm this possibility. Yet I would predict some significant affects in the responses 
of listeners both at the level of immediate arousal and their imaginative projects 
when listening in groups as opposed to individually. 
 
Music and Colour 
Overall I have built a case for saying that expressive qualities really are in the music. 
The emotional experience that these expressive qualities generate in us is of a 
simulated or fictional kind. Yet this is mostly because the perceived emotion is not 
representing a real situation. In the next chapter I present cases where despite 
utilising the simulative capacity of the performer, the music can qualify as partly 
constituting a real emotional state. 
 
In general we can legitimately say the music possesses the expressive quality in the 
same way as objects possess colours (where colours are construed as secondary 
qualities). The music possesses a dispositional property to express to suitable 
listeners the intrinsic nature of an emotional state. There are of course differences in 
the ways that listeners understand what it is they are hearing, and the kinds of 
imaginative activities they engage in. Yet ultimately, these differences should be 
grounded in the resemblance that music bears to emotions. Hence the different 
responses of listeners are likely to be refinements of more universal responses rather 
than radically different. Our responses should at least be intelligible to the expert 
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listener, if not also to each other. This allowance for expertise does not make 
emotions in music less dispositional than colour. We might equally say that some 
people are more exquisitely sensitive to colour variations than others. 
 
As I noted above however, one important difference between colour perception and 
emotional perception in music is that our capacity for the latter has in all probability 
evolved for a different purpose. That is, our recognitions of emotions in music are 
situated within a context of recognising emotions in interpersonal contexts. Now 
given that the mechanisms by which music expresses emotions are largely 
sub-personal and innate, it is conceivable that a piece of music could express an 
emotion to a listener that he had never before experienced, or at least a more specific 
variety of that emotion. Yet in general our experiences of emotions in everyday 
contexts are liable to play a significant role in developing sensitivity to the 
expressive qualities of music. This is particular relevant to musicians, who it is 
typically claimed must mature emotionally before they can express emotions very 
convincingly (a musical performance can equally be ‘beyond one’s years’ in more 
than just technical respects). 
 
In this way the background experiences or personality of the listener may cause them 
to be more susceptible to certain emotions that should allow them to recognise its 
occurrence in music more readily. Similarly, different listeners may be used to 
dealing with emotions and the way they are expressed in different ways. For instance, 
men might be more inclined to suppress their sensitivity to emotions that indicate 
weakness. Furthermore, even if listeners do recognise the very same emotion, the 
different affects that such recognition can have on different listeners could be 
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profound. One listener may be completely jaded, and regard the expression as 
sentimental or silly where another is moved to tears. In my own experience, there 
have been some occasions in which a piece of music has seemed to capture the entire 
human condition. I suspect however that most other listeners to those pieces would 
not have experienced such an intense reaction.  
 
Music seems to go deeper into the human experience of feeling than any other art 
form, and can drag these experiences out into the open for all to see. I mentioned 
above how we may be more sensitive to emotions in music than we are to emotions 
in people. It seems plausible to suppose that when an emotion is so obviously 
attached to definite person with their own concerns, (that may conflict with our own) 
our sense of being separate from that person is sometimes intensified. Yet when 
presented in abstract there is no such barrier to embracing the emotion expressed as 
one’s own. Similarly when there’s no specific object or state of affairs that the 
emotion is directed at, the imagination is free to associate the expressive content with 
whatever situation one likes, or if contagiously aroused by the music, to introspect on 
one’s own physical feelings and to allow them to be shaped and transformed by the 
way the music progresses. 
 
Yet despite the abstract nature of emotions in music, the emotions expressed are not 
sui generis. If music expressed completely distinctive emotions then it would be 
quite mysterious why we describe it using everyday emotional terms, or why music 
arouses and absorbs us to the extent that it does (cf. Davies 1994: 203). The main 
difference between music and everyday emotions is that music idealises the 
emotional experience. As Susanne Langer says, “sheer self expression requires no 
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artistic form” (Langer 1951: 184). But in its role as an art form, music extends, 
reflects and transforms common everyday feelings into sometimes intensely poignant, 
sometimes heroic attitudes. This is a difference of exaggeration or complexity rather 
than a difference in kind of emotion expressed. Music makes us concentrate more on 
feelings than we might otherwise do so. As such the capacity of music to allow the 
deep appreciation of emotions, as well as give them a sense of order and completion 
is one of the most valuable experiences that art can provide. 
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Chapter Five: Expression and Extended Cognition 
 
The ‘realist’ expression theory was rejected in chapter three because it was not 
necessary for the music to be causally related to a composer’s emotional state for that 
music to be expressive. However, it was later granted that on a phenomenal level the 
listener treats the music as if it were the expression (or embodiment) of a persona’s 
emotion. In this chapter, the expressive content of music is considered from the 
standpoint of the composer or performer. I claim that whilst the composer or 
performer need not express his own emotional state, it is still a value that may be 
effectively pursued, and for which music is highly suitable. Moreover I will argue for 
the possibility of an extremely intimate connection between the emotional content of 
the music and the emotional state of the person who produces that music. Under 
certain specified conditions, the music may not just influence, but also partially 
constitute the musician’s emotional state. 
 
The most significant of these conditions requires that the musician be able to control 
the content of the music in an immediate and detailed way. Allowing for this level of 
control leads me to focus on jazz improvisation. Having focused on this style of 
music I then analyse some of the explanations for how it is that jazz improvisation is 
accomplished and in what ways this contributes to the value of the genre. In pursuit 
of a deeper explanation for what I call the ‘individuality’ of jazz improvisation, I 
then explore the expression theories of Benedetto Croce and R. G. Collingwood, in 
particular the idea that the artist clarifies his own emotional state by expressing it. 
Whilst this central insight is preserved, I emphasise the essential role of the artistic 
medium (in this case the musical instrument or the sounds produced) to that state. 
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This leads me to the theory of extended cognition (also known as vehicle 
externalism), which argues that the physical constitution of some mental states 
extends beyond the brain of the subject. After showing how this theory applies to 
improvised performance, I then justify two claims: Firstly, that playing the 
instrument cognitively extends the musician’s creation of the music. Then secondly, 
and more significantly, that playing the music cognitively extends the musician’s 
emotion. 
 
The first claim is argued to be true of all cases of jazz improvisation. The second 
claim is only true of a subset of cases, yet it captures one of the central goals of jazz 
performance. Given this, the second claim then breaks down into a stronger and a 
weaker version. The weaker version states that the music elaborates the emotional 
state of the musician, playing the same role as his bodily changes in generating and 
maintaining the bodily pattern. The stronger claim is that the music replaces the role 
of bodily changes in generating the bodily pattern.1 And thus that the musician’s 
experience of the music more fully constitutes his experience of his emotion. 
 
The Musician’s Emotion 
One of the key problems with the realist expression theory was that it left 
unanswered the question of how it is that feeling a certain way whilst producing a 
work is supposed to convey these characteristics to the work itself. As a typically 
mediated and highly contrived process, music composition is unlike painting where 
potentially a violent stroke of the brush could be recognised as such by the viewer. 
                                                     
1
 Note that since conscious attention to feelings is not necessary for emotional states, the experience of 
an emotion is distinct from the emotion itself (see chapter one). Accordingly, I do not argue that the 
experience of the emotion is partially constituted by the music. 
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Even in the more direct case of performance, it is not the case that the emotion of the 
musician is necessarily transmitted to the work. In order to explicate this, it is worth 
distinguishing several levels at which the emotional state of the musician may affect 
the character of the music: 
 
First of all, the musician may be in an emotional state prior to performance. 
Performing whilst in that state then affects the character of the music. For instance, 
being anxious causes the musician to make mistakes. A second possibility is that the 
emotional state of the musician affects the music in such a way that the character of 
the emotion is reflected in the character of the music. For instance, the musician feels 
anxious, and playing the music in an anxious way causes the music to have an 
anxious character (perhaps a tremor in the hands leads to a tremor in the sound). A 
third possibility is that the musician is in relatively neutral state prior to performance 
but is fully aroused by the character of the music he is playing (as a result of not 
inhibiting the simulative recognition of the music’s content). It may then follow that 
being infected by the character of the music affects the way the musician plays that 
music. Finally, a fourth possibility further allows that this changed performance style 
transmits the quality of the musician’s emotion back to the music. Hence a feedback 
loop could be generated whereby the music arouses the state of the musician, 
affecting the way he performs, which then affects the character of the music, 
potentially further arousing the musician and so on. 
 
In all cases, we should note that the emotion of the musician need not enhance the 
expressive value of the music. For example, taking the fourth possibility mentioned 
above; suppose that I play a piece of music expressive of anger and become aroused 
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by anger as a result. This then causes me to play more recklessly, striking the keys of 
my instrument more forcefully and quickening the tempo. As a result of this the 
music expresses anger even more convincingly, but at the same time, I hit lots of 
wrong notes, my timing is disrupted and soon the entire performance loses coherence. 
From one perspective this may be an interesting performance, but more likely it will 
be regarded as a distortion of the work, perhaps spoiling the planned development or 
resolution of the emotion conveyed by the music. Thus there is a difference between 
a musician’s aroused state affecting the performance and the musician using that 
arousal in a controlled way to enhance the performance. It is important that the goal 
of expressing one’s emotion does not conflict too much with the more intrinsic goal 
of conveying what is indicated in the score. 
 
Due to the high complexity of much classical music (and its corresponding difficulty) 
a cool, calm approach is usually demanded to ensure a successful performance of the 
work. As such, musicians are required to inhibit their emotional responses to the 
music. Antonio Damasio relates an experiment in which he monitored the 
physiological activity of pianist Maria Joâo Pires as she listened to a familiar piece of 
piano music and found that she could either allow or restrict “the flow of emotion to 
her body” at will, reducing her physiological responses, including lowering her heart 
beat and flattening her skin conductivity (Damasio 2000: 50). Since this experiment 
has not been performed on other musicians, we cannot say how common this ability 
is. Though we can admit that the ability to inhibit one’s own feelings is at least 
encouraged by classical performance practise.2 Yet encouraging emotional inhibition 
                                                     
2
 It may be that learning to perform enables musicians to develop greater control over their emotional 
responses or that people who already possess greater control over their emotions make better 
musicians. Interestingly, musicians tend be ‘bold introverts’, that is, they show several introvert 
tendencies (such as detachment and self-sufficiency) but can also be gregarious and expressive, so 
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sets up a tension within the classical performance situation. In order to ensure that 
the emotion expressed by the music is effectively conveyed, the musician must 
utilise their understanding of the way that emotion feels. This is particularly true of 
works where an expressive label (such as ‘agitato’) has simply been added to the 
score without specifying in detail how this is to be achieved. Understanding the 
emotion in the music will require the performer to use their own emotion generating 
mechanisms (just as in the case of the ordinary listener). Hence the classical 
performer must strike a balance between sensitivity to the emotional state they are 
trying to represent, whilst resisting getting carried away by it. 
 
Of course, it is possible that with exceptional control over the technicalities of 
performance, a certain amount of attention could be freed up to allow oneself to be 
more fully aroused. Yet ultimately, given the concern within the classical genre for 
fidelity to the score, the performer does not have much freedom to allow their 
emotion to affect the character of the work. Even quite subtle changes to the timing 
and dynamics of a piece can be detrimental to its coherence. Moreover, beginning a 
performance in an emotional state is unlikely to be beneficial since there is no reason 
to suppose that one’s state will appropriately match the emotion to be expressed in 
the work. On some occasions the performer may be able to decide which work from 
their repertoire would best match their state. Yet given a limited repertoire this is 
unlikely to be a very fine-grained choice and will allow only generic matching of 
expressive music to emotional state. So one would need more radical choice over the 
content of the music in order to exploit one’s emotion appropriately. 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
long as it’s on their own terms i.e. using musical performance (Kemp 1997: 27-28). 
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In contrast to classical performance, improvisatory performance allows the musician 
far greater control over the character of the work. Jazz in particular is much more 
flexible about what counts as right or wrong notes, emphasising spontaneity and 
communication over technical accuracy. As such, this genre should permit greater 
levels of emotional arousal in the players and a more immediate connection between 
the state of the musician and the nature of the work. There are still limits of course. 
Jazz improvisation is not the pure spontaneous production of music that it is 
sometimes taken to be. In most cases there is some kind of pre-planned reference 
material such as a written chord structure, melodic theme or background tonality that 
the musician uses to guide his performance. This reference material can then be more 
or less detailed as well as more or less possible to ignore. At one end of the scale, the 
performer has to follow a pre-written part and can only add his own emphasis or 
elaboration to it. At the other end of the scale, there is no referent material at all and 
the performer is not compelled to follow any kind of theme or tonality whatsoever 
(cf. Smith & Dean 1997: 32). 
 
For the sake of simplicity I am only interested in solo performance here. But one of 
the main reasons reference material is used at all is to enable several musicians to 
collaborate effectively. Again, the sounds produced by other musicians can be more 
or less embraced or ignored. Sometimes the soloist engages with the other 
performers by imitating or developing what they play in a quasi-conversational way. 
At other times, the other musicians are only there to provide a minimal ‘pad’ from 
which the performer can launch his own flights of imagination. In chapter seven I 
propose an ideal balance between sensitivity towards other musicians whilst still 
allowing individual expressive immediacy. For now though I take as my paradigm a 
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relatively unconstrained solo improvisation style which whilst sticking to the stylistic 
forms of the jazz genre, imposes no time constraints or adherence to a particular 
chord structure. This should be of ample sufficiency to let the performer’s emotion 
significantly affect the character of the music in a way that properly corresponds to 
the character of his feeling. It is thus closer to Modal or Free Jazz than Bebop. 
 
It’s not the case that I am reliant on this specific kind of improvisational style or even 
on the jazz genre generally in order to justify my claims. It’s likely that other forms 
of improvisational music may equally permit the kinds of expressive potential I 
argue for here.3 For example Ravi Shankar claims that at the creative peak of 
improvisation he loses all awareness of the strings of his sitar. He feels so directly 
fused with his instrument that creating music seems “more a release of inner energy 
than an activity requiring conscious effort” (Slawek 1998: 338). Yet I restrict my 
attention to jazz improvisation, partly due to my familiarity with this genre as a 
performer and listener, and partly because historically it has emphasised the personal 
expression of the musician. 
 
Musicological Explanations 
So I am interested in the extent to which jazz improvisation enables the musician to 
become emotionally engaged with the music. In addition, I claim that a high level of 
emotional engagement is not simply a possibility in jazz but one of the main goals of 
improvisational practise. It helps us to answer two very general questions we might 
                                                     
3
 It may also be argued that the presence of constraints can actually aid expressive engagement 
because it leaves the performer one less thing to worry about deciding (cf. Pressing 1998: 52). 
Moreover, in Free Jazz, it is possible that the extreme lack of structure can itself be constraining if the 
musicians constantly try to play sounds as different as possible from anything else they have played 
before. 
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have about jazz improvisation, which I distinguish as the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ 
questions. The ‘how’ questions concern how it is that the musician is able to generate 
the music at all. Given all the musical possibilities that are available, how does the 
musician choose what notes to play? The ‘why’ questions then concern the aesthetic 
value of improvisation. That is, what makes this style of performance valuable for 
the performer as well as the audience? What distinguishes good from bad improvised 
performances? 
 
To some extent the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ questions are related in that the means by 
which an improvisation is generated should reflect what makes it worthwhile. At the 
least, the very fact that it is improvised should have a significant role to play in 
determining its special aesthetic value. Conversely, a consideration of why 
improvisation is done should give us some clues as to the manner in which the 
musician goes or should go about doing it. So it is my hope that my claims about the 
extended cognition of emotion in music help explain how improvised performances 
are achieved and also give us insight into why improvisation can be such an 
aesthetically valuable activity, especially from the standpoint of the musician. 
 
However we can go some way towards saying how and why improvisation is done 
without having to appeal to the notion of extended cognition. We see that it is only 
when we pursue the questions to a fairly deep level of explanation that the 
justification for a stronger cognitive interaction between the musician and the music 
becomes apparent. Hence I first explore some of the musicological explanations of 
jazz improvisation before arguing for my extended cognition account. 
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To begin by addressing the how question, we can appeal to the familiarity of the 
musician with the conventions of the jazz idiom, his absorption in its stylistic 
language. For instance, the repetitive practise of various jazz ‘licks’ can provide the 
musician with a great deal of musical material that can be strung together to form a 
jazz solo. Yet the question then becomes, given various choices of appropriate licks, 
how does the musician choose which one to use at any given moment? We may 
respond that to a large extent, certain figures will simply fall more naturally under 
the fingers of the musician as he plays, particularly when he is playing very fast. 
Given that his hands are already in some position on the instrument, muscle memory 
can take over and find whatever acceptable figure happens to lie closest to that 
current position.4 However the performer is under no obligation to go for the easiest 
choice in any situation. There is nothing to stop him from being musically 
adventurous and leaping to a very distant hand position if he so desires. 
 
More importantly, improvisation is at its worst when the performer merely strings 
together ‘correct’ sounding notes without any sense of musically meaningful 
relations between these notes. Hence many jazz musicians emphasise the idea of 
telling a story, or having a conversation or argument with themselves through their 
playing. These analogies describe the way that the musician must be constantly 
looking back to what he has already played, and then repeating, contrasting or 
developing these figures in various ways such as by adding notes, translating the 
whole figure up or down, or stretching the intervals and rhythms involved. In 
addition the best players should be able to simultaneously develop a larger scale 
shape to the solo, such as building up in intensity or dissonance and then resolving it 
at the last moment. 
                                                     
4
 This observation will become relevant to my extended cognition account later on. 
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So we have an initial answer to the question of how the improvising musician is able 
to generate music, as well as some clues about the relative quality of different 
performances. Of course, the question now becomes; where do these larger scale 
structures come from? As the musician develops his material in performance, what 
guides him to take it in one direction rather than another? Are there any principled 
ways in which jazz solos are supposed to be structured?  
 
One possibility is that the musician absorbs certain large-scale structural principles 
from his previous experiences of listening to jazz music, which then become 
organised around mental prototypes of what counts as a great jazz solo. There is 
some initial motivation for this idea in that many musicians describe their 
introduction to jazz music in terms of being inspired by some great player that they 
then sought to emulate. At the same time, we can suppose that this emulation takes 
practical form in terms of developing an idea of what their musical heroes’ solos 
tended to sound like, which they then try to capture in their own playing. This 
emulation need not be pre-planned, or even particularly obvious to the musician. 
They may simply have an intuitive idea about what a jazz solo should sound like and 
try to match this intuition. We can also see how such emulation might be reinforced 
by rehearsal as well as how in the course of performance, the musician may find 
himself reminded of some great player’s sound, and then allow this memory to 
determine how he continues. 
 
This then is one of the ways that the historical continuity of jazz music may be 
established as an oral tradition passed from one generation to the next. However, I 
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don’t think we should be satisfied with this answer because as much as jazz 
musicians may want to maintain the spirit of the jazz sound inherited from their 
musical ancestors, they are also routinely criticised if they fail to demonstrate their 
own individual sound. For instance, Jazz analyst Ajay Heble sums up a variety of 
perspectives on jazz improvisation claiming: 
 
What all of these critics, despite their varied emphases and points of focus, 
have in common is their insistence that improvisation is a powerful ally in 
struggles for self-expression, self-determination, and self-representation. 
(Heble 2000: 93) 
 
It is taken as a sign of musical maturity in jazz circles that the musician transcends 
their musical influences in finding a more distinctive voice (cf. Berliner 1994: 256, 
274). Moreover, jazz musicians often claim to enjoy taking risks or surprising 
themselves in their performances. Yet if all they are seeking to do is replicate some 
pre-conceived ideal, why bother with such risks, or even to improvise at all? I don’t 
think we can claim that jazz musicians improvise just because that’s what their 
predecessors did. In order to justify improvisation as a significant musical practise 
we should look to values that would motivate the musical heroes as much as the 
modern players. Otherwise we can expect the virtues of improvisation to become 
progressively de-emphasised in jazz the way it has in classical performance. Thus, it 
seems to me that improvisation is not just a means of demonstrating virtuosity or as 
establishing oneself as part of a traditional community, but an important way in 
which this genre embodies the artistic goals of creativity, individuality and social 
engagement. It is the constant experimentation by good jazz performers, combined 
 177
with, and ultimately intensifying the personalisation of the jazz sound, that enables 
this genre to develop. Hence any account of jazz improvisation should try to show 
how it achieves these values. 
 
So we end up with the claim that improvisation is a way for musicians to 
demonstrate their individuality. However, if we look more closely into what it is that 
constitutes this individuality, i.e. having a distinctive kind of sound, we might again 
find it difficult to explain why this is best achieved by improvisation. What makes 
one player audibly distinguishable from another may be a certain expressive tone or 
style of emphasis, use of particular motifs, favoured intervals and harmonic voicings, 
or the melodic ways they structure their solos. But why can’t the jazz musician 
simply sit down before the performance and plan out all these distinctive features? It 
seems that it would be easier to create an unusual and unique musical performance if 
you had a chance to really think about it, allowing you to conscientiously avoid 
sounding like anyone else you can think of. This certainly seems to be the preferred 
method of the classical composer anyway. 
 
Perhaps it is because individuality must be tempered by coordination with the other 
musicians involved, and so improvisation is geared towards the flexibility to deal 
with the contingencies of the performance situation. Yet while this is certainly an 
important consideration, it seems equally possible that all the musicians involved 
could collaboratively plan what they were going to play beforehand. They could then 
all get to be unique and distinctive without worrying about treading on each others’ 
toes too much. So we are still left with the question of how improvisation as 
improvisation contributes to the sense of individuality. 
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I think the answer here is that the particular sense of individuality the jazz musician 
is driving towards is one characterised by ideals of personal freedom, the naturalness 
of playing what ‘feels right’ at that particular time, and the kind of sincerity achieved 
by committing to the moment of performance. Equally, the audience can appreciate 
that the improvisation is something unique to this particular situation that helps to 
generate, as well as reflect the mood of this moment in time. It is for this reason that 
I think the structure of an improvised solo is one ideally derived from the way the 
musician feels at that moment and their sense of the actual musical situation at hand. 
Hence we can appreciate what jazz trumpeter Lonnie Hillyer means when he says: 
 
All I am looking for is to get what I feel through the horn. When I was 
younger it was like trying to get what Dizzy felt through the horn, but, 
eventually, it’s got to come to be about you. Emotions are what it’s all 
about. (quoted in Berliner 1994: 261) 
 
So one of the ideals of jazz improvisation is the immediate emotional expression of 
the musician. However this is not to say that musicians will simply regurgitate 
whatever they happen to be feeling at that exact moment in musical form. If this was 
all there was to it, they could just as easily shout or groan with the same expressive 
success. Rather I claim that the music is a means for the musician to self-reflectively 
construct their feelings, to control and transform their felt states into something more 
artistically profound. It is with this in mind that we now turn to the Expression 
theories proposed by Benedetto Croce and R. G. Collingwood, who both developed 
this very idea. 
 179
 
Croce and Collingwood 
Croce and Collingwood both argue that the central purpose of art is to express the 
emotions of the artist. In particular, the music becomes something that the musician 
uses to think about himself, to explore and articulate his emotional state. Yet unlike 
Croce and Collingwood, I do not claim that emotional expression is the central 
purpose of art. I simply argue that it is one of the most important and valuable goals 
that the improvising musician can seek. 
 
Croce derives his idea of expression from a more general theory of mind. He claims 
that before we can conceive of objects within general categories (such as whether 
something is real or unreal, or using Kantian categories like space and time) we must 
first grasp them as individual entities. This is what he calls intuition. He then goes on 
to identify intuition with representation and expression. The reason for this is that 
understanding an object as an individual involves an active process of imposing 
order upon the raw impressions that we receive by fusing them together into coherent 
form. And we do not properly understand an object as an individual until, by 
imposing structure, we are able to articulate its particular characteristics. So for 
example Croce says, “How can we truly intuit a geometrical figure if we do not have 
so clear an idea of it as to be able to draw it right away on paper or on a blackboard?” 
(Croce 1992: 9). 
 
Thus Croce thinks of expression as our primary act when understanding the world. 
Only after we have imposed some structure upon our impressions are we then able to 
distinguish objects from each other and form more generalised concepts. The same 
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process applies to emotional states. We begin with the raw impressions of our 
feelings and by expression form them into distinct perceptions. Generalising these 
states under labels like ‘sad’ or ‘happy’ is then part of the later conceptualising stage. 
 
Similarly to Croce, Collingwood draws a connection between expression and an 
immediate kind of understanding:  
 
Expressing [one’s emotion], we saw, has something to do with becoming 
conscious of it; therefore, if being fully conscious of it means being 
conscious of all its peculiarities, fully expressing it means being 
conscious of all its peculiarities. (Collingwood 1958: 113) 
 
It is on this consideration that Collingwood bases his well-known distinction 
between art and craft. Because expression is a matter of becoming conscious of one’s 
emotion, the artist can have no detailed idea of what emotion he is expressing until 
he actually completes it. In contrast crafts (such as carpentry) employ a much clearer 
means-end distinction, where the craftsman has a definite goal in mind of what he 
wants to produce prior to executing it.5 If we argue that sometimes artists also have a 
clear idea of what they want to produce prior to executing it, Collingwood will argue 
that by this point the process of expression (and hence the main goal of the artist) has 
already taken place. Actually producing the artwork is just something that enables 
other people to access the expressive idea of the artist. This is what leads us to the 
familiar claim that Collingwood’s theory is idealist. For instance he says, “a piece of 
                                                     
5
 Though contra Collingwood, we may argue that not all crafts are completely specified prior to 
execution. For instance, a cook may gradually refine a meal as he cooks; adding ingredients until he 
perceives some exquisite balance of tastes has been achieved. Does this make cooking an art? 
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music is not something audible, but something which may exist solely in the 
musician’s head” (1958: 151). Here he seems to be stating that there is only a 
contingent relation between the true artwork, the artist’s expression, and the physical 
work before us. In other words, the existence of the artwork is sufficiently realised if 
the artist merely articulates it to himself mentally. Croce appears to take a similar 
stance: 
 
The aesthetic stage is completely over and done with when impressions 
have been worked up into expression... the work of art (the aesthetic work) 
is always internal; and what is called the external work is no longer the 
work of art. (Croce 1992: 56-57) 
 
Like any other object, the physical work is only so much raw material until the mind 
is able to organise the impressions it gets from it into an expression. Hence the 
physical object produced by the artist is just the stimulus for the construction of the 
true aesthetic object in the mind of the artist (or hopefully audience). So even if we 
argue that artists do not typically have a fully articulated idea of their works prior to 
physically producing them, Croce can say that these artists; 
 
... make brushstrokes, not to externalise their expressions which do not 
then exist, but as if to try out and to have a simple point of support for 
their internal meditations and contemplations. (Croce 1992: 114) 
 
This idea of support forestalls an objection based on the implausibility that mental 
images can be as distinctly articulated as most complex works of art. The physical 
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production of a complex work need only stimulate the raw impressions necessary to 
remind the artist of the complete expression. The problem is, if the external artwork 
now functions only as a reminder, it seems to be reduced to a mere heuristic device 
to get at the expressive idea, i.e. that potentially the artist could just as easily use 
some other means, or none at all. 
 
Separating the true artwork from the actual physical production is counter-intuitive 
since, as Richard Wollheim argues, the difficulties (and unpredictability) that 
accompany the handling of the physical medium are often a vital part of what makes 
the work expressive (Wollheim 1980: 42). Moreover, any ideas that the artist has 
prior to producing the object are ideas about how the medium may be manipulated. 
They are ideas of the medium and presuppose its actual physical characteristics. So 
for instance, when a jazz musician expresses their emotional state in performance, 
they must think of that emotion in distinctly musical terms. It is the qualities and 
relations obtained by the actual physical sounds (sometimes accidentally) that 
constitute his emotional language. Similarly Aaron Ridley, who attempts a defence 
of Collingwood’s theory, immediately rejects the ideal theory using the example that 
“the peculiar fluidity and grace and power of Bernini’s Ecstasy of St. Theresa are 
inseparable from the fact that it has been almost caressed out of a piece of stone” 
(Ridley 1997: 264). Similar arguments could be generated for musical performances 
where the stretching of a particular musical instrument’s capacities is part of what it 
is for that music to express an emotion like boundless joy. 
 
Though he only analyses Collingwood’s theory, Ridley’s defence could equally 
apply to most of Croce’s claims. Instead of trying to justify an idealist interpretation 
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of Collingwood, Ridley argues that Collingwood was only concerned to highlight the 
importance of active imaginative engagement when confronting artworks. Ridley 
appeals to Collingwood’s analogy of listening to a lecture (Collingwood 1958: 
140-141). Just as a lecture may seem like mere noises to a person who cannot 
understand English, so the very same string of sounds may be heard as the exposition 
of theories to one who hears with understanding. This latter person is imaginatively 
engaging with the meaning of the lecture via its sounds. Ridley then argues that this 
distinction does not imply the existence of two possible objects, one a set of noises 
and another a set of ideas, but simply that one thing may be experienced in two 
different ways thus: 
 
[A]n imaginative experience (of music, say) need not be an experience of 
something imaginary (in someone’s head), but might rather be a way of 
experiencing something real (such as music). (Ridley 1997: 265 emphasis 
in original) 
 
This then would make Collingwood’s claims compatible with the kind of 
dispositional theory of expression that I raised in the last chapter, where an object 
expresses x in terms of its dispositional property to cause the idea of x in an 
appropriate viewers in appropriate circumstances. So when Collingwood says that 
the music may exist solely in the musician’s head, all he really means is that the 
musician may be the only person who properly understands the work. It does not 
follow that the external work does not actually possess properties expressive of that 
meaning, and thus that it is inessential for accessing the expressive idea. 
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Even if we understand Collingwood (and Croce) in this way, the issue that interests 
me here is whether a separation is still made between the production of the actual 
physical artwork and the emotion of the artist. Even if the artist must produce the 
work in order to become conscious of his emotion, this does not entail that it does 
not exist prior to him becoming conscious of it. Yet sometimes Collingwood 
suggests a very close connection between the artistic activity and the formation of 
the emotion: 
 
[The painting] is produced by an activity which is somehow or other 
bound up with the development of that [aesthetic] experience itself. The 
two activities are not identical; he distinguishes them by the names 
‘painting’ and ‘seeing’ respectively; but they are connected in such a way 
that, he assures us, each is conditional upon the other... There is no 
question of ‘externalising’ an inward experience which is complete in 
itself and by itself. There are two experiences, an inward or imaginative 
one called seeing and an outward or bodily one called painting, which in 
the painter’s life are inseparable, and form one single indivisible 
experience, an experience which may be described as painting 
imaginatively. (Collingwood 1958: 304) 
 
So Collingwood explicitly says that the act of painting and the aesthetic experience 
are not identical, but are so closely related that they are experienced as if they were 
indivisible. He is describing an interdependence between the two processes, at least 
in certain cases. This suggests then that the act of expression enables the formation 
of the emotional state. We also see this view in Dewey, who explicitly rejects the 
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idea that what is expressed is just an externalisation of a pre-existing emotional state. 
Rather it is physical interaction with a resistant medium that allows the emotion to be 
formed: 
 
The thing expressed is wrung from the producer by the pressure exercised 
by objective things upon the natural impulses and tendencies - so far is 
expression from being the direct and immaculate issue of the latter. The 
third point follows. The act of expression that constitutes a work of art is 
a construction in time, not an instantaneous emission... It means that the 
expression of the self in and through a medium, constituting the work of 
art is itself a prolonged interaction of something issuing from the self with 
objective conditions, a process in which both of them acquire a form and 
order they did not at first possess. (Dewey 1971: 78-79, my emphasis)6 
 
So we are developing a view in which the physical production of the work allows the 
emotion to develop. Yet it is unlikely that Collingwood would fully endorse this 
notion because of his commitment to the way that art can enable the sharing of 
emotions between people.  
 
To explain: Collingwood emphasises that since to express an emotion is simply to 
understand it as a unique thing, the audience equally expresses an emotion of their 
own when they recognise it in the artist’s work (e.g. 1958: 315). As in the case of the 
lecture, the students who listen with understanding in some sense make the thoughts 
                                                     
6
 In many ways Dewey anticipates the idea of extended cognition in his account of expression. For 
instance he claims: “The epidermis is only in the most superficial way an indication of where an 
organism ends and its environment begins” (Dewey 1971: 73). 
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of the lecturer their own (cf. Ridley 1997: 268). Hence the only real difference 
between the artist and the audience is that the artist got there first. As Collingwood 
says, “he is singular in his ability to take the initiative in expressing what all feel, and 
all can express” (Collingwood 1958: 119). 
 
Since according to Collingwood, someone is able to express the very same state of 
emotion as the artist simply by understanding the work in the right way, the 
formation of that emotion must be separable from actually producing the object. This 
would be true even though experiencing the work may be the only way to access that 
emotion. So even if we suppose that the audience must imagine the construction of 
the artwork in order to properly access the expressive state the artist, this only 
reveals that the idea of producing the work is what is important, not its actual 
production. 
 
Yet Collingwood seems unduly optimistic that the audience will discover the same 
expressive state in the work as the artist, just so long as the artist is skilful enough in 
externalising his expressions (1958: 149-150). As long as it is a matter of 
reconstructing the experience of the artist from our impressions of the physical work, 
there is no guarantee that others will perceive the same thing as the artist or each 
other. Every imaginative reconstruction of the work is in some sense a 
re-interpretation. And there will be inevitable distortions that accompany the filtering 
of a work through another’s experiential background. The advantage of identifying 
the artwork with the physical object is that at least there is some definite thing upon 
which our interpretations can converge. 
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Moreover, artworks like improvised jazz performances are much more tied to their 
actual singular occurrence than other notational art forms like poetry or scored music. 
The improviser doesn’t get a second chance to replace what he has already played 
with something more appropriate. Rather, the whole performance may be viewed as 
the struggle of the musician to articulate his state, forming and reacting against the 
unalterable characteristics of that very event. This is what makes the performance his 
expression in a way that the rest of us can only appreciate rather than replicate. 
Ultimately it is the deep individuality of this kind of expression that really 
undermines any claim to idealism, at least so far as these kinds of artworks are 
concerned. This is because what guarantees that a work captures an individual 
emotional state is the unique physicality of its expression; the fact that it is embodied 
in a particular physical event by a particular person in a particular set of 
circumstances. 
 
The main reason Croce and Collingwood come across as idealists is because their 
concern is to say the real work of art is a kind of mental state or process. Under most 
interpretations of mind this would automatically imply that the public object could 
not be the real work of art, and so conflict with our basic intuitions about what 
artworks are. Yet I think we can rescue as well as strengthen some of the insights of 
their position when we appeal to the theory of extended cognition. As we shall see, 
when physical objects become integrated into cognitive processes in the right way, 
they should be considered parts of the mental state. Hence it is possible that if 
physically producing an artwork is integrated with a cognitive process, then that 
artwork may be a physical part of the artist’s mental state. As a result, we can hold 
onto our intuitions that physical objects and their actual history of production are 
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what constitute artworks, whilst still embracing the possibility that artists are 
interested in expressing their emotional states. 
 
Note that we still cannot embrace some of Collingwood’s statements such as that 
artworks may exist solely in someone’s head. In general, neither Collingwood nor 
Croce shows sensitivity to the possibility that mental states may not be entirely in 
someone’s head. Yet as I argue in chapter seven, the extended cognition account 
allows the possibility of sharing an emotional state as closely as Collingwood ever 
envisaged. By locating mental states partially in the environment, we can bypass the 
need for any reproduction or replication of mental states, but instead allow people to 
collaboratively generate and thus physically share mental states. 
 
Extended Cognition 
In order to explain how extended cognition applies to jazz improvisation it is 
necessary to provide some background on the theory. Its locus classicus is Andy 
Clark’s and David Chalmers’ influential paper ‘The Extended Mind’ (1998) (though 
they are indebted to externalist theories of mind generally). Their basic idea is that 
we often incorporate external objects into our cognitive processes, the active 
manipulation of which enables the completion of cognitive tasks such as recognition 
or search. So for example, if I do some long division step by step on a piece of paper, 
or if I rearrange Scrabble tiles in order to find a word to play, I am exploiting these 
information rich features of the environment to support and supplement my cognitive 
processes. Hence they argue that these kinds of action are ‘epistemically active’ in 
that they alter the world for the purpose of completing some cognitive task rather 
than simply to enact some pre-conceived change that the subject intends. 
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It seems that many of our behaviours can be interpreted in this light where the 
environmental resource is reliable, easily available and the subject automatically 
endorses the information it provides. A key part of arguments for extended cognition 
(and externalist views of mind generally) then involve a supervenience claim. If two 
identical cognitive processes or states internal to the body can nevertheless have 
different content due to differences external to the body, then the constitution of the 
mental state must partially supervene on those relevant aspects of the environment. 
So for instance, if the Scrabble tiles happened to have been arranged differently, I 
would have come up with a different word despite being in the same internal ‘search’ 
state. 
 
Obviously, this difference would then have impacted upon my brain state when I 
recognised the word to play. The point is however that within a certain range, I 
would endorse whatever word the external process resulted in. My internal state, 
though an important source of control in choosing the word, is not doing all the 
relevant work in finding that word. Work is being done by objects outside my body, 
which in combination with my actions and brain state physically realise an extended 
cognitive system. As a final test we may ask whether if the same process were done 
purely in the head (say imaginatively moving scrabble tiles around), we would be 
happy to grant it cognitive status. If we would, then it seems to exclude the object as 
part of the cognitive process simply because it is located outside the body is nothing 
more than a conceptual prejudice. 
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Clark and Chalmers go on to argue that not only can processes like recognition be 
cognitively extended but also more definitively mental states such as beliefs. Here 
they use the example of Otto who has Alzheimer’s disease and who uses a notebook 
to tell him the location of the museum. The notebook then functions as a part of 
Otto’s long term memory, which coupled with Otto’s disposition to consult the 
notebook when considering the location of the museum, forms his belief that ‘the 
museum is on 53rd Street’. 
 
We might worry that because Otto has to visually perceive the notebook in order to 
consciously hold his belief, it is quite unlike the direct and sub-personal activity of 
accessing such information from our biological memories, especially since the visual 
image has a distinctive phenomenology. However Clark and Chalmers argue that 
because the flow of information from notebook to brain is all part of the same 
cognitive system, it is not perceptual at all in the sense of “registering the impact of 
something outside the system” (Clark & Chalmers 1998: 20). Furthermore, the 
phenomenology of retrieving the information is not particularly relevant to its status 
as a belief. We could equally suppose that if a sound accompanied the introspective 
access of our biological memories, those memories would no less form a part of our 
beliefs.  
 
This point is relevant when exploring the role of music in the extended cognitive 
processing of emotional states. However for now I would like to point out that an 
important aspect of extended cognition is that the extended mental state is not an 
internal representational copy of some external object that then mediates between 
subject and world in directing behaviour. Though the information in the notebook 
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typically impacts on Otto’s brain, (though not always, see below) his belief is not 
constituted by an internal mental representation of the page in his notebook, or the 
disposition to form such a representation. Rather it is the active exploitation of the 
information the notebook provides (that happens to be visually received) with 
additional internal processes (such as subject’s endorsement) that together complete 
a system realising the cognitive function. 
 
So there is a general sense of representation that is distinct from the acquisition of 
internal representational states (cf. Wilson 2004: 183). In some cases, such as 
knowing how to get from one town to another, the knowledge of the route may not 
fully correspond to any internal representation. Rather the subject may simply have 
learned how to respond in the right way to reliable worldly features (such as 
signposts) and allow the world to be its own map. In this case we can still distinguish 
between someone who knows how to use the signs (for instance, they know when to 
look out for the sign that will point them in the right direction) and someone who just 
has a general ability to follow signs but has never taken that route before (cf. Clark 
1997: 21-31). In general, having to mediate behaviour by fitting an internal map 
against the environment it represents is an expensive drain on cognitive resources. So 
there is an evolutionary reason to suppose that the brain is geared towards co-opting 
certain reliable aspects of the environment rather than developing a psychical 
distance characterised by codified representations. This is true of many bodily skills 
in which the direct manipulation of objects bypass the need for internal maps of 
those objects. And as I argue below, playing a musical instrument is a good example 
of such direct manipulation. 
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In eschewing internal maps, we should consider extended cognition as aligned with 
direct realist or disjunctivist theories of perception, in which internal ideas do not 
mediate between perceptual states and their objects. However, even if Otto’s belief 
state contains a completely internal representational state, a visual perception, this 
does not entail that his belief state is also internal. Overall it is the system constituted 
by the perception of the notebook, the writing in the notebook, and the endorsement 
of the information it provides that constitutes his representational activity. Only this 
system as a whole functions to represent where the museum is. Another sort of 
system with only differences external to Otto, such as different words in his 
notebook would have a different representational content. Moreover, these 
differences would not necessarily have to impact on his internal brain state to do all 
the work that beliefs do. For instance, someone could ask Otto where the museum is, 
and Otto could simply show him the relevant page in his notebook without having to 
look at it himself saying, “that is where I think it is.” 
 
Jazz Improvisation as Extended Cognition 
Having briefly explained the theory of extended cognition we may now begin to see 
how it applies to the case of jazz improvisation. My overall strategy here is to show 
that it is possible for the improvising jazz musician to go through a process of 
emotional expression much as Croce and Collingwood described. Yet contrary to the 
standard account of expression theory, this act of expression is realised by the 
physical interaction between the musician, his instrument and the music. So forming 
the emotion by expressing it in music is a cognitively extended process. However, 
before we deal with emotional expression, it is necessary to first show how the 
musician can develop such a close relationship with the music. This is my first claim; 
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that playing the instrument cognitively extends the musician’s creation of the music. 
Hence I begin with a universal claim that simply improvising, apart from any 
concerns about having a real emotion, is a form of extended cognition. It is this view 
for instance that music psychologist Eric Clarke seems to be endorsing when he says 
that “playing music is a concrete form of musical thinking, and the body is as much a 
part of finding out about music as it is a means for it actualisation” (Clarke 2002: 
68). 
 
If we consider the simple task of generating notes, it is clear that the musician’s 
interaction with his instrument allows him to do this, not just in the uninteresting 
sense that the musician needs the instrument to produce notes at all, but also that the 
particular way in which the notes are formed are a matter of sensitively responding to 
the capacities and affordances of the physical object. It is not the case that the 
musician always has some music in mind (either as sound or in symbolic form) that 
he just enacts on the instrument. Moreover, even if the performer does have a rough 
idea of what sound he wants to produce, there are many features of that sound that go 
beyond his concept of it, yet which he would still endorse as the sound he wanted to 
play. 
 
At every level of creative decisions the musician and his instrument form a single 
tightly coupled system. For example, certain qualitative features of the sound may 
just be a product of the way the instrument is set up. It might have a harsh or smooth 
tone for instance. So the instrument itself helps to decide the character of each note 
that the musician then endorses. The way the instrument is physically set up also 
constrains and encourages ways that notes can be strung together. I mentioned earlier 
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the way that some musical figures will fall more naturally under the musician’s 
fingers. In addition, building up a vocabulary of musical figures is something done 
on the instrument by exploring its physical capacities. This development then allows 
the expansion of the musician’s imaginative capacities in terms of what is possible to 
play. 
 
In addition, within the immediate context of performance there is the sense in which 
the musician may only have a rough idea of what he wants to play, for instance a fast 
upwards sequence of notes, but it is the interaction of his fingers with the keys that 
ultimately determine what exact notes are played. Thus when completing the 
cognitive task of choosing what exact notes to play, the instrument is part of an 
extended loop between the musician’s brain, the muscles in his hands or lips and the 
keys of the instrument. As in the Scrabble example, within a certain range, the 
musician automatically endorses whatever the external physical processes result in. 
 
There is then a further level at which the musician’s conscious interaction with the 
music determines what he will play next. Similar to the instrument, the music itself 
will present certain limitations and affordances to the musician in terms of what 
sounds could follow in a musically coherent or meaningful way. By listening to what 
has happened so far the musician develops an idea of the music’s momentum. A 
good way to conceive of this momentum is as an experience of the pattern of the 
music, which entails a limited range of ways in which this pattern can be completed. 
Thus music can gain momentum in terms of harmonic tension that can be resolved 
by returning to the home key, or thematic continuity and development. Also in terms 
of maintaining tempo, rhythmic pulse, and note durations, as well as developing 
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general dynamic shapes like building to a climax or fading away. We should note 
that the musician must perceive these qualities in order to react to them, and their 
perception relies on certain standards he has acquired concerning harmonic or 
rhythmic development. Yet at the same time the musician may not have planned any 
of these qualities. They may simply be the unexpected consequences of other 
musical decisions he has made. 
 
Many features of the expressive character of the music can equally be unplanned, and 
can generate their own form of momentum, in terms of maintaining an emotional 
character, or developing it to completion or exhaustion. As we have seen in chapter 
three, the expressive character of the music is conveyed by features at every level of 
detail, from the intensity with which individual notes are attacked, to the smoothness 
of the timbre, the rhythmic pulse, harmonic tension as well as the large scale formal 
structure. It is thus highly unlikely that the musician can anticipate and control all of 
these potential sources of expressive effect. In many cases he can only react to the 
precise expressive character the music suggests. Yet he can still intelligibly take 
responsibility for the exact expressive qualities of the sound. Though the music 
possesses a wide variety of subtle expressive qualities that the musician did not plan 
or predict; he can, like Otto and his notebook, still point to the music and endorse the 
expression of that. 
 
So overall, these features of the music form an information rich environment that the 
musician relies on when deciding what will happen next. In this way the music and 
musician form a cognitively extended system where the music presents certain 
information about what sounds are available which combines with the musician’s 
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endorsement of these possibilities to enable and enhance the cognitive task of 
generating musical sounds. The musician’s endorsement of these possibilities relies 
on his musical intentions. So a dialogue is set up between his intentions and the 
musical momentum. The key difference between the two is that a musical intention is 
an idea that the musician has about how the music should sound in the future. The 
musical momentum in contrast, is an idea about how the music will sound in the 
future so long as it is not disrupted either by mistakes or contrary intentions. Also, 
where musical momentum is something actually heard and anticipated, musical 
intentions are imaginative and creative. So a central component in the experience of 
performing music concerns the relative alignment of musical intentions with musical 
momentum. In the usual case the performer experiences a tension between his idea of 
what the music should sound like (perhaps determined by some mood he is trying to 
capture, or some structural concept he has) and what possibilities the sound itself 
seems to suggest or allow. A musician can also choose to violate what he regards as 
the musical momentum for expressive effect.  
 
All this, by the way, is equally applicable to the relation between a singer and his 
voice. On traditional internalist terms we would say that the mechanisms of the voice 
are external to the singer’s mind. Yet the singer must still interact with their vocal 
apparatus to decide what music is created. So this highlights that there are two 
aspects to extended cognition: the interaction with the mechanical means of 
performance; one’s body and the musical instrument, and then interaction with the 
sound produced. In general, the mechanical means of performance are more central 
to my universal claim of extended cognition. It is conceivable for instance that a 
musician uses his instrument to decide what to play yet ignore what sounds are 
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actually produced. In this case the musician does not care about the momentum 
suggested by the music. Meanwhile the physical act of interacting with their 
instrument could generate a certain momentum. For instance, one may find oneself 
striking the keys more and more softly. Yet the musician could not do the reverse 
and ignore the affordances of the instrument whilst reacting to the musical 
momentum. Not if he actually wants to produce the sounds that the music suggests. 
 
Altogether then my claim that playing the instrument cognitively extends the 
musician’s creation of the music works at three levels, some or all of which are 
present in all improvised performances: The physical interaction between the 
musician and the instrument performs the task of generating the detailed notes. The 
interaction between his intentions and the perceived momentum of the music 
determines the larger scale shape and style of the music. Finally the interaction 
between the musician’s intentions and perceived emotional momentum determines 
the expressive character of the music, affecting the sound at all levels of detail. All of 
this is analogous to performing long division step by step on a piece of paper, or 
rearranging Scrabble tiles in order to find a word to play. 
 
Emotion Generation as Extended Cognition 
Having justified my claim that creating the music is cognitively extended, we can 
now turn to my second claim; that the musician may use the music to cognitively 
extend the formation of his emotions. My explanation of exactly how this is done is 
mostly reliant on the accounts of expression in music that I have provided in 
previous chapters. The basic point is that an improvised performance can help 
generate an emotional state because the music can fulfill the same role for the 
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musician as the primary expression of emotion (such as crying or punching the air). 
In the second chapter I argued that what makes these primary forms of expression 
expressive is that they contribute towards the bodily pattern and thus the feeling of 
an emotional state. The way it feels to cry or shout or jump for joy is a distinctive 
part of what it feels like to be sad, angry or joyful. In the same way, it feels like 
something to produce sounds on an instrument. To strike the keys gently or 
aggressively directly arouses the corresponding bodily feeling. 
 
More importantly however, the patterns of the music are mapped by the simulative 
capacity of the musician’s brain as patterns of emotional feeling, just as in the case of 
the listener I described in chapters three and four. Since the simulative capacity is 
used to recognise the emotions of others we might suspect that the emotion 
expressed is not the real state of the musician. But here the relation between 
simulated emotions and direct bodily emotions should be made clearer. Both 
processes equally result in a neural map of bodily changes in the brain, which in turn 
generates the phenomenal experience of the emotion. In chapter one I described how 
simulation may anticipate actual bodily changes in a personal emotional state, so the 
mere fact that the simulative capacity is being employed is no barrier to the 
authenticity of the emotion. Moreover, the neural pattern of bodily changes on its 
own is insufficient to distinguish between a real emotion, an empathic reaction, the 
recognition of emotions in music or the extended cognition of emotions in music. 
The wider context in which the bodily pattern is generated is vital for determining 
which of these states the subject is in. 
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The key identifying condition is not whether the bodily pattern tracks real or 
simulated bodily changes, but whether the system as a whole represents a real 
situation of personal significance for the subject (a core relational theme), the 
expressed state of another or simply a fictional expression of emotion. In the case of 
the improvising musician, there is no reason that the feelings expressed by the music 
cannot track the real situation of the musician. The music could even be both the 
object of an emotional state (for instance how well one is playing), and 
self-reflectively the emotional response to that object. This is similar to having 
emotions about one’s emotion, as in the case of panic attacks that I mentioned in 
chapter one. Yet there is no reason why the musician cannot also be responding to 
some other aspect of the environment, such as the audience reaction, or any thought 
or imaginative idea he might have at the same time. 
 
A second condition concerns the control that the subject has over the emotion 
generating process, which determines whether the state is partly cognitive or purely 
perceptual. Since the musician is responsible for producing and endorsing the 
emotional content of the music, this entails that the musician is cognitively 
deliberating his emotional reaction, in the same way as deliberately engaging in 
expressive actions allows the cognition of emotions (see chapter two). The sense of 
control or agency over the emotional content of the music also encourages a 
conscious identification with its content, unlike the case of simply listening to 
expressive music, where the listener must submit to its flow. 
 
So what of the actual bodily changes of the musician in this case? In the first place, 
the bodily changes of the musician help to generate the intentions of the musician to 
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appropriately match the way they feel in the music. The musician’s sensitivity to the 
expressive qualities of the music can also arouse his bodily changes in turn, as I 
described at the beginning of the chapter. Thus a dialogue can be set up between the 
musical momentum in emotional terms, and the inner bodily changes of the musician. 
So consider how the musician starts his improvisation: He could just wait beside his 
instrument and contemplate his emotional feelings before launching into a solo that 
he feels reflects these feelings, or as seems more likely, he will just start playing in a 
very impulsive way and then allow his sensitivity to the music develop into a sense 
of emotion. Either way, there is a constant feedback between the musician’s inner 
changes and the expressive character he perceives in the music. 
 
However, if this was all there was to it, we might complain that the inner bodily 
changes of the musician already constitute his emotional state. The music merely 
influences that state, or is influenced by the state in turn. So whilst we could admit a 
close relation between the two we need not say that the music partially constitutes 
the musician’s emotion. Yet this criticism can be met on two levels: First of all, by 
tracking the music with his aroused bodily changes, and then reacting to maintain or 
develop the unplanned emotional character of the sound, the musician is endorsing 
whatever emotional content the music suggests. The music has direct control over 
what the content of the emotional state is. This is analogous to endorsing whatever it 
says in the notebook. So where we conceive of the emotion as a cognitive process of 
deciding what to feel, the music itself plays a vital role in enabling and enhancing 
this process. 
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Recall that a cognitive state is one in which the subject manipulates representations. 
In this case the representations take the form of emotional states. The musician 
simply cannot manipulate his emotion directly. He can only send a signal from the 
brain, to his hands, to the instrument, to the music, which he then hears and interprets 
as feelings. So he simply cannot cognise his emotion without actually manipulating 
the music. Suppose the musician had an identical twin that was a brain in a vat; so 
with exactly the same brain state, sending out exactly the same signals and receiving 
the exactly same felt feedback. Yet in this case the music is absent or changes in the 
music are independent of his instructions. This twin would be undergoing a different 
mental state. The twin subject would not be cognising his emotion. He would be 
having a passive emotional reaction, since he would not be in control of 
manipulating his emotional representations at all. His feelings would be occurring 
quite independently of his attempt to control them. So given that changes in the 
music alone entail a different sort of mental state, the music must be a physical part 
of the cognition of feeling. 
 
However we may draw a distinction between deciding what emotion to have and the 
emotion itself, just as we may draw a distinction between performing an expressive 
action and the bodily changes that this action generates. So secondly it is important 
to note that the music is also immediately incorporated into the musician’s emotion 
via his simulative capacity. That is, the musician enjoys the feelings expressed by the 
music alongside his internal bodily changes as the total combined emotional state. 
The patterns in the music effectively play the same role as his inner bodily changes 
in relating to the overall bodily pattern. Now, I argued in chapter one that we should 
equally include bodily changes as a constitutive part of the emotional system. This 
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was partly for reasons of wide content of the kind I articulated above, and partly 
because they do vital work in generating and maintaining the emotional content. The 
musical patterns equally do significant work in generating and maintaining the 
emotional content where the musician’s brain simply endorses that content. So 
equally we should include the music as a constitutive part of the emotion. The music 
constitutes part of the content that is registered in forming the overall 
representational state. 
 
In this case the music constitutes a physical elaboration of the musician’s felt state. 
Phenomenally the musician partially experiences his emotional state in musical form. 
Of course, the qualities of the music are then registered by the musician’s brain. Yet 
actual bodily changes are equally registered by the musician’s brain. In either case 
the emotion is physically constituted by the system that incorporates both the neural 
pattern and the bodily or musical changes that sustain it. Then in the case I have been 
describing, there is interaction between all these parts. So we may say that the 
emotion is constituted by the entire system of bodily pattern in the brain, bodily 
changes, bodily actions, the activity of the instrument and the patterns in the music. 
The vehicle of brain, body, instrument and music then supports this system for 
generating the content of the emotion. 
 
In general, one of the main motivations for including an external object as part of a 
cognitive process is that it should enhance that cognitive process, and not merely 
enact the results of some internal process. In this case, when the music is used to 
extend emotional cognition, it enhances the complexity of the emotion the musician 
undergoes. Just as expressive actions can generate patterns far more fine grained than 
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inner bodily changes, so musical expressions can generate patterns far more fine 
grained than expressive actions. The musical expression of emotion can have 
increased complexity, temporal range, subtlety and force. It can also have long-term 
structural content as a result of the repetition and development of motifs. As such, 
the music enhances the emotional response of the musician. Their emotional 
response to the world can be that much more structured, subtle and intense. Track 
one of the recording accompanying this thesis is intended to provide an example of 
this kind of musical performance. 
 
Music as the Core of Emotion 
So far I have justified a weaker version of my claim that the music partially 
constitutes the emotional state of the performer. The core of the emotional state is 
still the internal bodily changes of the musician, which the music then elaborates. 
However there are some cases in which the music appears to replace the bodily 
feelings of the subject as the main focus of the emotional state. These are cases of 
radical absorption within the emotional momentum of the music. 
 
Earlier I described a dialogue between the intentions of the musician and the 
momentum perceived in the music. In most cases, the intentions of the musician are 
not perfectly realised. So where the intentions and momentum are experienced in 
emotional terms, the musician may feel a tension between his bodily feeling and the 
music’s expressive content. Yet it is possible for the musician’s intentions to align 
with the emotional momentum of the music in such a way that the intentions of the 
musician effectively disappear. There is a continuum between what the music 
dictates in terms of its momentum and what the musician intends. At one extreme the 
 204
performer has a detailed idea of exactly what he wants the music to sound like and he 
simply executes it. At the other extreme, the performer seems as passive as a 
non-participating listener to the momentum of the music. So alignment may occur 
either because the musician finds that his emotional intentions are immediately 
realised in music or because he gives up trying to control the music and simply 
affirms the progression of the music as it happens. This kind of alignment is rare, yet 
there is some evidence that this does take place when we look at what the musicians 
themselves claim. Note that these descriptions are clearly impressionistic and 
suggestive rather than conclusive demonstrations of my claims. Yet they seem best 
explained by the theoretical apparatus I have suggested: 
 
There is such a thing as letting the music take you, if you are willing, or if 
you are open enough. (David Baker (trombone) quoted in Berliner 1994: 
219) 
 
And: 
 
I feel that I’m at my best when I can free myself completely from the 
effort of trying to put something out and feel more like I am the 
instrument being played... (Ira Sullivan (trumpet and saxophone) in 
Spitzer 1972: 14) 
 
Similarly: 
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If a solo is going well, developing, I let it go on its own. Then I’ve 
reached that place where I’ve gotten out of my own way, and it’s as if I’m 
standing back and watching the solo play itself. (Jim Hall (guitar) quoted 
in Berliner 1994: 798 ft. 38) 
 
And again from saxophonist Ronnie Scott: 
 
[W]hat seems to happen is that one becomes unconscious of playing, you 
know, it becomes as if something else has taken over and you’re just an 
intermediary between whatever else and the instrument, and everything 
you try seems to come off, or at least, even if it doesn’t come off it 
doesn’t seem to matter very much, it’s still a certain kind of feeling that 
you’re aiming for - and when this happens - inspiration - duende - 
whatever you like to call it - a happy conjunction of conditions and events 
and middle attitudes - it will feel good. It will feel that ‘I should be doing 
what I am’ kind of thing. (quoted in Bailey 1992: 52)  
 
Finally trombonist Curtis Fuller describes getting ‘caught up’ in the music saying: 
 
I dance with it. That’s my emotional state when I play. That’s my feeling 
of expressing my total self in the music. (Curtis Fuller (trombone) quoted 
in Berliner: 217) 
 
In many ways these experiences seem to represent one of the peaks of musical 
achievement. This is because whilst it is not so hard to play the note you intended to 
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play a fraction of a second earlier, especially if you have modest ambitions, it is 
extremely difficult to temporally align one’s intentions with the moment of actually 
producing them, or to suspend one’s critical judgement of what one is playing. When 
this does happen we may say that the perception of the music fully absorbs the 
attention of the musician. So the music takes the lead, or becomes the locus of 
control for how the emotion of the musician will progress (though of course, in 
performing that music, the musician overall is still in control) 
 
Yet if the musician ‘loses’ himself in the music, such that he is no longer aware of 
his internal feelings, what allows us to say that the musician is feeling any emotion at 
all? Is the experience of ‘watching the solo play itself’ a form of self-alienation? 
Ciarán Benson, finding precedence in Dewey’s descriptions of “a rhythm of 
surrender and reflection” in aesthetic activity (Dewey 1971: 144) describes these 
states of absorption as a ‘re-centering’ of experience (Benson 2001: 187). She 
diagnoses the phenomenon as the absence of self-predicated thoughts. When 
self-analysis disappears and one is more absorbed in the music, the musician does 
not feel embodied in the same way. My idea of extended cognition justifies the idea 
that the normal boundary of body-world has actually changed. But the musician has 
not ‘lost’ himself, he has literally extended himself. It is not unreasonable then that 
this should result in a different sense of agency and embodiment. 
 
Yet is it still an emotional state? It would seem so, since the case of musical 
absorption need be no different to any case of normal emotional absorption where we 
are so caught up in the feeling that we forget ourselves in the process. It is fairly 
atypical, since part of the purpose of emotions is to direct the attention of the subject 
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towards certain aspects of the world. Yet the emotion can continue to represent the 
relation between subject and world even when this meaning is not attended to. 
Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that if the progress of the music has up to 
this point been dictated by the goal of emotional expression, then the music suddenly 
loses its expressive status just because the attention of the musician is now more 
fully focused on the music. 
 
Hence overall, it seems that the music just more fully constitutes and dominates the 
development of the musician’s emotion. And although the attention of subject is not 
a necessary part of the emotional state, we may say that the musician’s experience of 
the music more fully constitutes his experience of the emotion. At the same time, we 
should recognise that being absorbed to such an extent is a fairly exceptional state of 
being. So emotionally it is likely to be a state of great euphoria, where the dynamic 
relation with the world that it tracks is a sense of one’s life flowing like music, of 
living musically. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that such a radical identification between the music and 
the emotion of the performer need not be recognised as such by the listener. As 
described in chapter four, if they understand the music as having emotional content, 
the listener need only attach some persona imaginatively to that emotion, not 
necessarily the performer’s. Of course, if the listener were to be watching the 
musician as he plays, it may be abundantly clear that the music produced is a primary 
expression of his emotion, given other behavioural cues such as facial expressions or 
bodily movement which would presumably align in an appropriate way with the 
emotional content of the music. However, it is by no means necessary that the 
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musician provide any of these other cues. Apart from producing the music, there may 
be no other indication of the musician’s emotional state. In the following chapters, I 
explore what it is that really forces the listener to hear the music as constitutive of the 
emotional state of the performer right in front of them. That is, by a more profound 
sharing of attention to the music and finally, in terms of sharing in the production of 
that music. 
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Chapter Six: Joint Attention to Music
 
 
In the previous chapter I described a maximal form of engagement that an individual 
may have with a piece of music. There the music served to partly constitute the 
emotion of the musician. In this chapter I return to a more minimal form of 
engagement, passive listening, in order to begin exploring our experiences of music 
at a social level. The key phenomenon that I analyse here is joint attention, which we 
may initially characterise as when two or more people are mutually aware that both 
are attending to some object in the environment. So I am interested in what ways 
jointly attending to music can affect the way that we perceive it, especially the 
music’s expressive properties. In particular, I want to examine whether joint 
attention to music can cause a convergence of responses, or a mutual fixing of the 
music’s expressive properties. Yet I am not just interested in whether we can agree in 
our perceptions so much as whether we can listen to the music as a group. That is, 
whether our perceptual activities can be so integrated as to be called ‘socially 
extended’ in any way (in the sense of extension that I elaborated in chapter five). 
 
Whether jointly attending to music involves group perception in the sense I have 
indicated relies primarily upon the nature of joint attention itself. The philosophical 
and psychological literature on this subject is mainly focused on infant joint attention, 
because engaging in this behaviour is often regarded as a landmark in the infant’s 
ability to understand other minds. It is claimed for instance (e.g. Tomasello 1999) 
that joint attention provides the foundation for all manner of cooperative activities 
involving mind reading, most notably the acquisition and use of language. Yet 
exactly what notion of other minds (or their own) infants grasp at this stage is 
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unclear. When adults jointly attend to something, they are able to appreciate that 
others have beliefs that are distinct from their own, and that those beliefs may not 
accurately represent reality. Adults are aware of the ways that joint attention could 
go wrong, and thus the level of mutual monitoring that is required to ensure its 
genuine occurrence. So the mature case should involve a more sophisticated form of 
interaction that is more applicable to the joint attention to music. 
 
Yet I think it is worth examining how infant joint attention functions because it 
reveals just how minimal the requirements for joint attention are. In particular, it is 
implausible that infants have much understanding of the distinction between their 
own intentions and the intentions of others. Instead infant joint attention seems to 
rely on a more automatic imitation of the adult’s behaviour given a context in which 
they are ‘tuned in’ to the adult’s intentions. Then as they get older, infants learn to 
check and direct the adult’s behaviour in ways that gradually take on the 
sophistication of the mature case.  
 
Despite these developments however, I argue that mature joint attention still relies on 
essentially the same stance of mutuality that infants are able to establish. Mature 
joint attention is merely a refinement of this stance. In particular, I argue that infants 
form ‘plural subjects’ of attention with their caregivers, where the task of looking is 
structured interdependently with the adult. It is forming this plural subject that allows 
people to mutually determine the character of objects in the world, to engage in more 
complex cooperative actions, and ultimately to share mental states such as intentions 
and emotions. Hence I argue that adults equally form plural subjects of attention, 
they are just more sensitive to what kinds of conditions can upset that state. 
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Infant Joint Attention 
Infant joint attention develops in several stages during the first 18 months of life. At 
9 months, the infant simply follows the gaze of the adult towards objects in their 
common environment. By 12 months however, the infant is leading the focus of 
attention, either by vocalising or pointing towards the object of interest. In addition, 
genuine joint attention is signaled not only by the infant’s ability to grasp that the 
adult’s eyes are ‘pointing’ at something, but that they also return eye contact with the 
adult, seemingly to confirm that both are indeed attending to the same object. This 
confirmatory behaviour is important because it shows that joint attention is a truly 
shared activity, as opposed to just two people looking at the same thing at the same 
time. The confirmatory behaviour is also significant to the further development of 
joint attention. Between 12 and 16 months the infant will check the direction of the 
adult’s gaze whilst they are pointing, and by 18 months they will check before they 
start to point at all (Franco 2005: 143). Using this strategy will help to ensure that the 
adult’s attention is successfully directed. 
 
The change in behaviour at 9 months can partly be explained by the infant’s new 
ability to accurately follow the adult’s line of sight. Prior to this age, infants will 
follow changes in the adult’s direction of gaze but much less reliably. It may be that 
initially the infant simply mimics the head movements of the adult, at which point 
they become attracted to some object lying near to them. Joint attention could then 
develop because infants learn that generally following the head movements of adults 
will lead them to interesting sights. The ability to focus on eye movements within 
head movements then gets gradually refined into a geometric mechanism enabling 
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the infant to infer the location of objects from the adult’s eyes more exactly 
(Butterworth 1995). 
 
However, this geometric mechanism is insufficient to fully explain joint attentional 
behaviour. Firstly, infants gesture at objects for seemingly no other reason than to 
share the adult’s attention. That is, they appear satisfied when the adult’s attention 
has been focused on the object of interest. This indicates that the infant’s behaviour 
is socially motivated rather than motivated by the object per se, at least by 12 months. 
Secondly, as Michael Tomasello points out, a whole range of social behaviours 
appear between the ages of 9 and 12 months including “joint engagement, gaze 
following, point following, imitation of instrumental acts, imitation of arbitrary acts, 
reaction to social obstacles, use of imperative gestures, and use of declarative 
gestures (including proximal gestures such as ‘show’ and distal gestures such as 
‘point’)” (Tomasello 1999: 63). As such Tomasello argues that a more general 
understanding in the infant must be linking all these behaviours together. 
 
Since the goal of the infant’s behaviour appears to be simply to attend with the adult, 
Tomasello argues that the infant must recognise the adult’s intention to attend with 
the infant. Equally, when the infant comes to initiate joint attentional behaviour, they 
should recognise that the adult engages in this action because they recognise the 
cooperative intent of the infant. So the infant must try to reveal this intention to the 
adult. Thus Tomasello claims that the infant grasps the thought, “You intend for [me 
to share attention to (X)]” (Tomasello, 1999: 102). If this were the case, infant joint 
attention would involve a structure of intentions similar to that required by Grice’s 
(1957) account of meaning, where part of the reason for interpreting the content of 
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the intention in a certain way (in this case to jointly attend) is recognising the 
intention for it to be understood. Yet some theorists (e.g. Eilan 2005, Roessler 2005) 
have objected to this account on the grounds that it is implausible that infants have 
intentions with such a complex internal structure. Infants do not seem to possess the 
necessary conceptual sophistication that would allow them to recognise the adult’s 
intention as an explicit basis for forming their own intention to engage in joint 
attentional behaviour. 
 
Clearly the infant is interested in making sure that they properly target what the adult 
is doing, otherwise they would not turn back to check the adult’s gaze. This seems to 
involve understanding the goal of the adult as distinct from his behaviour. It is 
reasonable to suppose that infants can grasp goals, since we know that by 8 months 
infants can distinguish goals from intermediary actions, such as pushing away an 
obstacle in order to reach the desired object. Then at around 11 to 14 months, infants 
will imitate the goal of unusual adult behaviours that could be produced by various 
means and will look around in anticipation of the previously observed result 
(Tomasello 1999: 82). Between 14 and 18 months they also become sensitive to the 
difference between successes and failures of the adult’s intention, revealed by their 
imitation of the successful action, rather than the failure (Tomasello 1999: 81-83). 
Yet what all this indicates is the infant’s increasing ability to keep a goal in mind (the 
adult’s or the infant’s) as an imagined state of affairs. It does not show that infants 
have a higher order awareness of the existence of their own intentions, or the 
intentions of the adult, especially in so far as those can be directed towards each 
others’ intentions. 
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Apart from reading the adult’s goal, the infant must also have a goal of his own to 
imitate the adult’s goal. Yet this goal may not be deliberately formulated. Rather we 
can appeal to the general disposition that infants have to imitate others. In chapter 
two I described infants’ pervasive and innate imitative tendencies in order to explain 
our ability to recognise emotions. We can then point to a gradual transition between 
these direct forms of imitation and the imitation of the adult’s attention. The first 
development is from simple mirroring to more extended protoconversations, where 
infants will take turns with adults in reciprocal1 actions such as looking, touching and 
vocalising (Tomasello 1999: 59). These interactional routines develop because adults 
assume that infants are intentional agents and relate to them accordingly, even before 
they can be truly classed as such. They are reinforced with positive expressions of 
emotion every time the infant responds in the appropriate way. In addition, adults 
recognise the infant struggling with a response and so simplify the interaction, 
standardising it with repetition, directing the infant’s attention onto a key aspects of 
the task and so reducing the number of variables that the infant has to deal with. Here 
the adult is not just tuned into the infant’s attention but helps to structure their 
expectations, gradually extending their attention towards more sophisticated tasks 
(Bruner 1995: 6). 
 
The interactional routine scaffolds the development of infants from one stage of 
social understanding to the next, gradually drawing the infant into more sophisticated 
social games. From the basic foundation of direct eye contact and dyadic interaction, 
the infant then moves onto triadic interactions like joint attention. It is still important 
for the adult to respond in the same reciprocal way, but now objects have become 
                                                     
1
 Reciprocal actions match the intensity and temporal pattern of the behaviour rather than the exact 
movement. 
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integrated into the interactional routine. So the infant and the adult have already 
tuned in to each others’ actions and emotions during their dyadic interactions. The 
infant already has experiences of himself and the adult acting together so can 
therefore recognise this state, and given that it is an emotionally positive experience, 
be motivated to establish this state once again. Moreover, apart from providing basic 
information about looking behaviour (either ‘at me’ or not), direct eye contact 
establishes a primary sense of mutuality that is a constant from the earliest cases of 
dyadic interaction. So it is likely that the importance of occasional eye contact within 
bouts of joint attention is to establish or confirm this primary sense of mutuality. 
 
Thus I think the simplest explanation for the infant’s ability to target the attention of 
the adult may be just that their imitation gradually targets more subtle aspects of the 
adult’s behaviour. In chapter two, I argued that infant imitation is most likely 
grounded in the mirror neuron system, which recreatively processes the actions of 
others from a first person perspective. This system was important in grounding a 
variety of mental simulation in which by mirroring another’s behaviour (either 
actually or at a neural level) one could come to be in the mental state that drives their 
behaviour. In this way, infant imitation of attention could be an important precursor 
to more sophisticated empathic or mind reading projects. Certainly it is worth noting 
that one of the symptoms of autism is an incapacity or unwillingness to engage in 
joint attention behaviours. 
 
Even in adult life we have a strong automatic tendency to follow other peoples’ 
gazes when they suddenly look around. Hence infants may not even form much of a 
deliberate goal to act in conjunction with the adult. They may simply acquire goals 
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by two means; either by desiring it themselves, or by imitating the intentions of the 
adult. The infant may automatically go through a simulative mirroring process and 
then simply fail to inhibit acting on that simulation. Perhaps some mechanism for 
inhibiting simulation takes a few years to develop. Equally infants may be so prone 
to emotional contagion because they are less able to inhibit the arousal involved in 
emotion recognition. 
 
Then to explain how infants can read the goal of the adult at all, we should also 
supplement this simulative activity with a generalised understanding of behaviour. 
We know that as well as having an innate tendency to imitate, infants also have an 
innate tendency to look at drawings that resemble faces rather than other patterns. 
This selective attention to and imitation of humans rather than other kinds of objects 
indicates that infants can immediately distinguish between the two and that they 
functionally identify humans as entities like themselves. It indicates what Andrew 
Meltzoff has called a ‘like me’ stance (Meltzoff 1996, 2002), a disposition to grasp 
bodily and behavioural states in a general way as applicable to both oneself and 
others. In effect infants understand the behaviour of others the same way they 
understand their own (without necessarily having to make some kind of analogical 
inference). So they can potentially imitate any aspect of the adult’s behaviour that 
they are sensitive to in their own case. Hence the idea here is that once the infant is 
generally able to distinguish goals within their own behaviour (such as focusing on 
one object rather than another), they should be able to distinguish the same in 
others.2 
                                                     
2
 Equally the process should also go in the other direction. Having formed imaginative representations 
of the goals of others, infants should also be able to form imaginative representations of their own 
goals (Asendorpf 2002). 
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Once the triadic structure of interaction is fully in place, the infant can then use it to 
learn how to approach the world generally. One of the key ways this is demonstrated 
is when infants socially reference, looking to adults when meeting unfamiliar objects 
or strangers in order to determine what kind of emotional reaction is appropriate. For 
instance, infants will avoid objects or people that their mothers show fear towards, 
not just whilst the mother is present but also later when they are on their own. 
Emotional contagion alone could not account for this permanence of effect, but 
something more like emotional conditioning towards the object. It is also possible 
that if the child is looking to the adult when approaching the new object, it may 
simply be for reassurance rather than to resolve any uncertainty about how to deal 
with it (Baldwin 1995: 136). This is confirmed by the fact that infants will look to 
their mothers more when their mothers display fear rather than pleasure, indicating 
that the child is generally feeling more threatened. However, infants show a high 
degree of specificity in how they correlate the adult reaction to a particular object or 
person. Hence the infant must also be led by the properties of the object rather than 
just a general feeling of unease (Baldwin 1995). 
 
Peter Hobson makes the stronger claim that the main purpose of joint attention is to 
share emotional reactions towards objects. He claims that one of the reasons autistic 
children do not engage in joint attentional behaviour is because they are generally 
not responsive to emotion sharing in dyadic interactions (Hobson 2005: 190). In a 
similar vein, Johannes Roessler argues that the most significant aspect of this 
emotion sharing in reference to objects is that it is a form of predication. That is, 
objects come to acquire properties other than just being worthy of attention, such as 
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being funny or scary. The importance of this is that emotional predication can be 
right or wrong (Roessler 2005: 245-6). So the infant may have one emotional 
reaction to an object that the adult transforms, or ‘corrects’ with a different emotional 
reaction. This may be the earliest case of a sense of objectivity. Hence Roessler 
(following Werner and Kaplan 1963) claims that the importance of joint attention is 
in establishing the sense of objectivity. 
 
So rather than joint attention enabling the infant to gain a sense of mutual awareness, 
they may in fact enable the infant to make a more accurate distinction between his 
reactions to an object and the way that objects ‘really are’. At the same time, his 
different reactions to objects can establish a more accurate sense of distance between 
himself and the adult.3 So it seems the importance of joint attention is to teach the 
infant how to attend to the world. The way we attend to objects and people 
fundamentally shapes the way we experience them, in particular the kind of 
emotional reaction that they engender. As such joint attention allows the infant to 
begin participating in the cultural world, understanding the purpose and meaning that 
certain objects have to offer on top of whatever natural ways they can be 
manipulated. Moreover, when infants learn to manipulate the adult’s attention in 
return it signals their capacity to negotiate the meaning of their common 
environment. 
 
In this way infant joint attention provides a model for how our perceptual activities 
can be interdependently structured. Adopting Margaret Gilbert’s (2000) terminology, 
                                                     
3
 This notion is very similar to Davidson’s theory of triangulation, whereby three forms of knowledge; 
knowledge of our own minds, knowledge of other minds, and knowledge of the world are all 
interdependent (e.g. Davidson 2001a, 2001b). 
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the infant and the adult form a ‘plural subject’ of attention. Gilbert’s idea here is that 
the two try to integrate as much as possible the way that they approach the world. In 
this case, the adult and infant integrate their attention to objects, both in terms of 
when and what they attend to, as well as the sorts of properties of that object they are 
interested in. Thus we shouldn’t describe joint attention as the infant simply looking 
at an object plus recognising the adult do the same, but from the start sharing the 
task of looking with the adult. Equally, when infants initiate joint attention they are 
interested in first setting up the framework of attending together. For the infant, this 
behaviour is unlikely to be mediated by a cognitive model of how the adult’s and 
infant’s intentions are related to each other. Rather it is directly and 
unself-consciously entered into. As much as possible, infants seek to make their 
activities interdependent with the adult’s, to form plural subjects of attention. And as 
I argue in the following section, this is a form of socially extended cognition. 
 
Mature Joint Attention 
The joint attention that an infant has with an adult is not like that between equals. It 
would be better to say that the infant is immersed in the attention of the adult. This is 
because the infant trusts the adult more than is warranted to be responsive to their 
intentions, at least until their checking behaviour develops. Secondly they defer their 
emotional reactions to those of the adult. Thirdly they are not yet able to understand 
that adults may have false beliefs about the situation or the infant, and that they in 
turn could have false beliefs about the adult. Finally it is unlikely that infants have 
the same self-reflective understanding of attention that adults do. Attention for adults 
is a conscious relation between a self-aware subject and a world containing distinct 
and meaningful objects. The adult is able to consciously shift his attention to 
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different objects within the environment or to different aspects of those objects, as 
well as bring to bear various background knowledge that will enable them to 
conceptualise the object and recognise its functional affordances. So the adult can 
understand that even if an object lies within another’s perceptual field, the other will 
not necessarily see the same object as they do, or focus on the same aspect of it, or 
understand it in the same way unless specifically directed to do so. 
 
Yet despite these differences, I argue that adults still rely on essentially the same 
stance of mutuality, the plural subject, that infants are able to establish. They are just 
more sensitive to what kinds of conditions can upset that state. In particular, jointly 
attending to something is still a matter of having, or setting up a framework for 
attending to the environment, where the task of seeing is structured interdependently 
with the other person (cf. Currie 2007). The nature of this framework in the mature 
case is just more complicated. For instance, adults can manipulate each others’ 
attention in various ways, such as which sensory organ is to be brought to bear on the 
world, or the degree of urgency involved. More significantly, mature joint attention 
is infused with a sense of the normality of the situation, where objects have 
conventional ways in which they are attended to, and certain conventional reactions 
are implied. For instance we normally look at clocks to check the time, and plan our 
actions accordingly. In this way normality helps to fix the content of what is jointly 
attended to. 
 
On the other hand, if the object of joint attention is more unique, then a more 
sophisticated process of mutual alignment towards the object is required. As well as 
directing your gaze, I may verbally describe various aspects of the object to you, for 
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example saying “look at the way the light reflects from that building” perhaps 
implying an emotional response as well. By reciprocal behaviour on your part, we 
can then build up a specific framework for that object, the mutual negotiation of 
which gradually fixes the nature of the object, and confirms that we are jointly 
attending to the same thing. 
 
In this respect the framework is similar to the notion of a shared cognitive 
environment that Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson (1993) appeal to as the 
background for successfully disambiguating the content of communicative intentions. 
It involves gradually building up a picture about what kinds of information are 
mutually available (and mutually known to be mutually available) to both of us. This 
can include not just ordinary facts about the physical world, but also obvious cases of 
natural meaning such as black clouds indicating the coming of rain, or most relevant 
to my interests, that certain behaviours indicate certain emotional states. Of course in 
most cases there will be a degree of uncertainty as to what facts we can reasonably 
assume other people to possess. Yet on a day to day scale, as we continue to interact 
with other people, we mutually gain all kinds of information about what facts are 
available to each other. Moreover being able to identify someone as belonging to a 
particular social group, such as a culture or a profession, will immediately entail all 
kinds of information about what kinds of facts are shared between normal members 
of these groups. For example, amongst musicians within the Western Classical 
tradition, certain generic styles of music will immediately signify certain generic 
emotional states. Hence even two musicians who have never met before should find 
it fairly easy to communicate ideas about what emotion a piece of music expresses 
without having first to explain the basis for those interpretations. Combined with 
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continuing interaction, their ability to recognise each other’s musically expressive 
intentions can become extremely fluent.  
 
So the shared framework is a way for the content of our attentional states to be 
mutually fixed. Yet establishing a framework is also a matter of mutually structuring 
the activity of attending to the world. First of all, we can see that as in the infant case, 
some form of mutual monitoring is required that causally influences the way we 
attend to the object. Though I may be motivated to attend to the object because it is 
an interesting stimulus; that I am attending to it at this particular time, for this 
duration, with regard to this or that particular feature (that may be socially 
meaningful) is because you are attending to it as well. For example when I direct 
your attention towards the clock, I may be interested in the time because I want to 
catch the train, but also because I want to synchronise my behaviour or emotional 
feeling with yours, or to help explain to you the reason why I am rushing around. 
 
Monitoring the other can involve periodically exchanging eye contact or any other 
form of mutually reciprocal behaviour such as verbal exchange or touch, yet it can 
also be less overt. My awareness of the attention of the other does not have to be a 
particularly complex part of the activity. In normal conditions, I can track another’s 
attention simply by being disposed to notice when he is no longer attending with me, 
for instance if he walks away or changes the subject. Hence joint attention is 
characterised by an ongoing preparedness to alter the way I attend to something 
should you direct me to it, as well as being self-consciously aware of the publicly 
available aspects of my own attention as they have the potential to lead your 
attentional focus. This preparedness and openness should be mutual. 
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In general different cases of joint attention will require different degrees of 
monitoring. The notions of preparedness and openness can also help us to identify a 
minimal kind of mutual monitoring. Suppose for instance that I happen to be walking 
along a road tunnel at the same time as a complete stranger when suddenly a burst 
water main sends a wall of water crashing towards us. We could both assume that we 
both see the water (and that we both know that we both see the water) without ever 
having to check each other’s gaze. Suppose we then both turn and flee, still without 
directly looking at each other. Given no reason to think one’s reaction is unavailable 
to the other (i.e. they aren’t blind) we could still expect a degree of mutual sensitivity. 
For instance, if the other person looked back and then started to slow down, I would 
most likely notice this and assume that the danger had passed. Similarly, if I looked 
back and slowed down I would anticipate that he would notice this in turn. 
 
In general, when confronting very sudden or salient events, particularly where they 
impact on everybody around, it is possible to assume joint attention without having 
to engage in overt monitoring.4 The pervasive sense of normality also means that the 
joint attentional attitude is potentially always on to a minimal extent when we are out 
in public. It is when the situation is more unusual or subtle or of a more individual 
impact (for instance if one finds money in the street) that we need to check each 
other’s reactions more carefully. We also expect certain normal reactions to 
situations, which when violated (for instance, if the stranger runs towards the water) 
motivates closer monitoring of joint attention. Yet in any case there is still a 
                                                     
4
 Due to an undeveloped sense of normality, it is unlikely that infants could jointly attend in this 
minimal manner. Hence the sophistication of the adult case both allows more complex mutual 
alignments (i.e. conversation about the object) as well as less overt monitoring. 
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preparedness to adjust our responses to the situation according to the responses of 
others and an assumption that others can respond in kind to us. 
 
The point of all of this is that since this monitoring behaviour is embedded within the 
activity of attending to world, we should say that it is a constituent of the task of 
attending to the object rather than an additional factor. The mutual awareness 
involved in joint attention entails basic differences in our perceptual attitudes in 
terms of the preparedness and openness that I have described. So similar to the infant 
case, it is not the case that when jointly attending to x that we each have (i) 
perception of x plus (ii) mutual awareness of (i), but rather a perceptual state which is 
of both of us perceiving x. 
 
This is also the view of John Campbell who argues that,  
 
[J]oint attention is a primitive phenomenon of consciousness. Just as the 
object you see can be a constituent of your experience, so too it can be a 
constituent of your experience that the other person is, with you, jointly 
attending to the object. (Campbell 2002) 
 
One consequence of this view is that it would not be possible for me to have this 
perceptual state if the other person were not in fact attending to the object. So for 
example suppose that I thought we were both sitting by the lake watching the ducks 
when in fact you slipped away some time ago. It might be argued here that if the 
visual experience of attending to the ducks was the same whether you were there or 
not, then your presence could not partly constitute the perceptual state. However 
 225
Campbell argues that we should take a disjunctivist perspective on this case, in the 
same way as disjunctivist accounts of perception distinguish veridical and 
hallucinatory perceptions. On this account, when veridically perceiving, the actual 
object is necessary to determine the content of the perceptual state. Hallucinations in 
contrast, make the perceiver believe that an object is part of the content of the state 
when in fact it is not. They are two fundamentally different sorts of state. In the same 
way when I falsely believed that we were jointly attending to the ducks, I took you to 
be part of the content of my perceptual state when in fact you were not. I was simply 
not having an experience of joint attention.5 
 
It is worth clarifying this point about perceptual experience because Campbell’s 
point is slightly ambiguous. We are assuming that I don’t literally see the other 
person, so he is not part of my perceptual experience in this way, he is not one of its 
objects. Rather he is part of the subject, the person to whom the perceptual 
experience is happening. But again this is an odd thought. That person is presumably 
having a perceptual experience of his own, which may be qualitatively similar to 
mine, but surely numerically distinct. Hence how could he be part of the subject of 
my experience? 
 
I think we can best characterise it like this: I am having a perceptual experience, and 
my experience represents a relation between the subject and the object. So part of it 
is an awareness of myself as relating to a thing in the world. However, in this case, 
my awareness of the subject is also an awareness of the person sitting next to me. I 
feel like I am one point on the base of a triangle that converges on the object we both 
                                                     
5
 Campbell also argues that only this view of joint attention can provide the common knowledge 
necessary to engage rationally in cooperative actions. 
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perceive. So the directedness of my representational state is different, in that it is 
directed from a wider spatial point than normal. The other person helps to shape the 
framework of my visual perception, literally the way I take myself to be approaching 
the object. This is not purely a spatial experience however. I also have ideas about 
what kinds of information are available to the other person, and to some extent what 
kind of person he is, the kind of information I could equally self-consciously think 
about myself. So my thoughts about the other person, combined with my awareness 
of what facts about me are available to him, are a filter through which the visual 
perception is interpreted. Thus I have a different experience of the object when I see 
it with others. 
 
Then according to Campbell’s general disjunctivist views, I could not be having this 
experience unless the other person was actually there, in space, next to me. We might 
concede this much at least. Yet I have only really referred to thoughts about the other 
person. This is all quite compatible with a thoroughly internalist conception of the 
whole state. And as long as we keep talking about other people being constituents of 
my experiences, the internalist can continue to talk about the thoughts of other 
people, not the people themselves. So instead I think we should take the extended 
mind approach, and talk about cognitive processes in non-phenomenal and functional 
terms. 
 
So let us assume that my visual experience supervenes on my brain state. All 
information that I experience must be first processed by my brain. This is what 
allows the internalist to make his claims. However, we can instead say that the task 
of seeing the object is something mediated by the other person’s task of seeing. So to 
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the extent that I am monitoring the other person, the direction of his gaze, his 
responses to the object and to me and so on, my task of seeing is sensitive to him, 
and affected by him. I look at something because he looks at it, I identify certain 
features because he does. I have certain emotional responses to it because he does 
and in all these respects he is equally affected by me. And if he were not there at all, 
(if I was hallucinating, or he had slipped away unnoticed) I wouldn’t really be 
directing my seeing via his seeing. I wouldn’t really be having what is called a joint 
attentional state. I would be having something else, a regular attentional state, though 
one that might seem a bit like a joint attentional one. So just as infant joint attention 
is not mediated by some cognitive model of their interactions with the adult, but is 
constituted by those interactions themselves, so mature joint attention is equally 
constituted by the actual system of interactions, the plural subject framework. 
 
The extent of monitoring is an important condition here. It allows the tasks of seeing 
to be more or less integrated. This factor will be important when we compare the 
silent joint attention to music to the noisy joint attention to music, since depending 
on the situation, the mere fact of jointly attending (with no additional overt 
monitoring) can have various affects on the perceptual state. But first let us 
emphasise that the intrinsic content of my visual state is not partly constituted by the 
other person. Rather my task of seeing is partly constituted by the other person, what 
we might call the structure of the visual state. Sometimes philosophers talk as if the 
task of seeing were equally the visual state, and since perception is a dynamic 
process, continually tracking features of the world, filling out details, solving the 
binding problem, focusing, recognising and interpreting and so on, it is often fair to 
say that this whole process is the visual state. Given this proviso then we could say 
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the other person partially constitutes the visual state. Yet when we talk about visual 
experiences, the distinction becomes clearer. One could not be engaged in the same 
task of seeing if one were a brain in a vat. But perhaps one could have the same 
experience if one were a brain in a vat. (We could then make a content externalist 
argument about whether or not this was the case (e.g. Putnam 1981) but I do not have 
the space to go into this issue here.) 
 
Overall, my claim is that joint attention involves establishing a plural subject of 
attention, in which a framework for perceiving the world is generated. This is a 
minimal case of socially extended cognition since the actual interactions involved 
define that state. Furthermore, just like the infant case, the main purpose of joint 
attention is to objectively fix the content of attention. So when jointly attending to 
the clock, there is one clock that constitutes our two perceptual states and in this way 
our perceptual states converge. At the same time however, various details of our 
perceptual experiences may differ, such as the specific orientation towards the clock, 
or whether one of us attends to the second hand and the other does not. Joint 
attention does not require the matching of perceptual experiences beyond a basic 
level. Rather we can both be attending to the same thing whilst ‘filling out’ the 
details of that experience in different ways. Yet what matters is that we are able 
accommodate these differences within the shared framework of the joint attentional 
experience. Where these differences are expressed we can recognise that they apply 
to the same thing. This means that we can jointly keep track of the shared object 
even if whilst one person is looking at the clock, the other is monitoring my gaze or 
vice versa. At the same time, joint attention can imbue the object with additional 
social meaning, as something that signifies our relation to each other, as something 
 229
that affords a cooperative action or as something that arouses a social emotion in us. 
It is with this is mind that we can now turn to the case of jointly attending to music. 
 
Joint Attention to Music - The Silent Case 
Now that I have shown that joint attention is a socially extended state we can now 
begin to explore the consequences of this on our social experiences of music. To start 
with I will look at cases of silent joint attention, which we may characterise with the 
following kind of scenario: 
 
In a prestigious city concert hall, an audience of several thousand people chatter 
quietly amongst themselves. After a while the musicians of the orchestra make a 
ramshackle entrance, take their seats and begin to tune up. Finally the conductor 
strides in and the audience applauds him to his podium. The conductor ritualistically 
shakes the hand of the leader of the orchestra and the musicians lift their instruments 
in preparation. The audience gradually becomes completely silent and then at a 
moment of exactly his own choosing the conductor begins the performance. The 
disorder of life suddenly coalesces into perfect order. The actions of the orchestra are 
exquisitely balanced, beyond most other social activities. The audience too has 
become ordered, uniformly focused on the movements of the conductor and 
orchestra. During the performance they remain silent and immobile. They hardly 
even look at each other until the music is finished. 
 
If when participating in audience listening of this kind, you take a mental step back 
from the music and instead think about those around you, you realise the enormous 
concentration of attention focused on the stage. Concert halls of this kind are 
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designed to direct all eyes onto the conductor (or soloist) at the centre. The audience 
is still visible, yet any kind of audience noise is considered a nuisance. So the listener 
is encouraged to ignore the other listeners and concentrate on the music as much as 
possible. Yet this is certainly a case of joint attention, since the listeners are aware of 
their mutual participation in a listening experience. However the minimal degree of 
mutual monitoring of each other’s reactions throughout the performance will limit 
the extent that the aural perception of the music is integrated. 
 
Yet even without the freedom to openly comment on the music during its 
performance, the audience are at least directed towards the same event and may 
nonetheless be having extremely similar experiences. As in other cases of joint 
attention there will be normal ways in which the music is perceived. At the most 
basic level the music is to be treated as a piece of music, performed largely for its 
own sake rather than for any other instrumental purpose. In addition, within the 
classical repertoire usually performed in concert halls, the audience can commonly 
expect that there will be a theme to follow, that the music will have a familiar 
large-scale form and that it will be emotionally expressive. 
 
The problem of course is that pieces of music are multi-faceted objects, capable of 
sustaining all manner of different perspectives beyond the most superficial level. 
Throughout chapter four I outlined the various ways in which listeners may differ in 
their responses. One of the most significant factors was the different levels of 
expertise that listeners can bring to bear on their listening experiences. Some 
listeners will be familiar with the cultural context in which the piece was composed, 
some will have heard the same piece before and some will have greater theoretical 
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knowledge about how the music is produced. The result of this expertise is that some 
listeners will literally be able to hear elements of the music that others cannot. 
 
Yet in chapter four I also described how given that the music relies on its natural 
resemblance to emotions for its expressive character, we should not expect radical 
differences in what emotions listeners recognise. The different responses that 
listeners have should for the most part be intelligible to each other and grounded in 
real features of the music. I also described above how the framework for the 
perception of objects that joint attention generates is one that can accommodate 
different ways in which different people fill out the details of the experience. So even 
if one cannot eliminate the different levels of expertise, joint attention still entails 
that there is a common target at which the listeners all aim. The mutual fixing of this 
target involves a willingness to allow one’s perspective to be influenced by others 
and an inclination to have one’s reaction cohere with the reaction of the group. So 
just as in ordinary cases of joint attention we should not separate out the listening to 
the music into (i) perception of the music plus (ii) mutual awareness of (i), but rather 
a perceptual state of us all listening to the music. 
 
Though there is a basic alignment in our perceptual activities, exactly how much the 
content of our listening experiences can be coordinated depends on how much a 
listener can be made aware of the reactions of other listeners. The problem of course 
is that within a silent joint attentional situation, there simply isn’t the opportunity to 
allow different responses to be expressed and thus negotiated. Yet even in the silent 
case of joint attention, there is still a sense in which the awareness of being part of a 
situation like this will impress itself in common ways upon the individual listeners 
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within an audience. When it comes to the emotional content of the music it is 
important to note that silent joint attention implies a tacit acceptance of that 
emotional content. Sometimes this can be a particularly uncomfortable experience. 
For instance, imagine listening to a highly sentimental and romantic piece of 
classical music in a room alone with your boss. Since the emotional content of the 
music must be commonly assumed to be equally obvious to both listeners, it 
generates a palpable sense of an emotional ‘atmosphere’, which given your 
background knowledge about each other may or may not seem appropriate. Thus due 
to its mutual availability, that emotional content of the music now gains social 
dimensions.6 
 
Furthermore sitting in a huge concert hall surrounded by thousands of other people 
immediately lends an intensity to any event that occurs in that space. Apart from the 
vast range of sonic forces that can be achieved, part of the drama inherent in live 
performance is to witness an extraordinary act of human skill, comparable to 
watching a tightrope act with no safety net. It is unlikely that the same atmosphere 
could be achieved if there was only one listener present. The greater sense of tension 
is dependent on the increased concentration of attention that the mass audience 
generates. Every event in that space has massively increased social consequences. 
 
Compare this to recordings, in which the signs of human presence are diminished. 
Because the music is no longer a social event in the same way, we may even claim 
                                                     
6
 It would be worth empirically testing the different emotional responses of listeners when made to 
listen to music whilst directly facing each other as opposed to facing the source of the sound. I would 
predict that an inhibition as well as intensification of response might result depending on the listener’s 
mutual familiarity or the degree to which they identify with each other. Moreover, the content of those 
responses may be interestingly aligned. 
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that recordings are less likely to be surprising or shocking, even when we hear them 
for the first time. Recordings remain the same in each playing. As such they 
encourage ‘perfect’ performances. In contrast, live performances can be risky. They 
can aim at the broad sweep of the music’s character without worrying so much about 
mistakes that would be revealed on further analysis. Thus a sense of the spontaneous, 
rare, or unrepeatable qualities of a human expression are emphasised by the live 
performance and undermined by the recording. This impression can confront a 
listener who listens again to the recording of a live concert he attended. One listener 
described it as “a pale reflection of what I experienced in the hall, with people 
around me getting excited, and seeing musicians in animated mode” (Andrew Keener 
in Philip 2004: 54). 
 
All this seems to cohere well with what Walter Benjamin described as the loss of 
‘aura’ that he says must accompany the mass reproduction of a work of art. 
Benjamin defines aura as the “unique phenomenon of a distance however close it 
may be” (Benjamin 1968: section III) and describes it as what gives an artwork its 
authority and uniqueness. The term ‘aura’ implies the peripheral social context 
within which the work is embedded, and which Benjamin claims is essential to its 
singular presence and our awareness of it as a complete and distinct object. Where 
social rituals of music go to great lengths to preserve context, one of the essential 
functions of reproduction is to remove musical content from one social context and 
translate it into another. The listener may be encouraged to imaginatively reconstruct 
the original context (particularly if some signs remain such as coughs or applause). 
Yet recordings often strive to surgically remove any signs of the social context. As 
result the ‘distance’ between the listener and the music is reduced. As even signs of 
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the performer are diminished, so the listener gains more control over the content of 
their experience. As I mentioned in chapter four, this may encourage the listener to 
imagine the music as an idealised expression of his own feeling.  
 
This rather solipsistic phenomenon misses out on the almost unique potential for 
musical performances to unite listeners in experience. Just how great this potential is 
can be appreciated when we note that the important difference between joint 
attention to music as opposed to joint attention to most other events is that music is 
so richly expressive of the inner character of emotion. For this reason to involve 
oneself in the music and allow it to dominate one’s sense of stress and flow is to 
locate a source for the character of one’s inner life that is common to the thousands 
of listeners around you. It is based on this consideration that phenomenologist Alfred 
Schutz claims that music has a special capacity to align listeners’ sense of ‘inner 
time’. Schutz here is drawing on Bergson’s notion of inner time or ‘duree’ (in 
contrast to measured clock time). The reason that music can structure inner time is 
because unlike a mathematical proof, music cannot be grasped all at once, but must 
always be experienced as a gradual revelation stretched out in time. 
 
Moreover, Schutz claims that the structure of the music captures the subjective 
stream of consciousness as “an interplay of recollections, retentions, protensions, and 
anticipations” whereby the listener is continuously re-organising the sounds that he 
has heard previously as well as anticipating what is to come. This view is similar to 
Meyer’s theory that music arouses emotions by generating and resolving 
expectations. And just as in Meyer’s theory we may worry that listeners’ relative 
familiarity with the work will significantly influence what expectations they have. 
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Nevertheless, the point is that by being drawn into the same sequence of sounds, the 
listeners gain a sense of simultaneity with other listeners, in Schutz’s terms of 
“growing older together” (1971: 175), even if they have differing perspectives on 
that experience.7 As such Schutz draws a particular connection to the sharing of inner 
time and the state of joint attention: 
 
[T]his sharing of the other’s flux of experiences in inner time, this living 
through a vivid present in common, constitutes what we called in our 
introductory paragraphs the mutual tuning-in relationship, the experience 
of the “we,” which is at the foundation of all possible communication. 
(Schutz 1971: 173) 
 
Adorno similarly claims that great symphonic performances can “annihilate... the 
contingencies of the listener’s private existence” enabling the communal elation of 
an audience. Accordingly he complains that playing symphonies on the radio has 
‘atomised’ the audience and destroyed the traditional collective aspect of the 
symphony (Adorno 2002: 256-257). Schutz has a different opinion here. He believes 
that radio listening provides just the same sense of simultaneity as the concert hall, 
though there may be “variations of intensity, intimacy and anonymity” (1971: 174). 
Schutz is mainly interested in how the content of the music must be experienced in a 
particular temporal way. However he doesn’t appreciate the extent to which private 
listening can significantly affect the sense of control over the music. The listener to a 
radio programme can certainly imagine all the millions of other listeners that might 
                                                     
7
 In addition, when performing together, Schutz says that musicians must align both their inner and 
outer time. This is comparable to the claims about sharing emotion that I make in the following 
chapter in that they can share their reactions to real events. 
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be tuned in to the same music, yet that fact does not impress upon him to such an 
extent that he won’t happily turn down, change stations, or switch off the music, 
whistle or sing along, or walk into another room for a while. The important 
difference with the concert hall experience is that a basic level of coordination is 
retained such that we are committed to focusing on the music as long as everybody 
else is. In contrast, a private listener has far greater control over exactly what he 
listens to and how he listens to it. 
 
Finally the concert hall listener will be self-consciously aware of his emotional 
responses in a way that the radio listener will not be. It is this awareness that others 
can observe one’s reactions, and the taboos against any behaviour that might be 
considered distracting (including exaggerated facial expressions) that is likely to 
inhibit the concert hall listener’s response to emotions in the music. This is especially 
the case if other listeners do not show such signs of arousal. If on the other hand, 
other listeners do show arousal, we can expect the listener to feel more validated in 
his own responses. In either case there will be a feedback effect. If other listeners 
show arousal, then the individual listener is more likely to, which will further 
encourage the response of others. Likewise the lack of arousal shown by others will 
dampen down the individual’s response and the response of others as a result. Due to 
the inherent constraints of the concert hall listening scenario, we can expect the 
dampening effect to occur more often. Nevertheless there is the potential to reverse 
this effect, though the factors that encourage such a reversal are liable to be complex 
and subtle. 
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Overall the most significant effect of silent joint attention to music is to intensify the 
drama of performance. This may make the emotions expressed seem more vivid or 
intense, especially since they gain additional social meaning. As such the potential 
for audience arousal is increased. In this way our responses to the music’s expressive 
qualities can be interdependently structured. However the potential for greater 
integration and convergence of responses cannot be fully realised whilst the audience 
is unable to openly respond to what they are hearing. It is thus in what I call the 
‘noisy’ case of joint attention that the opportunity for music to generate a deep sense 
of community in an audience becomes most apparent. 
 
Joint Attention to Music: The Noisy Case 
The situation of the concert hall immediately changes when the performance finishes 
and the audience bursts into applause. Suddenly, a listener can fully appreciate the 
excitement (or apathy) of his fellow listeners. If he has found the performance to be 
of high quality, he will enjoy the sense of agreement in the rapturous applause of 
thousands. So we have at least the beginnings here of what I have been calling the 
negotiation of the experience of music. Yet because the applause is separated from 
the experience of the work, it cannot track the moment to moment fluctuations of 
music itself. So any new perspective that the other listeners provide can only be 
treated like a single filter through which the experience of the work is affected in its 
entirety. For this reason I am mostly interested here in reactions that occur during the 
performance itself. This includes noisy reactions like applause, cheering, booing, 
whistling, singing or humming along with the music, finger clicking, emotional 
exclamations and verbal commentary. But in addition I consider clear observable 
behaviours such as foot tapping, nodding, dancing and explicitly communicative 
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behaviours such as exchanging looks, smiles, grimaces, or placing one’s hands over 
one’s ears. 
 
An interviewee in a paper by music psychologist Alf Gabrielson describes a 
particularly strong example of the kind of noisy joint attention I am talking about: 
 
The music began before the curtain rose, and you just stood there as 
semi-paralysed and screaming... Everybody in the audience is exciting 
each other to a stage next to a climax, and when the artist at last comes on 
stage he does not have to say more than ‘hi’ to trigger that climax. It is 
very much the atmosphere in the audience that gives this concert feeling... 
One feels so free somehow. At concerts one can dance, jump, scream and 
sing as much as one wants. You are like a part of it all, not just a spectator. 
Throughout the whole concert the audience was in total ecstasy. It was 
the only thing that mattered: the music! ... You don’t think about what 
you are doing. You do what you feel like without even thinking about it. 
(interviewee quoted in Gabrielson 2001: 437) 
 
There is clearly a massive difference between this situation and the concert hall ritual 
I presented earlier. When emotional responses are unconstrained to this extent, we 
are unlikely to have the sense of tension that silent joint attention generates. What we 
have instead is an orgy of emotional abandonment. It would be hard not to get caught 
up in such a scene. So both the perceived emotional content and impact of the music 
is virtually guaranteed to be mutually recognised by the audience.8 In less extreme 
                                                     
8
 It could be argued that much of the audience reaction is directed towards the social situation itself. 
Yet the music is still the foundation and justification for all responses. 
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situations, it is still the case that enthusiastic or disapproving responses to particular 
moments in the performance will focus the attention of other listeners onto those 
passages in order to ascertain the cause of the response (assuming it is not obvious 
already). Hence an awareness of the responses of other listeners can allow joint 
attention to particular aspects of the music and its perceived content. 
 
Given also that joint attention already motivates the listener to allow his reactions to 
be influenced by others, we can expect that when the reactions of others are apparent, 
that there will be a high degree of agreement concerning the character of the music. 
So it’s not just the case that noisy joint attention enables mutual recognition of what 
others perceive in the music. It also encourages an inner ‘endorsement’ of certain 
reactions, that is, mutual agreement about the effectiveness of the music’s expression 
of emotion. In this way, adult listeners have not moved significantly beyond infant 
social referencing. There are still strong social pressures to emotionally conform with 
others. Moreover, since the music strongly affects the inner character of experience, 
this sense of agreement will entail that listeners will be in similar states of arousal. 
So far this is fairly obvious. If two people are cheering loudly in response to a piece 
of music, the chances are that they both feel the same way about the music, or more 
precisely, that they feel the same way about the music as it is performed in that 
particular social context. 
 
The major difference between listeners will involve just how aroused by the 
performance they actually are. As I discussed in the second chapter, those that 
engage in more expressive behaviours are liable to have more intense inner feelings, 
though some individuals will be internalisers, enjoying more intense ANS activity 
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with less expressive behaviours, and others will be externalisers, engaging in more 
expressive behaviours with lower ANS activity. Clearly those listeners who already 
happen to have similar emotional personalities will have closer emotional reactions 
to such a situation. In many ways, these similarities will be self-selected for because 
those who enjoy a particular genre of music and its attendant performance situations 
are already liable to have similar emotional personalities. We can also expect 
alignments along the introvert-extrovert divide.9 Because music has such immediate 
connections with the character of emotions, with particular types of music tending to 
express distinctive temporal profiles and intensities of emotions, we can expect that 
those listeners who already enjoy or aspire towards such emotional profiles will be 
most likely to seek out such performance situations. 
 
So in the noisy case of joint attention to music, we can expect not just agreement 
about the character of the music, but a strong mutual awareness of this agreement. 
This sense of agreement will both intensify the listener’s enjoyment of the music and 
their sense of community with the other listeners. In fact what is less certain about 
the noisy case of joint attention is how much it could possibly allow disagreement 
about the content of the music. Certain responses will be socially endorsed where 
contrary responses are silenced. The noisy reaction of others will make it abundantly 
clear which emotion is socially endorsed. So even if one did not agree about 
character of the music, one would certainly be disinclined to voice such a sentiment. 
The most likely result would be a sense of alienation from the group. 
 
                                                     
9
 Stelmack and Campbell (1974) have shown that in response to music, introverts are more sensitive 
to low auditory stimulation and show progressively less sensitivity to higher levels of auditory 
stimulation (corresponding with their tendency to inhibit higher levels of arousal). Extraverts reveal 
the opposite trend (cited in Kemp 1997). 
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So noisy joint attention increases the tendency of listeners to have similar attitudes 
towards the music, fixing the characteristics that it is perceived to express. Then 
because the audience are converging on their interpretation of the music, and this in 
turn involves not just the sub-personal arousal involved in emotional recognition but 
also encourages a fully aroused response, the audience will also converge on aroused 
emotional states. The mutual awareness of this creates a sense of the emotional 
atmosphere of the situation. Yet although the perception of the music is socially 
extended, and this perception involves emotional interpretation, we cannot say that 
the audience are sharing their emotional states in the strict sense. The task of 
determining one’s emotional state is to some extent socially extended, yet this is 
mostly a matter of either affirming or denying the expressive character of the music. 
It does not involve detailed control over the character of one’s emotion. Moreover 
the arousal of each listener, though clearly observable by others is still individual to 
each. As in the case of joint visual perception, the intrinsic content of each listener’s 
emotional state is not constituted by the other listeners’ arousal. 
 
But what of the musician during all of this? Certainly musicians are sensitive to the 
reactions of the audience. For instance the opera singer Caruso claimed to be only 
able to sing top Cs in the presence of an audience (Davidson 1997: 215). Similarly 
performer and music theorist Jihad Racy (1998) describes situations that apparently 
occur regularly in Arabic music where the performer is spurred on by the expressive 
signals of a knowledgeable and appreciative audience to attain a sense of ‘musical 
ecstasy’. He defines this as an effortless mastery over one’s instrument that manifests 
itself in the form of spontaneous creativity. Regarding improvised performances in 
particular, the potential for audience reactions to affect the content of the music is 
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significant. Music analysts Hazel Smith and Roger Dean argue that audiences 
appreciate when a performance is being improvised and will be all the more 
sympathetic in supporting the musician as a result (Smith & Dean 1997: 4). As in 
classical performance there is a risk that the musician may fail, but in improvised 
performances the audience can recognise their role in ensuring a successful 
performance such that their reactions can be immediately reflected and incorporated 
into the music. 
 
Yet despite the ability for the improvising performer to respond to the 
encouragement of the crowd, there is still a significant division between the state of 
the performer and the state of the audience. The performer must inevitably take 
responsibility for the content of the music. He must make decisions, influenced 
perhaps by the audience response, but ultimately based on his own technical and 
imaginative capacities. In his position at the centre of attention, the performer can 
control the emotional mood of the audience. If the performer is interested in 
expressing his own emotional state, and he is skilled, then this sense of control can 
afford a sense of communicating his emotions to others, but that does not necessarily 
involve a sense of sharing the emotions of the audience. There are all kinds of 
considerations that bear differentially upon the performer’s state of emotion, such as 
the technical and social pressures of the task, his capacity to respond more 
immediately to his emotional state, and his inevitably greater understanding of the 
productional and structural aspects of the music. As such listeners are more likely to 
feel the same as other listeners, not the performer. 
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Let us assume that the goal of the performance situation is to encourage as close a 
sense of mutual awareness and emotional community as possible. Does this 
necessarily require the audience to reproduce the emotions of the performer or 
composer as accurately as possible, by means of understanding and endorsing the 
emotional characteristics of the work? Collingwood argues that the composer 
expresses emotions on behalf of the audience and that the audience act as 
collaborators in bringing his expressive intent to fruition (Collingwood 1958: 
311-315). He claims that it is important to the artist that many people can recreate his 
emotional state by engagement with the work, or else the artist cannot be sure that he 
has had a genuine aesthetic experience. Nevertheless, Collingwood does not mean 
that the audience and the artist should enjoy the emotion expressed as a collective. 
Rather the artist communicates with each member of the audience separately on an 
individual basis. Other individuals reproduce the artist’s individual emotions. 
 
Tolstoy takes a similar view to Collingwood, but seems more optimistic about the 
capacity of art to unite the audience in emotion. Adopting a theory of expression as 
emotional contagion he claims that, “every art causes those to whom the artist’s 
feeling is transmitted to unite in soul with the artist, and also with all who receive the 
same impression.” (1899: 163). Tolstoy tries to overcome the problem of differing 
expertise by demanding that art only express simple emotions such as merriment, 
pity, cheerfulness and tranquility or “feelings flowing from the perception of our 
sonship to God and of the brotherhood of man” (1899: 164). All other arts either 
unite some people at the expense of alienating others (such as patriotic arts) or are 
inaccessible to the masses. Apart from his blithe proselytising that all nations and 
creeds would be better off uniting under Christianity, one unfortunate consequence 
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of Tolstoy’s view is that he rejects Beethoven’s 9th Symphony on the grounds that it 
is overcomplicated. Nevertheless I think that Tolstoy is right to single out the special 
capacity of folk art to engender emotional community. The reason for this however is 
not the simplicity of any emotions expressed therein but the fact that folk musics 
tend to involve far greater communal participation in the actual production of the 
music than the professionalised genres of music we currently enjoy in the 
industrialised world. 
 
The fundamental limitation of joint attention to music is that is still involves a 
division between those who produce the music and those who listen to it. Although 
clear audience reactions can go some way towards overcoming the subjectively 
variable nature of individual responses to music, there can be no guarantee that 
listeners are in fact enjoying exactly similar emotions. So long as the model of 
sharing involved is that of reproducing the emotional state of the performer, or the 
emotions of other listeners, there are numerous ways in which such reproduction can 
be partial or distorted. Thus in the next chapter I argue for a radically deeper form of 
emotion sharing based on mutual participation in the production of music. 
 
In the meantime however, it seems the best way for an audience to become 
intimately involved in the music and thereby with each other is through dancing 
together. This is because dancing not only allows the listener to physically 
synchronise with the music but also with other listeners. One particularly interesting 
example that music anthropologist John Blacking (1976) describes is the ‘possession 
dance’ of the Venda tribe. Here dancers can apparently achieve trance-like states of 
absorption in the music by physically coordinating their movements with the 
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drumming. Interestingly however, it can only occur when dancers are surrounded by 
members of their own cult, presumably people with whom they identify and trust. 
This highlights how a sense of community with others can enhance, as well as be 
enhanced by jointly participating in a musical event. 
 
Blacking emphasises the role of physical movement in experiencing one’s relation to 
others. He states, “I do not say that we can experience exactly the same thoughts 
associated with bodily experience; but to feel with the body is probably as close as 
anyone can ever get to resonating with another person” (Blacking 1976: 111). Again, 
Blacking’s idea of emotional resonance is based on the reproduction of feelings, in 
this case an additional reproduction of the dancers’ proprioceptive states. Hence 
although it is guided by a communal source, the rhythm of the drums, it is not as 
radical a case of sharing as that I explore in the final chapter. 
 
Yet we can still recognise that the more listeners can actively respond to the music 
the more their individual responses should converge. By interdependently structuring 
listeners’ perceptual activities, joint attention provides a solid foundation for such 
convergence. Moreover, when listeners can clearly observe, negotiate and agree on 
their emotional responses, a significant part of their experience will be an awareness 
that it is the same for others. This will help to validate their emotional reactions, 
most likely leading to an intensification of arousal. At the same time, by providing a 
basic ‘we’ perspective, joint attention allows many individuals to think of themselves 
in terms of a group identity. An individual listener in these situations can legitimately 
think of himself as part of an emotionally bonded group. So as long as he remains 
tuned in to the attitude of the crowd, he is entitled to prefix his descriptions of his 
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behaviour and attitudes with ‘we did’, ‘we felt’. Though their intrinsic emotional 
states are not shared, joint attention to music defines a plural subject, which listens 
and responds to the music as a group. 
 
 247
Chapter Seven: Shared Emotions in Performance
 
 
In this chapter I argue that groups can share emotions. By this I do not mean merely 
that groups can share an emotion type (by having similar although individual feelings 
towards the same object) but that they can share token emotional states. Naturally 
this will strike some readers as a highly counter-intuitive claim since emotions seem 
to be paradigmatically individual mental states. It would be hard enough to show that 
groups could share a single emotion type since emotions are sensitive to all the 
subjective differences to which mental states are prone. Moreover, whilst it might be 
more credible that groups could commonly possess an emotion where we conceive of 
emotions purely as judgements, I use the conception I outlined in chapter one of 
emotions as primarily kinds of bodily patterns. 
 
However, we have in previous chapters extended our conception of emotions quite 
considerably. Firstly, I showed in chapter one that bodily patterns are able to 
represent states of affairs without conscious attention. This separated the intentional 
content and causal role of emotions from their phenomenal experience. Then in 
chapter two I showed that bodily or vocal expression can enable cognitive control 
over one’s emotional state. In combination with the arguments from chapters three 
and four that music is able to directly simulate bodily patterns, this grounded my 
claim in chapter five that musicians can use music to extend their cognition of 
emotions. Once emotions have been externalised in this way, the possibility of 
sharing becomes more plausible. That is, if one person can externalise their emotion 
using music, and more than one person can get involved in the production of that 
music, then why can’t more than one person possess the emotional state expressed? 
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Yet making this kind of move is far from straightforward. Within the extended 
cognition account, the individual still very much remains the locus of the emotional 
state. In most cases the music is an elaboration of their bodily patterns. So we need to 
show how music can socially extend these patterns such that two or more musicians 
mutually possess the emotion. In the previous chapter I explained how the task of 
perceiving an object can be socially extended. I also began to describe how we may 
socially extend some of our responses to music. But the main concern of this chapter 
is to show how socially extended cognition can apply not just to the overall way we 
direct our cognitive activities, but also to the intrinsic content of our mental states. In 
order to show this I first look at intentions to act, because a great deal of extant 
material already discusses whether these may be collectively possessed. In particular 
I analyse the position of Margaret Gilbert, who not only argues that groups can 
possess irreducibly collective intentions but also provides a general model for group 
states which is applicable across a variety of psychological domains. 
 
When this model is applied to emotions, the claim is that two or more people are 
jointly committed to having an emotion as a body (Gilbert 2000). However whilst I 
support this basic model, I argue that Gilbert does not have a satisfactory way to 
explain how bodily patterns can be shared. It is the nature of music as well as the 
special circumstances of musical production that overcomes this difficulty; what we 
may describe as its high potential for blending and expressivity. So first some 
discussion is required of how musicians blend their musical activities such that they 
can collectively express a simulated emotion. Then once this is done I can bring in 
the considerations about using music to extend cognition of real emotions that I 
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raised in chapter five. This allows me to describe how one musician’s emotional state 
may ‘overlap’ with another’s. Yet not only are overlapping emotions possible, but 
also states where the group as a whole possesses an emotional state that is distinct 
from any state possessed by the individual members of that group. This is not to say 
that the group has its own consciousness, though I am not as bluntly dismissive of 
this notion as other writers seem to be (e.g. Searle 1995: 25). Nevertheless by having 
an emotion the group certainly displays a mental state of its own. 
 
Collective intentions 
In chapter six I argued that both infants and adults can form plural subjects of 
attention in which the task of perceiving is structured interdependently with another 
person. Clearly it is also possible to intend to form such plural subjects of attention, 
as when we attract the other’s attention by pointing to an object. However I did not 
show that the intention to form such a plural subject could be an intention of the 
group rather than the interacting intentions of the individuals involved. The intention 
to engage in an action is a mental state. It typically has the content “I will do x”; both 
representing what will be done, and determining who will do it. So to share an 
intention would require that this content (and causal power) is possessed by a group 
and not by the individuals involved. 
 
Note that I don’t mean we share the intention as we would share a cake, each person 
taking a portion of the totality. Rather I mean sharing the intention as we might share 
ownership of a house. Though each person may make individual contributions to 
generating that state (e.g. paying the mortgage) they only enjoy ownership as a group. 
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By shared possession of the content (and causal powers) of an intention then, I hope 
to show that a mental state can belong to a group. 
 
Since it is quite possible to intend to jointly attend to some object without worrying 
too much about the other’s intention, as when we forcibly attract their attention, the 
case of joint attention is not a very good example with which to demonstrate the 
possibility of collective intentions. Instead it is more instructive to find an example 
that could only be achieved with the aid of a collective intention. This is not to say 
that we cannot collectively intend to jointly attend to something, or that collective 
intentions aren’t very common. We can and they are. The point is just that once 
having recognised the existence of collective intentions we can then appreciate how 
many group activities utilise a similar structure of interactions. 
 
For instance, an action such as performing a symphony is clearly not something that 
I can intend to do, or in normal circumstances, force others to do. Hence we might 
suppose that only the orchestra as a whole can intend to perform the symphony. At 
this point however, it is reasonable to object that no single intention to perform the 
symphony is necessary. Rather each person involved need only individually intend to 
play his or her part in the symphony. However, as Raimo Tuomela notes, we can 
only make sense of the individual intention to play one’s part given the proper 
context. It is only rational to do my bit if I can be fairly sure that everyone else will 
do their bit as well (Tuomela 1991: 15-16). I must be aware of what it is that we are 
all supposed to be achieving as a group. I must desire that this overall goal be 
achieved. Moreover, I must be reasonably sure that everyone else has this goal, either 
as the result of explicit agreement or by long standing convention. Without this, it 
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could only be fortuitous that everyone happens to perform the right actions at the 
right time to achieve the goal. Ultimately then, it is this goal about the collective 
action that explains and coordinates our individual actions to play our parts. 
 
Yet as recognised above, I simply cannot intend to achieve this goal as an individual, 
since the individual actions required are entirely conditional upon the corresponding 
actions of others. Since the goal is only achievable by something that we do, I can as 
a result only intend that we do x. 
 
At this point we can still understand the collective intention as something possessed 
by individuals rather than the group as a whole. The collective intention that we x 
could be a type of which the group members each possess tokens (cf. Searle 1995). 
Yet despite the fact that this intention would be irreducibly an intention for the 
collective, it is not enough to guarantee the performance of the group action. We still 
require a sense in which my possession of a we-intention is dependent on your 
possession of a corresponding we-intention and all of this is common knowledge 
between us. Otherwise, since my we-intention belongs to me alone, I could 
unilaterally rescind it. Yet if I decided that I didn’t want to play the symphony 
anymore and walked out during the performance I would not have thereby negated 
my obligation to act according to the intention. I cannot remove the intention like 
this. In normal group actions, once I’ve agreed to do something together with others, 
I am committed to doing what I’ve agreed to do until we all agree to do something 
else instead. So there is a distinctive normative aspect of collective intentions that 
shows I am not completely in control of when and how the intention comes into 
force (cf. Gilbert 2000: 16-18). 
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Michael Bratman (1993) has presented an account that incorporates these mutual 
dependencies with additional refinements to ensure that any subplans we have as 
individuals to satisfy these intentions are also compatible. Yet whilst an intertwined 
web of individual intentions goes some way towards a system that is only realised by 
the group as a whole, we may object that it fails to properly capture the nature of 
intentions. In the sense of intentions that we are interested in here, I can only 
individually intend to do x if doing x is under my control and this intention goes 
some way towards actually bringing about the desired result (Velleman 1997). For 
example, if I desire to kill Smith, and order a taxi to take me to his house, but on the 
way the taxi happens to run over Smith and kill him, the result I intended has been 
satisfied, but I certainly haven’t killed him intentionally. Rather the intention must 
represent itself as responsible for bringing about the action. The intention determines 
how the action is to be carried out. So for example, uttering, “I intend to go for a 
walk,” resolves me to go for a walk for the very reason that I have intended to do so. 
Hence equally, any individual intention that we x cannot actually bring it about that 
we x. I cannot intend that we perform the symphony because my forming this 
intention cannot bring about the action, or represent itself as bringing about the 
action.1 Only an agreement of some kind can do this. So we are only entitled to 
identify this agreement as the true intention.1 
 
                                                     
 
1
 In his article ‘We intend that J’ (1999) Bratman has responded to this objection by claiming that one 
can intend that x despite not being able to personally bring it about that x. Just as I can intend that my 
children go to college, I could intend that we x. However Bratman has been accused of changing the 
subject here. Normally, when an individual intends x, there is something he intends to do to bring 
about x. Hence similarly an intention for some group action should be an intention to do something as 
a group. 
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It is worth exploring the nature of agreement in some depth, because it is crucial to 
all kinds of socially extended states. For example, suppose you say “we should play 
Bach” and I say “I agree”. What exactly is happening here? For the moment, let us 
just concentrate on what is happening with me in this episode. I have adopted the 
intention to play Bach, and I have done it by means of finding out your intention. But 
how important is that process to identifying how my mental state is physically 
constituted? It seems to depend on just what my purposes are when I say, “I agree”. 
In some cases, I may just be interested in expressing my own intention. However in 
many other cases, I may also be specifically interested in matching your intention. If 
for instance, I acquired the intention to play Bach, but later found that I had misheard 
your utterance “we should play Bartok” I may be disposed to change my intention 
accordingly. We might say that my attitude here is rather weak willed. Yet my main 
motivation may just be to do something together with you. 
 
So it seems that in many cases where I agree with you, I am concerned to track your 
intention as closely as possible. In these cases, I defer the content of my intention to 
you. In other words, I intend whatever you intended when you made that utterance. 
So part of the content of my intention makes an ineliminable reference to your 
intention. This is the initial motivation for the familiar externalist claim that part of 
my intention, its meaning or content, is partially located somewhere outside my 
head. 
 
Now we might explain what is happening physically here with the aid of types. So 
we both have qualitatively similar though numerically distinct intentions in our 
respective heads. We might then say that this type does not physically exist in either 
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of our heads but somewhere in the interactions of our linguistic community. Yet this 
is not entirely satisfactory. My intention is basically a shadow of yours. When I say 
“I agree”, I am implicitly saying “I intend that”, whilst mentally pointing at your 
intention.2 In some cases I may not even be aware of what it is that I’m agreeing to, 
so I don’t independently possess any token of the intention type. I may defer to your 
intentions to such an extent that when I want to find out what I intend, I have to get 
you to say it for me. Suppose for example that I’m on trial, and I want to decide what 
plea to enter. I ask my lawyer who says to me, “non est factum” which I accept, 
trusting his judgement despite the fact that I have no idea what ‘non est factum’ 
means or can even remember the words a few moments later. We should say here 
that I have decided what to plea via my lawyer’s intention. 
 
This is the kind of extended cognition that Clark and Chalmers describe in ‘The 
Extended Mind’. Furthermore, like the waiter that they mention, who decides what 
food I shall eat for me, it is a case of socially extended cognition. Now we may 
complain that in the case I described, I simply have the more vague intention ‘I will 
plea whatever my lawyer says’. Similarly, when two people agree in their intention, 
we might explain that each really has an independent intention in their own heads. 
It’s just that those intentions influence each other. It’s certainly a part of the causal 
story that my intention is formed by finding out yours, but this cause need not be a 
physical part of the mental state itself. Just as for sunburn to really be sunburn it 
must be caused by exposure to the sun, but this does not mean that the sun is literally 
a physical part of my sunburn (cf. Davidson 1987). 
                                                     
2
 In addition, since my intentions can only settle what I do, and your intentions can only settle what 
you do, we cannot have mutually identical intentions, or tokens of the same type, since strictly 
speaking, the subject of those intentions differ (Stoutland 1997 cited in Tollefsen 2004). 
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One of the replies to this is the parity argument that Clark and Chalmers make. 
According to this, I have the particular intention ‘I will plea non est factum’ because 
it is completely specifiable when occasion demands. This intention is accessible, 
reliable, and it guides my actions. So there is a parity between it and any other 
intention I might have more independently. Now our intuitions may differ on 
whether this is a satisfactory reply. Some might say it’s just more parsimonious to 
locate the vaguer intention as what is really guiding my actions, where others might 
complain that that’s just an internalist prejudice. 
 
I think that what decides this issue is whether another internal representational state 
of mine is always required to get at the content of the extended state, in order for it to 
do any of the work that mental states normally do. So if I always have to think, ‘I 
will plea whatever my lawyer says’ in order to get at the intention, and then once my 
lawyer speaks I must then form an internal intention “I will plea non est factum” in 
order to act on it, or alter any of my other mental states, then there seems to be no 
reason to admit the extended state as a physical part of my mental economy. 
However, this doesn’t seem to be the case here, because in court, the lawyer can 
stand up and say “he pleads non est factum your honour” and I can sit there 
approving the process without ever having to form the specific intention internally. 
The plea meanwhile is still recognised as my decision. 
 
Now we might debate whether this is an accurate description of the situation. The 
lesson I want to draw is just that we should only call something a mental state if it 
has an independent and distinctive representational content in the way I have 
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outlined above. What I want to concentrate on is the process of agreeing with 
somebody. It seems fairly clear that as a case of deciding what to think, agreement is 
an example of a cognitive process. It’s a kind of reasoning. It is also clear that the 
process of agreeing is an extended process. To illustrate we can adapt the example 
that was used in chapter five: Suppose I were a brain in a vat, and I began the process 
of deciding what to intend by way of finding out what you think. But rather than 
actually tracking what you think, I am given some algorithmic signal by a computer 
and this brute causal process is what leads me to think ‘let’s play Bach’. In this case, 
I haven’t agreed at all. I haven’t even gone through a decision process properly so 
called, because my intention to make up my mind using a particular method has not 
been achieved. Rather I have rather passively acquired a new intention by a quite 
different process. 
 
As I mentioned in chapter five, the external part of the process (the agreement) 
typically goes on to impact the internal part of the process (the brain state). However 
it is unreasonable to pick out any particular part of this system as the mental state. 
The content of the mental state could change externally and at that point have a 
causal effect (it could be communicated to another person for instance), before that 
change has been registered by an inner component of the mental system. Yet I still 
remain responsible for that content (despite not knowing what it is exactly). In 
addition, the external stage could be read off by another, distinctive internal state (e.g. 
a belief about what I intend), and thus play a role in modifying another mental state. 
The same is of course true of the inner stages in the mental process. Any part of the 
system could be the ‘point of contact’ in a process of mental causation. But because 
of this parity, we should only identify the system as a whole as the true mental state. 
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So what I would like to emphasise is that agreeing is a mental process or system that 
is partly physically constituted by the thoughts of another person. And the 
mechanism by which it is extended is by partially giving up control over the mental 
process to another. In the process of specifying what it is I agree with, something 
outside of me is partly in control of what that is. Such that within a certain range, I 
would endorse whatever the outer process resulted in. In general, deferring control or 
authority over one’s mental state is the key factor to all cases of externalism and 
extended cognition; whether control is given to a person or some other feature of the 
environment. 
 
Now the reason this can happen is because control over a process is something that 
can be held to a greater or lesser degree by the various components of that process. 
But another interesting feature of control is that it is also possible for two or more 
people to completely share control over some matter, such that one could only say 
that the group controls it. So if control over a cognitive process is shared in this 
manner, it would entail that the group possesses that mental state. 
 
In the legal case that I mentioned above, there was still a definite sense that one 
person remained the locus of control. When it gets down to it, I have to enter the plea 
‘non est factum’ or not and I can unilaterally veto this decision if I so choose. It is 
also possible to agree with someone without their ever knowing about it, if for 
instance, I was hiding in the bushes listening to them soliloquise to the stars (cf. 
Campbell 2005). However, when we return to the case of playing Bach from the 
perspective of both people involved, we can only agree on what we will do together, 
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or at least agree on who should decide the matter for us. The other person relies as 
much on tracking my intention as I do on tracking his. As such only the interaction 
itself, the agreement, has the final authority over what is intended. 
 
Overall, my notion of agreement is similar to Margaret Gilbert’s idea of joint 
commitment, which she uses to talk about the possibility of collective mental states 
in general. J. David Velleman elaborates Gilbert’s notion of joint commitment as 
standardly being formed by the joint conditional ‘I will if you will... then I will’. He 
says: 
 
Each of us places his behaviour under the joint control of both, by issuing 
an intention that’s conditional on the other’s intention... The result is that 
each of us conditionally settles, and is represented as conditionally 
settling, one and [the] same set of issues - namely, how both of us will 
behave - and we thereby categorically settle those issues together. 
(Velleman 1997: 48) 
 
Velleman goes on to say that we both make up both of our minds, though he 
qualifies that “this joint making up of minds is not the making up of a joint mind” 
(1997: 48). But then what exactly are we talking about physically when we say that 
the group has an intention? Velleman explains that an oral or written agreement can 
literally be an intention, since it represents the action to be performed and plays the 
right causal role in bringing about the action (Velleman 1997: 37-38). But if the 
agreement functions exactly like an ordinary internal mental intention to bring about 
an action, why does Velleman deny that it’s a mental state? His denial seems like 
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nothing more than an ‘individualist’ prejudice because the agreement, the collective 
intention satisfies the conditions I gave above for being a mental state. 
 
To explain: First of all, no additional individually based intentions are required for 
the collective intention to do its work. The reason for this is because the collective 
intention is not floating around in type-heaven, existing independently of the tokens 
possessed by individuals. Rather the collective intention is generated by, and directly 
supervenes on the conditionally intending states of the individuals involved plus the 
various relations between them. No change in the collective intention can occur 
unless some component of this system changes. So the collective intention can 
function independently of any additional individual intentions because the agreement 
already derives its representational and motivational properties from the neural states 
of the people who make the agreement! 
 
Yet note that what I’ve called the conditionally intending states of the individuals are 
not complete intentions. On their own, the individuals’ brain states do not have the 
power to decide what the goal is and how it should be achieved. It is only once they 
stand in the right relations to each other that they (jointly) gain this content and 
causal power. So the collective intention is made from individual brain states that are 
like intentions in some ways, but only the extended system as a whole, the agreement, 
is the true intention. The agreement itself is the ultimate locus of control. 
 
As a result, the individuals involved must defer to the agreement itself as specifying 
the content of whatever is decided on. Where problems arise, they must refer back to 
what was agreed in order to settle how to proceed. So individually, each person may 
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retain only a partial grasp of the content of what is agreed. Hence as well as being 
independent, the agreement itself has a distinctive representational content. In respect 
of both content and causal power, the collective intention satisfies my conditions for 
being a mental state. As such it is only an individualist prejudice to deny the 
agreement the status of a mental state. 
 
What I would like to emphasise is the mechanics of this process. It is still the 
individual brains of the people involved that are doing most of the work in actually 
implementing the intention. The point is that the connections between these 
individuals, the way they interact, is doing some important work in structuring the 
process, and in specifying its content. Moreover, where the locus of control is the 
agreement itself, we are able to say that it is a mental process performed by the group 
for the group. Agreement defines a group subject that has ultimate authority over the 
state in question, and to which all members of the group must defer. 
 
Still we might complain that it’s just a combined set of individual intentions. But this 
is not a fair description because in collective intentions, the individual states 
involved are blended to form a distinct and unified authority over an issue. What do I 
mean by blended? Well, there are difficult issues concerning emergence here. But in 
general, a group activity or state is blended where it forms an effect that cannot be 
decomposed into parts whilst remaining that effect, such that responsibility for the 
parts could be attributed to the individuals involved. This is clearer when we 
consider the kinds of activities that can be intended in this way. For instance, if two 
people are pushing a car up a hill together at 5 mph, it is ludicrous to say that each 
pushes half the car, or that each pushes the car at 2.5 mph. It is true that each person 
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is contributing a measurable force towards the effect. And the movement of the car is 
entirely supervenient on the force they individually exert. Yet you cannot divide up 
the movement of the car in a simple temporal or spatial way, a way where each part 
could still be described as the moving of the car. So we cannot meaningfully ask 
which part of the car moving effect is the responsibility of which individual. 
Similarly, if two people own a house together and contribute towards a joint bank 
account that is then used to pay for various repairs, we cannot take any given repair 
to that house and ask which person paid for it. The owners paid for each repair as a 
group. 
 
Music is a particularly good example of a blended activity in a number of different 
respects. Take for example a group of musicians playing a dissonant chord together. 
One musician plays an E, another plays a G and another an Ab. We might say that 
responsibility for the chord can be parceled out to the individual musicians involved 
since each plays a different note that in combination form the chord. Yet what about 
the dissonance or the particular harmonic quality that is generated? Can we divide up 
the dissonance and say that each musician is responsible for a part of that dissonance? 
Certainly they contribute different notes, but this is a different sort of description. 
The overall effect, the dissonance, is not something that can be meaningfully 
partitioned whilst each part remains a dissonance.3 Similar arguments could be made 
about jointly producing a syncopated rhythm, the overall volume, and most 
significantly for me, the expressive quality of the music. It is not meaningful to ask 
which performer is responsible for which bit of the sadness of the music. 
 
                                                     
3
 The case of difference tones; where a third tone or vibration effect is generated when two similar 
tones are played together is a particularly good example of this.  
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Playing music together requires the utmost blending of individual actions. Equally 
when I listen to the music, I am not listening to the oboe part and the flute part and 
the timpani part and so on. I am listening to the music that they produce together. 
Accordingly there is one overall goal; to produce a piece of music. And it is only the 
blending of the individual intentions that is capable of achieving that goal. The 
collective intention has a causal power that no individual intention can have, though 
the causal power of the collective intention supervenes on the conditional causal 
powers of the individual states plus their relations to each other. The individual states 
involved must blend prior to having this effect. Their effect is mediated by needing 
to be agreed first. Thus there is one unified cause for one unified effect. 
 
A further important point to make is that agreement can be achieved in a variety of 
mediums, not only words. When we understand agreement in a broad sense, we may 
observe that given the right sort of context, simply engaging in cooperative 
behaviour can signal agreement. For instance it is possible that several people could 
spontaneously help to push a car up a hill without any form of verbal negotiation. 
The fact that such cooperation would be obvious and fairly normal to the parties 
concerned would mean that as long as nobody protests, they could mutually assume 
to have tacitly agreed on what to do. Similarly a group of musicians playing together 
could agree on what to play purely by starting to cohere on a particular song. Of 
course, in different contexts what exactly counts as agreement will differ. As I 
discuss below, different groups of musicians may have different standards about 
what counts as a unified sound. The point is that agreement can be an ongoing 
process, and embodied in the actions of the participants. It doesn’t have to be 
something that begins and ends with a prior verbal negotiation. What matters is that 
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control and content is deferred to whatever the medium of interaction is, be it actions 
or words. 
 
So I think that the concept of agreement is a good way for us to characterise group 
states in general. Moreover, by recognising that one person asymmetrically agreeing 
with another is itself a socially extended state, we can see that group mental states 
are built on top of individual socially extended states. What distinguishes these states 
from group states is merely the locus of control. Hence by appeal to the locus of 
control, we can posit a single dimension or variable of mental states ranging from the 
traditionally internal, to the extended, to the socially extended and then finally to the 
group state. 
 
Dimension of mental state extension: 
Internal individual – Extended individual - Socially extended individual - Collective 
 
Gilbert on Group Emotions 
Having established that groups can share token intentions the foundation has now 
been laid for group emotions. Group intentions provide a model for the structure of 
group mental states generally. Margaret Gilbert generates such a model from her 
notion of joint commitment: 
 
For the relevant psychological predicate “X” and persons P1 and P2, P1 
or P2 may truly say “We X” with respect to P1 and P2 if and only if P1 
and P2 are jointly committed to X-ing as a body. (Gilbert 2000: 19) 
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As in joint intentions, commitment here involves mutually and conditionally 
expressing willingness to engage in x, and taking on certain normative obligations as 
a result. Applying this to emotions, Gilbert claims that the nature of the participants’ 
commitment is, as much as possible, to constitute by their actions and words a single 
body that feels the emotion (2000: 135). This, she argues, properly captures what it is 
we mean when we say that a nation mourns the death of their leader, or that a family 
is overjoyed by a daughter’s marriage.  
 
Gilbert is specifically interested in emotions that the group has regarding its own 
group actions, such as an army or nation feeling remorse over its conduct during a 
war. The focus on group actions is however unnecessary for group emotions, it 
merely helps to strengthen Gilbert’s case. This is because a group emotion must be 
directed towards a content that impacts on the group as a whole. The nature of 
emotional perceptions requires a sense of the group as a definite subject that 
dynamically interacts with the world. Group acts are therefore good examples of 
such interactions, especially in so far as emotions motivate certain behavioural 
responses. However group emotions could also be legitimately directed at any 
situation in which the group as a whole finds itself in. There is a definite sense in 
which groups as a whole rather than their members can be in situations and can have 
goods independently of the goods of their individual members. For instance the 
philosophy department could flourish by working all its lecturers to death (though 
presumably not all at once). Similarly a company could go bankrupt although all its 
employees remain financially stable.4 
 
                                                     
4
 Keith Graham (2002) argues at some length that because groups can act, they can be regarded as 
distinct moral agents with the capacity to harm or to be harmed by others. 
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By focusing on group actions, the point that Gilbert is trying to establish is that just 
as individual intentions to do one’s part cannot add up to a collective intention, so 
emotional feelings towards one’s contribution to a group action cannot add up to a 
group emotion.5 For instance, one’s individual actions may have been entirely 
honourable, or one may have even protested against the group action, or simply have 
been unaware of it at the time. Yet it is still intelligible that a person feel remorse 
over the action of a group with which he is associated and legitimately say ‘would 
that we had not done that!’ The member of the group may feel no remorse on his 
own account, but only remorse for the group. 
 
However, this case is equivalent to having individual intentions that we x, in that it 
belongs to individuals within the group rather than the group as a whole. It is not for 
that reason impossible to have such emotions, though they cannot impact on the 
group’s future actions in the way that individual emotions can impact on an 
individual’s future actions. It is just not a group emotion. In order to be a true group 
emotion, Gilbert says that there must be conscious agreement between the members 
of the group to endorse a certain emotional response. In order to justify this, she 
contrasts it with two cases that seem like less than group emotions. The first of these 
is where each member of a group feels an emotion (in Gilbert’s example, remorse) 
towards an act that the group has engaged in, but keeps it secret from the others. This 
is clearly not a group emotion, since each member may believe himself to be alone in 
their feeling of remorse, so there is no sense in which the emotions of the members 
                                                     
5
 Equivalent to this would be having an emotion directed at one’s personal situation within the groups’ 
situation. For example, within the panicked reaction of a crowd to a gunshot, I may well fear only for 
my own safety (which is one of the reasons why panicking crowds are not good examples of group 
emotions). 
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are combined or coordinated in a way that intuitively captures the cases in which a 
nation mourns or a family is overjoyed. 
 
In the second case Gilbert offers, there is common knowledge amongst the group that 
each member feels remorse over the group’s act but this emotion is never publicly 
expressed. For instance, the participants may be already committed to expressing the 
opinion that the group can do no wrong and so all their statements to each other and 
the wider public may indicate that their actions were completely justified. This case 
is less clear than the first, since we might want to say that the group has an emotion 
but, as is possible in individual cases, it is ‘in denial’ about it. Yet just as in cases of 
individual denial where we might be reluctant to say that the individual really knows 
what emotion they are undergoing, it is unclear whether the members of this group 
could really be said to have common knowledge about the emotion they all possess. 
If the members of a group explicitly state to one another that the group action was 
justified, then the remorse of the members may not be sufficiently out in the open to 
qualify as common knowledge. The example could perhaps be fixed in this respect, 
or we might accept that there are borderline cases of group emotions. However the 
point is that unless the members’ expressions of emotion are in some sense combined 
or coordinated, we cannot say that the group as a whole represents the emotional 
object. 
 
The essentially perceptual status of emotions entails that they must represent their 
causes or objects. Within a group, unless this representation is done ‘as a body’ we 
can only say that the individuals all have separate but related emotions, i.e. 
individual tokens of a common emotion type. Such similar emotions are of course 
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possible, but it is not the kind of genuinely group emotion that we are interested in 
here. Generating a group emotional representation towards a particular state of 
affairs is vital for establishing that the emotion is truly the group’s reaction to the 
group’s situation. 
 
That this representational state belongs to the group is more clearly seen where it 
differs from the representations of the members of that group. We might think that 
where the members of a group are reasonably aware of the group’s situation, the 
content of individual and group representations may not differ very much. Yet as in 
cases of joint attention, the members of a group can mutually fix the target of an 
emotion and cooperatively fill out the details of the representational in ways that 
need not match with any member’s individual representational state. More 
importantly, the role of the representational state may differ in terms of its capacity 
for directing group actions, especially since the group explicitly agrees on it. Group 
representational states may also differ in terms of vividness or intensity, temporal 
duration or complexity (which could be greater or lesser along each of these 
variables). 
 
Yet this would not be just a combined set of individual representations because as in 
collective intentions, there is an agreement to which everyone’s representations must 
defer. If for instance, it was found that something about the different participants’ 
emotional representational states was in conflict. This would have to be resolved on 
pain of destroying the agreement. Again what counts as agreement or conflict 
depends on the context. For example, some groups may resolve apparent 
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inconsistencies by allowing that they feel happy about one aspect of the situation 
though sad about another. 
 
In the cases that Gilbert imagines, the group representational state is achieved by 
public expressions of emotion and associated behaviours. Yet if all that is required 
are expressions of emotion, (which the individual may not even commit to 
individually) what is to prevent any kind of group activity from qualifying as a group 
emotion? For instance, if a wrecking crew destroys a building, does this qualify as a 
case of group anger because the various noises that they create combine to form an 
expressive representation of the situation, and moreover, motivates each person to 
destroy the building with more vigour? Or for that matter, need the participants even 
be human? Could a collection of machines engaged in the same activity express 
anger as a body? 
 
I think we can resist these kinds of counter-examples by reminding ourselves of 
Dretske’s theory of representation. According to Dretske, a representation must be 
designed either by evolution or learning to represent what it represents. It is not 
enough that the state just indicates its cause, the way tree rings indicate the age of a 
tree. An organism’s bodily pattern represents the emotionally relevant aspects of its 
situation as a result of evolution, and within its lifetime, it can learn to associate the 
same core relational theme with different kinds of situations (such as imaginative or 
social objects). So even if the sounds that the wrecking crew makes are caused by its 
destructive activities and these sounds have some kind of behavioural consequence, 
they do not emotionally represent the group’s situation because they weren’t 
designed to do so either intentionally by the wrecking crew, or as the result of 
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recalibrating a pre-existing emotional response. Hence there is at least one important 
difference between individual and group emotions. The emotional nature of the 
group representation must be derived from the emotional nature of their individual 
representations. Collective representations must be acquired either as a result of 
explicit intention or gradual recalibration. 
 
So far then, a group emotion involves an agreement to form an emotional 
representation as a group about a situation that impacts on this group. However, we 
have not yet tackled the most troubling problem of all regarding the existence of 
group emotions, which is the precise nature of these group representations. In 
ordinary cases, individual emotions represent core relational themes with patterns of 
bodily changes, but how can a group have its own bodily state, let alone its own 
phenomenal feeling? Gilbert to some extent sidesteps this issue by claiming that 
bodily feelings are not essential components of emotional states. However she does 
argue that individual ‘pangs’ of remorse can still be part of a group emotion, since 
they are responses to the group’s remorse. Thus she says, 
 
Had the group not come to feel remorse, one might never have felt this 
way. And one’s feeling this way may not correspond to any judgements 
one has made in one’s heart with respect to the group’s act or to any 
associated act of one’s own. The pangs in question, then, may best be 
described as pangs of remorse associated with the group’s remorse or, 
more succinctly, as “pangs of group remorse.” (Gilbert 2000: 136) 
 
 270
Whilst I concur with Gilbert that these pangs may be about the group’s act, and 
signal a commitment to the group’s avowed emotion of remorse, they are 
emphatically not the group’s pangs. Rather they are my pangs that I perhaps 
imaginatively contribute to the group. 
 
This is precisely analogous to the individual intending that we engage in some group 
act. So for the very same reason that an individual intention that we x cannot, on its 
own, be part of a genuine collective intention, a pang of feeling on behalf of the 
group cannot be part of a genuine group emotion. It is not blended with the feelings 
of the others. Hence whilst Gilbert’s response may be more permissible from her 
perspective, given her cognitive conception of emotions in which bodily feelings are 
construed as responses to emotions rather than their central characteristic, it is 
completely inadequate for my favoured conception of emotions. 
 
A principle of sharing must be properly articulated here: The only mental states that 
can be shared are those that are embodied in an agreement. Without this, we could 
only point to mutually influenced mental states. And the only way for a mental state 
to be embodied in an agreement is if its content is manipulated in the process of 
agreeing. This is what allows the agreement to have distinctive representational 
content and to be capable of playing a mental causal role without needing to be 
duplicated by some additional internal mental state. Now because Gilbert’s examples 
involve the participants reciprocally forming their feelings (I feel remorse because 
you feel remorse), we can say that they truly share the overall task of deciding their 
emotion. This is just like the cases of noisy joint attention that I discussed in chapter 
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six. But they could never share the intrinsic content of their feelings, since these are 
never embodied in the agreement. 
 
Of course most philosophers’ main motivation for resisting the existence of group 
emotions will be because emotions seem to rely on bodily sensations so much. 
Gilbert tries to avoid this problem by focusing more on the evaluative concomitants 
of emotions. But I want to grasp the bull by the horns and argue that groups really 
can share emotions even though bodily changes in response to situations will always 
remain the central case of emotional states. It is for this reason then that we must 
return to the expression of emotion in music. 
 
Agreeing in Classical Music 
Before showing how musicians can collectively possess their emotions in music, it is 
important to first explain what it means to agree in music. Although as I argued in 
chapters three and four, music can capture the intrinsic content of emotions, the 
musicians cannot agree on that content without significant mutual coordination of 
their actions and attitudes towards the music. So at this stage I only concentrate on 
musicians agreeing on a simulated emotion, without worrying about whether the 
music is directly integrated with the performers’ actual emotional states. It is like the 
difference between a group of people collectively describing a fictional situation as 
opposed to collectively describing a real situation that confronts them. 
 
To begin with, the grounds for thinking that musicians are mutually sensitive to what 
it is that they are performing are very good: 
 
 272
In a musical ensemble... the interaction between players is of such a 
nature that mis-timings even of a fraction of a second, minute hesitations, 
slight differences in intonation, tiny misjudgements of dynamics and so 
on are regarded as monumental blunders even among musicians with 
quite modest pretensions. Across a wide range of variables almost total 
co-ordination is required, and this necessitates an exceptionally high 
degree of interpersonal awareness. (Young & Colman 1979) 
 
The view above expressed by psychologists Young and Colman is far from unique. 
There is wide agreement that ensemble performance requires an extremely high level 
of mutual sensitivity (e.g. Blum 1986: 14-15, Waterman 2003: 123, Goodman 2002: 
156-157). However, the purpose of this sensitivity is not necessarily to establish a 
completely uniform approach to the music. Several analysts emphasise that part of 
the interest of a form like the string quartet is in the balance between diversity and 
uniformity. For instance, David Waterman questions whether if one player could 
somehow perform all the parts of a Beethoven string quartet, it would eliminate 
something vital from the work (Waterman 2003: 100). The struggle to achieve 
ensemble between four different players (or to subvert it) may be part of the drama 
of the music. Similarly the Guarneri quartet make the point that sometimes the 
instruments need to stand in relief of one another rather than blending too well. As 
such, they do not seek a uniform approach to things like vibrato or sonority, placing 
as they say “a high premium on variety” (Steinhardt in Blum 1986: 3, cf. 6). 
 
Yet this allowance for diversity may belie a deeper underlying uniformity. When we 
look at the details of group performance, we find that contrasts are ultimately 
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grounded on a bedrock of solid ensemble playing. For example, it would be 
unthinkable for the musicians not to stick to a joint tempo. Any form of rubato 
playing (where the timing of notes is stretched or shortened) is usually limited to the 
lead instrument and must still adhere to the overall pulse. In addition, where the 
score indicates common timings amongst instruments for phrases and rhythms, 
special attention is usually made to attacking and finishing notes in perfect unison. 
Intonation between instruments must also be balanced, or else where the parts form 
chordal textures, the music will sound horribly distorted. Likewise dynamic balance 
must be carefully attended to so that whilst each instrument remains audible, the lead 
instrument at any given time stands out. 
 
Ultimately contrasts in vibrato, sonority, and rubato are fairly subtle. And whilst they 
certainly enable the listener to pick out the different instruments, they by no means 
undermine the conception of the music as a single unified work. These details simply 
add to the complexity and contrast within that single work. So even if the listener is 
not encouraged to experience the music as the product of a single person, they should 
nevertheless understand that the four people are combining to produce a single piece 
of music. It is in this sense then that ensemble performance is an exceptionally 
blended activity. The musicians must collectively express the content or meaning of 
the work, and given that this cannot simply be ascertained from objectively 
identifiable aspects of the score, they are required to align their subjective 
interpretations of the music in order to do it. 
 
Regarding the mechanics of establishing a collective interpretation, we may identify 
two important strands; negotiation within rehearsal and mutual tracking during 
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performance. Regarding rehearsal, modern quartets like Waterman’s and the 
Guarneri quartet tend to favour a democratic approach to settling musical details, (in 
contrast to traditional groups where one musician, typically the first violin, would act 
as leader). Unlike other kinds of democratic groups however, the string quartet must 
come to unanimous agreements, at least for the purpose of any single performance of 
a work, and those agreements should hopefully add up to a consistent vision of the 
entire piece. Hence the crucial importance of rehearsal negotiation should not be 
underestimated. Quartets survive or perish according to their ability to make joint 
decisions. As such, the compatibility of personalities within the group is important 
such that they must feel able to take and give criticism as well as accommodate each 
others’ way of understanding the music. For instance, some musicians may prefer a 
technical approach to analysing the music where others are more comfortable with 
intuitive or metaphorical directions such as “it sounds too hot” (Waterman 2003: 
102). 
 
The overall purpose of such negotiation is to generate ‘cognitive directives’ where 
the musicians agree on how they are to think about the music. The effect of this is to 
coordinate the way the musicians perceptually organise the sounds they are 
producing. That is, the way that audible events are lumped together as well as the 
way some musical characteristics are prioritised over others. This will significantly 
affect the manner in which musicians actually hear the music, and as a result how 
they play it. Cognitive directives can then function at several different levels, such as 
measuring the tempo in the same way (in 4 beats rather than 8 for example), or 
where phrases are divided, and eventually more overarching features such as 
expressive content. 
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Elaine Goodman (2000) has investigated the way that musicians negotiate the 
expressive quality of works during rehearsal. In one illuminating episode, she 
describes the discussion between a cellist and pianist when jointly deciding how to 
execute the climax of a duet by Chopin: 
 
The pianist described the mood as ‘hesitant passion’, while the cellist 
depicted the growing intensity of her levels using an analogy: ‘it’s like 
you’re asking a question, and then you start crying, and you ask it a bit 
louder, and then you scream the answer’. They resolved however, to 
‘make it sound more searching’.  The searching metaphor mediated 
between the two formal conceptions (i.e. levelled versus continual 
build-up) and provided a way to unify their conflicting insights. 
(Goodman 2000: 114) 
 
Agreements such as these will have a widespread impact on the execution of all 
kinds of musical details.6 However whilst this kind of discussion is not uncommon, 
we may expect that musicians will mostly communicate on a more practical level, 
and it is only having reached a fairly deep level of analysis, perhaps motivated by 
more intractable differences in interpretation, that such emotional insights will be 
discussed. In addition, where Goodman analysed the interaction of musicians playing 
together for the first time, we may expect that long term musical partnerships, being 
                                                     
6
 Although we can expect that different instruments may well have a different role to play in 
generating the overall emotional content, for example one instrument may need to keep strict time in 
order to allow another more expressive freedom (cf. Waterman 2002: 106). If however each musician 
is responsive to the total musical product as opposed to only their contribution, they will still need to 
perceive the emotional content of the music in similar ways. 
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more familiar with each others’ musical approaches, may generally require less 
verbal negotiation during rehearsal. Long-term ensembles may well have settled 
various basic issues over the years and established a group style. They are also likely 
to be more capable of intuitively anticipating each other and so more comfortable 
with allowing some details to be settled during the course of the performance itself. 
 
This moves us then towards the second strand of collective interpretation, which is 
mutual tracking during performance. Mutual tracking is mostly achieved by close 
attention to aural cues, although the role of visual cues such as eye contact or hand 
and other bodily movements is also significant (cf. Goodman 2002: 156-159 and 
Davidson 2002). Here the focus is not on explicitly establishing that the musicians 
think about the music in the same way, but on reacting immediately to each others’ 
performance in order to achieve a balanced and coherent musical product. From a 
functional perspective however, the consequence of this is that the musicians are 
indeed converging on a common idea of the music, at least as they express that idea. 
This is because by tailoring their musical productions to each others’ performances, 
the musicians are mutually establishing one particular interpretation of the piece. 
 
The Guarneri Quartet (having played together for over 20 years) particularly 
emphasise this form of coordination, regarding it as more spontaneous and hence 
more exciting for the performers and less likely to result in bland performances. 
They also see it as encouraging more genuinely communicative interaction in 
contrast to, for example, planning which musician will take the lead at any given 
moment thus: 
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The actual lead may be in the first or second fiddle, but, in fact, everyone 
feels it at the same time; everyone is thinking towards a central point; the 
start of a piece, a ritardando, or whatever it may be. We don’t follow each 
other; we play together. (Soyer in Blum 1986: 14-15, cf. 16 & 19-20)  
 
Similarly the viola player Michael Tree says (referring to John Dalley, 2nd violin), 
“I’d rather not play quartets at all than nail everything down in advance. There’s 
rubato in every note; I have to try to climb into John’s psyche” (Tree in Blum 1986: 
6). In general, the members of the Guarneri Quartet rely on an intuitive 
understanding of each other as individuals as well as a mutual trust in each other’s 
judgement. This corresponds to the more informed levels of empathy that I described 
in chapter two. Hence we can expect that where one musician expresses emotion in 
their performance, the other musicians will be particularly sensitive to the attitude of 
that musician. In addition, the musicians will not always respond to each other as 
individuals, but will respond to the attitude of the group as a whole. For instance 
violinist Arnold Steinhardt says: 
 
If two people are clearly in accord, the others sense it, and there’s a 
greater chance of unanimity. We’ve never talked about this, but it’s 
nonetheless something we’ve always done. (Steinhardt in Blum 1986: 11) 
 
So by means of mutual tracking during performance or establishing cognitive 
directives in rehearsal it is certainly possible (and probably very common) for groups 
to converge on a unified expressive content. Thus they collectively produce a 
simulated or fictional emotional state. 
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At this stage we may note that according to the evidence I presented in chapter two 
and three, in order to register such an emotional quality, the musicians must to some 
extent be aroused by that emotion.7 So the group simulation may tend to become a 
real emotion for each individual musician involved. However as I mentioned in 
chapter five, where the musicians have to concentrate on accurately performing a 
score, they must to certain extent stay relaxed and emotionally inhibited. Overall if 
the musicians do not personally identify with the emotional content of the music, that 
it does not signify something of importance to them, then any synchronisation of 
their emotions is likely to be limited. Hence it will be when the musicians can use the 
music to extend the cognition of their actual emotions that we will see the greatest 
effects. As I argued in chapter five, improvised music is far more likely to enable the 
extended cognition of emotions. As such it is worth reviewing to what extent the 
insights gleaned regarding scored performance will carry over to improvised jazz 
ensembles. 
 
Agreeing in Jazz 
The first thing to note about jazz ensembles is that given little or no musical referent 
the group will lack a significant resource to enable them to think about the music in 
the same way and thus converge on the music’s expressive content. However a 
                                                     
7
 To assess the alignment of musician’s emotional responses during performance Mitch Waterman 
(1996) instructed musicians performing a duet to press a button “when the music caused something to 
happen”. Combined with post-performance interviews of the musicians he concluded that their 
emotional responses were not synchronised. This experiment however was flawed in both the way the 
responses were measured (i.e. having to push a button at the same time as concentrating on 
performing the music) and due to the fact that the musicians had no prior rehearsal together. As a 
result, the performers were far more likely to worry about the technical demands of playing together 
than to concentrate on the emotional content of the music. At any rate, we should certainly not expect 
that musicians automatically align in emotional arousal irrespective of the manner in which they 
attend to the music. Rather, convergence is more likely to occur over several rehearsals as well as 
over the duration of a musical partnership and according to joint attention during the performance. 
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common familiarity with the history of jazz, and potentially with other 
interpretations of the same piece will make up for this to a large extent. In addition, 
many of the same issues regarding balance of intonation, dynamics and tempo that 
applied to the string quartet apply equally to the jazz group. For instance, although 
we can obviously expect the jazz improviser to be freer in the way they time their 
phrases, they must still be highly sensitive to the overall pulse of the music. Likewise, 
the group must cooperate to generate an appropriate balance of dynamics and 
intonation. So in general we can expect that jazz rehearsals (where they occur) will 
involve negotiation of cognitive directives. 
 
Of course, where a jazz piece involves improvisation, the actual performances will 
differ from the rehearsals to a significant extent. Hence we can expect that to a far 
greater degree than the Guarneri quartet, jazz groups must settle musical details 
during the performance rather than planning them beforehand. Miles Davis for 
instance was known to avoid analytic discussions of the music or giving too explicit 
instructions to his players, preferring instead a range of intuitive gestural signals 
during performance (Smith 1998). Yet as we have seen in the case of scored 
performance, this need not be a barrier to a genuinely collective interpretation of the 
music, and may even encourage a greater sense of intimacy between players. So as 
long as the musicians are geared towards understanding the music in emotional terms, 
there is no reason they cannot mutually establish a unified emotional interpretation of 
the music. 
 
In his analysis of improvisational arts, Keith Sawyer identifies several features of 
group performance that can encourage successful collaborative improvisations. The 
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most general of these is the point I made above that the musicians should share a 
common musical background and a shared frame of reference (2003: 54). The 
second point is a cognitive direction. He says that performers should not ‘write 
scripts in their heads’ that is, plan too much where the music will go. Saxophonist 
and pioneer of free jazz Ornette Coleman describes this very process:  
 
If I don’t set a pattern at a given moment, whoever has the dominant ear 
at that moment can take and do a thing that will change the direction. Our 
group does not begin with a preconceived notion as to what kind of effect 
we will achieve. When we record, sometimes I can hardly believe that 
what I hear when the tape is played back is the playing of my group. I 
want the members of my group to play what they hear in the piece for 
themselves. (quoted in Hentoff 1962: 242) 
 
Improvisers avoid too much planning because it can result in trying to force the 
responses of the other musicians in a direction that might not feel right for them. 
Alternatively when it fails to go as planned, the original musician may find his flow 
disrupted (Sawyer 2003: 9). Rather the musicians must be alive to the possibilities of 
the moment. As I described in chapter five, whenever a musician produces sound, he 
will thereby generate musical momentum, suggesting ways in which the music can 
progress. In reference to this Sawyer has three further points: Firstly that although 
these ‘suggestions’ will essentially limit the range of possible responses, musicians 
should try to leave a large range of possible developments (2003: 89). Secondly, the 
other performers should affirm whatever suggestions are made rather than ignore or 
deny them, that is, by harmonising with those ideas, imitating or developing them 
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(2003: 55). Finally, performances can be most successful where they suggest 
open-ended musical ‘problems’ (such as to make a musically successful transition 
between two distant keys) rather than a present pre-established ‘solutions’ that must 
simply be enacted (such as beginning a clichéd sequence) (2003: 105). 
 
As in the case of mutual tracking during scored performances, jazz musicians may in 
fact have different perspectives on what they are playing, but what is most important 
is their ability to produce a coherent total sound. It is the collaboratively generated 
total music product itself that embodies the collective idea of the musicians. In 
support of this notion, Sawyer argues that for any given contribution a musician 
makes to the music, the full meaning or impact of that contribution can only be 
determined by the responses of the other musicians (2003: 6). In addition, the 
relative freedoms of the performers to develop what each other play mean that the 
range of possible outcomes multiplies with every moment. These expanding 
possibilities make it impossible to predict how the music will continue. 
 
As I mentioned in chapter five, this makes the appreciation of what is happening in 
jazz music to some extent a backward looking process, where the expressive content 
of the music can only be appreciated in retrospect. Sawyer argues that these features 
of improvisation make it a prime example of an emergent process, where what 
happens is so reliant on the complex interaction between the parts that the music 
simply cannot be reduced to a description of what is happening at the level of these 
parts. Below is a diagram Sawyer provides to describe the emergent nature of 
improvised performance: 
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Group Creativity. No two-dimensional figure can adequately represent the 
complexity of real-time interactional this figure should be viewed as one of 
many possible visual representations. The horizontal axis, time, represents 
the constantly changing nature of the emergent. No representation of the 
structure of the emergent is implied or intended. (Sawyer 2003: 87) 
 
Here, each musician listens to the total music product (the emergent), which for him 
will contextually suggest certain developments. The musician (P1-P4) then 
contributes his musical idea, which goes through a further stage of being filtered by 
the other musicians. At this stage the other performers will react musically to either 
support that idea, develop it, or ignore it. This then is what finally forms the total 
musical product, in a continual cycle of reactions.8 This is all completely compatible 
with my assertion that performing music is a highly blended activity. As jazz 
musician Bobby Rogovin says, “you can only appreciate jazz if you listen to the 
whole group. The soloist’s part by itself is just one line in a whole painting” (quoted 
in Berliner 1994: 387). 
                                                     
8
 Sawyer claims that this process is analogous to the progress of art historically, where new 
contributions to that artistic field are filtered by other professionals within that field, and as such 
either denied admission to the field, supported, or developed in various ways (2003: 124). 
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In so far as this total musical product has expressive qualities then, it embodies a 
simulated or fictional emotional state. And responsibility for this total musical 
product can only be ascribed to the group as a whole. Thus the simulated emotion is 
a collaboratively generated, and collaboratively possessed state. It is not a type which 
the musicians possess tokens of, but a public representation that they all contribute 
to. 
 
Shared Emotions in Music 
In order for the group’s emotional simulation to actually function as a real emotional 
state it must be properly directed at the group’s situation. Yet there are actually 
relatively few emotionally inducing situations that a group of musicians can jointly 
focus their attention on. They do not rely on each other for survival, or face common 
threats the way an early hunter-gatherer society might collectively face drought or 
war or disease. It may be possible for the group to consider some very general issues 
such as the threat of global warming or the impact of technology but these are rather 
abstract, distant concerns. A better option is to use the very act of performance as the 
source of an emotional response. For instance, the reaction of the audience could be 
something that the group fear or enjoy collectively. Putting on a good performance 
may be something that each musician regards as a personal success, but the 
musicians may also regard it as a success for the ensemble as a whole. They may 
even have a ‘self-conscious’ attitude towards their capacity to form a well-integrated 
ensemble. As Keith Graham says: 
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It may be just the rapport that is set up in collective playing, the 
monitoring of what is happening with other players and the adaptation to 
it and the reciprocity which that engenders which we value. Here it is the 
perfection of what happens between players that we value, rather than 
what happens to each of them considered individually. (Graham 2002: 
124-5) 
 
Having located some potential targets for the group’s emotion, we can now address 
the manner in which the total musical product of the ensemble, which is supposed to 
embody its emotion, is related to each individual musician’s bodily patterns. This is 
not necessarily a matter of each musician having bodily patterns at the same time as 
producing the music. Rather it requires that the musician’s emotions are recalibrated 
in the right way to allow the music to stand in for those bodily patterns. 
 
In the case of extended cognition that I presented in chapter five, I showed that a 
musician can use expressive musical patterns to function as his emotional state. In 
most of these cases the music functions as an elaboration of the musician’s emotion, 
standing alongside his ordinary bodily patterns, and helping him to self-reflectively 
manipulate his overall emotional state. This is possible because musical sounds 
display a deep isomorphism with bodily patterns and because there are two channels 
to genuine emotional states; bodily changes and neurally simulated bodily changes. 
Due to the dynamic properties of music, and the pervasive intermodal capacities of 
the brain, music can hijack the simulative capacity and thus be treated by the brain as 
if it was a pattern of bodily changes. So the music stands in the same relation to his 
emotion as his bodily changes. The musician can then use this simulation in tandem 
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with his more direct bodily changes, or in some cases, as the musician becomes more 
absorbed in the flow of the music, the sounds can gradually replace his inner bodily 
changes as the dominant source for the content of his emotional state. 
 
I noted that in individual cases of extended emotional cognition, changes in the 
medium of the emotional state (from bodily patterns to musical patterns) must 
always be a result of recalibration from the more central case of bodily patterns. 
Hence equally, a group of musicians could not simply choose to employ the music 
they produce as the group’s emotion. Rather, it requires a further extension of the 
extended cognition of emotion described above. Of course, in a group of musicians 
there is not just one brain, and hence not just one simulative capacity to treat the 
music in the same way as emotion. What we have instead is the interaction between 
the simulative capacities of two or more musicians. This interaction is to be 
embodied in the music that they collaboratively produce with the help of their 
simulative processing. Most importantly, their simulative processing must            
not just target their own particular contribution to the music, but rather the music as a 
whole. 
 
Yet even if the simulative capacities of the musicians interact using the music, this 
does not automatically entail that they are having a collective emotional state as 
opposed to a set of interacting individual emotional states. This is even given that 
each musician simulates the total musical product as the elaboration, or dominant 
component of his emotional state. 
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First of all we need to show how interacting in this way forms individually based 
socially extended emotions. Sue Campbell discusses cases like these when she 
argues that sometimes I may lack authority over the identity of my emotion (1997: 
106-110). For example if I shrug intending to communicate impotence and you 
interpret this as contempt I might wonder if actually I am inadvertently but sincerely 
expressing contempt. In general we are not infallible judges of our mental states. Yet 
this need not be purely a matter of not knowing how I feel. Rather the interpretation 
of the other might actually change what my emotion is, transforming it into a more 
ambiguous or mixed emotion. This sort of change is especially plausible where our 
social interaction is what my emotion is about. For instance, I may shrug to express 
impotence about us losing a team game, which due to your interpretation becomes 
contempt about the value of the game as well. Thus Campbell says, 
 
If the type of meaning we are trying to communicate is that of the 
personal importance of a shared occasion, the responses of others to our 
responses may become a part of the significance of that occasion. 
(Campbell 1997: 117) 
 
This is especially applicable to ensemble performances of music where the very act 
of trying to achieve ensemble may be the content of the emotion. In addition, 
Campbell’s description is entirely in line with the argument by Sawyer that I 
presented earlier with regard to collaborative improvisations, where the impact of 
each musical contribution can only be determined given the reaction of the other 
performers. Hence although the musical contribution of each individual performer 
extends his own emotion, this emotion now becomes socially extended. This is 
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because the way his expression is interpreted and developed in response by the other 
musicians, as they alter the total musical product, actually changes the identity of his 
emotion. In some cases the emotions constituted by the total musical product may be 
emotions that he could not have outside of that social context. This is for instance, 
how the following statement from trumpeter Terrence Blanchard seems to be best 
interpreted: 
 
The amazing thing about playing with Art [Blakey] is that he has a way of 
tuning into inspiration that can draw an emotion out of you that may have 
never experienced before.” (quoted in Berliner 367) 
 
Similarly one Chicago jazz musician interviewed by Sawyer claims, 
 
The [ensemble] influences it the same way as if - we’re having a 
conversation now... When I start talking about it, I start thinking about it, 
putting bits and pieces together, coming up with ideas on how I feel about 
things, and that way it helps me... when I do it, I’d find that there were 
these things coming out of myself, which I didn’t even know were there. 
I’d never heard them, I didn’t know where they came from... but playing 
with the others triggers it, so maybe consciously or subconsciously you’ll 
hear that thing that you’re trying to find... by listening to what other 
people have to say, and by talking to them about it, it’s like talking about 
- really great music, it’s guys getting together and talking about how sad 
or lonely they feel, or how happy or angry. (quoted in Sawyer 2003: 29) 
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Now at this stage it’s still the case that other musicians influence one’s emotional 
state rather than share in it. But because what (partially) constitutes their emotion is 
the total musical product, other musicians are directly contributing to the identity of 
that individual emotion. In this way, playing with others can lead an individual 
musician to have an emotion that is unique to that social context (cf. Wilson 2004: 
299-302). So it’s a socially extended emotional state. 
 
From the point of view of the individual musician, the main difference between 
individually extended cognition using music and socially extended cognition using 
music is that he must react to and help to shape the total musical product rather than 
just the sounds that he produces on his own. This means that each individual 
musician can only have partial control over the development of his own emotion, 
which may undermine his sense that the music is an emotion that belongs to him as 
an individual. Then again, we rarely have complete control over our everyday 
emotions. So as long as the simulative capacity of that individual is directed towards 
the total musical product, and as long as his expressive acts are directed towards 
shaping that total musical product, there is nothing to prevent the musician from 
identifying the total musical product as his own emotional state. 
 
So if the other musicians involved in the ensemble performance equally extend their 
emotions in this same manner, what we have is a case of overlapping emotions. The 
musicians dip into a common pool of music/emotional material to extend their 
emotions. Yet this same material could help to constitute several different emotional 
states. To explain: the musicians share the material for their emotions (the body) but 
they each remain the locus of control for what this emotional state represents. 
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Accordingly, they could each take the total music (in combination with their own 
bodily feelings) to emotionally represent some fact about their own lives. One person 
could regard the music as reflecting on the troubles of his home life, where another 
regards the music as reflecting on the hostile reaction of the audience. 
 
However given this setup it is actually rather easy to switch from several overlapping 
socially extended emotions to one single shared or group emotion. Now that some of 
the intrinsic content of the musicians’ emotional states has been embodied in the 
music we can now appeal to the mechanisms that Margaret Gilbert outlined for 
collective emotions and its corresponding basis in joint attention. All that is required 
is that the musicians agree to have an emotion as a body, to represent some situation 
that impacts on the group. The music can then define the agreement of the musicians. 
It becomes the locus of control for the emotional state. Like a written agreement in a 
collective intention, the music has the final word concerning what the content of the 
emotion is. Similarly, the agreement defines a group subject to which all the 
musicians must defer. As a result, the entire system comprising the patterns in the 
music and the bodily patterns of each musician realises a single coordinated emotion. 
 
We can then see how this case satisfies my two conditions for being a mental state; 
that the system plays the normal causal role of an emotion and that it has distinctive 
representational content, independently of any additional internal states of the 
musicians involved: 
 
The fundamental difference between the group emotion and the individual emotional 
states contributing to it is that the total system speaks authoritatively for the state of 
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the group in a way that no individually extended emotion can. This is a distinction 
both in terms of cause and content. The variety of other distinctive features of this 
mental state are then derived from this fundamental characteristic. For instance, the 
group state is obviously independently capable of expressing the emotion of the 
group to outside observers. Similarly, the players involved can also recognise the 
emotion of the group without having to engage in any additional empathic projects. 
 
Furthermore, the system could have behavioural consequences on the group’s actions. 
The musicians may stop playing if the emotion embodied in the music is too 
upsetting, or they may intensify their activities if it is joyful. In general the content of 
the music encourages the group to reflectively manipulate its emotional character 
just as in cases of individual extended cognition using music, where the music is 
used to reflect on, and control one’s own emotional state. These behaviours are of 
course part of the activity of generating the shared emotion in the first place. Yet 
they are still occurring for emotional rather than purely musical reasons. Finally the 
system could have long-term effects on the solidarity of the group. Music can play a 
quite unique role in generating emotionally bonded communities, which as I noted in 
the introduction to this thesis, may be considered an evolutionary function of music. 
 
As regards the distinctive content of the system, we can see that it may differ from 
the music produced by each individual in terms of vividness, intensity, temporal 
duration or complexity of emotional character. Yet it is also worth exploring the 
possibility that the emotion of the group may be of a contrasting emotional type to 
the emotions of the individuals involved (though it nonetheless supervenes on the 
emotional states of these individuals). 
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For example, in her analysis of group emotions, Margaret Gilbert argues that 
collective remorse need not involve personal remorse. I might be able to sincerely 
say ‘we are full of remorse’ whilst not having worked it out for myself yet. In 
addition, some group activities allow there to be non-operative members, such as 
when a member of a committee abstains from a vote. Yet group expressions of 
emotion don’t seem to leave room for non-committed members in quite these ways. 
As I argued in the case of collective intentions, group mental states are supervenient 
on extended individual mental states. In setting up the total musical product as an 
emotional state, each musician must contribute their simulative processing, which 
interacts with the music produced by the others to fix the content of the group 
emotion. 
 
However, as we know from cases of empathy, one of the main functions of this 
simulative capacity is to detect the emotions of other people, not one’s own emotion. 
It even seems possible to simulate one emotional state (say the anger of another 
person) whilst simultaneously feeling fear for oneself (generated more directly by 
one’s bodily reactions). Hence it is possible for musicians to be involved in helping 
to generate the emotion of the group whilst simultaneously having their own private 
emotion, or just adopting the attitude that they do not identify with the emotion that 
they simulate. They could still jointly attend with the other musicians to the situation 
of the group and otherwise express a commitment to the group’s situation. Yet they 
could just not regard the emotion of the group as signifying anything of personal 
significance for them. We would not call this a shared emotion then so much as a 
‘group only’ emotion. 
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These cases are unlikely to encourage the sense of agreeing with others that I report 
in the following section, yet the sense of agreement is a conscious experience. Group 
emotions do not require the consciousness of the performers to exist, only that a 
recalibration of their individual emotional patterns takes place, allowing the 
musicians to commit to the music as the emotion of the group. Nor do performers 
have to be playing at every moment. Though stopping will tend to separate the 
individual’s emotion from the group’s emotion, a legitimate contribution to the total 
musical product may be to occasionally leave space for the other musicians. One 
might even imagine a situation where joint deathly silence seems to the group like an 
appropriate emotional representation of the situation. 
 
It is also worth considering situations in which the musicians may each individually 
feel that they are struggling to get it together, but an outsider could perceive this as 
the group struggling with itself, as if it were having a single self-conflicted emotion. 
The individual band members won’t feel self-conflicted, they will just feel plain 
conflict (with the other musicians). Of course, the feeling of conflict with another 
person can be quite different to the feeling of self-conflict. Where conflict can be 
outward looking, even exuberant, self-conflict is typically inward looking, complex, 
ambivalent, fluctuating this way and that emotionally.  
 
But could this really be a case of group only emotion, or merely something that an 
outsider might project onto what they are hearing? This will depend on whether the 
musicians satisfy the general conditions for group emotions. They must agree (either 
explicitly or conventionally) that the conflicted music emotionally represents the 
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situation of the group. So the group could ironically agree that the conflicted musical 
product expresses a genuine (group) self-conflicted emotion. The musicians may 
then contribute to this group emotion by each contributing clashing expressions of 
emotion. Moreover they may each really believe that their specific contribution helps 
to shape an appropriate representation of the group’s situation. So they are not 
merely pretending to have a group emotion. 
 
Overall, it seems possible for groups to express all kinds of emotions as a body, and 
play contrasting roles in bringing that group emotion to fruition. The main limitation 
is that because the musicians must concentrate very closely on the total musical 
product and use that to guide their emotional cognitions, they are far more likely to 
be infected by the group’s emotion. Generating a group emotion need not demand 
that one has a similar emotion oneself. Yet sincere emotional commitment to one’s 
musical productions greatly facilitates the generation of the group emotion. 
 
The Phenomenology of Sharing Emotions 
We find some limited confirmation of the possibility of shared emotions when we 
look at the descriptions that musicians provide of their own experiences of 
coordinating with others. Clearly no amount of individual reports (even if there were 
measured in more controlled circumstances) could confirm a shared emotion. 
Nevertheless, we would still expect it to feel like something for the individuals 
involved. Now we should note that some of these reports could be taken to imply that 
there is a single token phenomenal experience that everyone shares. Yet I am not 
arguing for this possibility here. Rather, I am simply interested in showing that 
individual musicians have quite remarkable experiences when they take part in 
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generating shared emotions. This should help to confirm that sharing an emotion is a 
real possibility, because we would expect it to feel quite unusual to engage in such a 
state. 
 
Although the cases presented in the published literature are rare, I have heard similar 
reports from most musicians I know. We should also note that musicians find the 
experience hard to describe. If they had the kind of conceptual apparatus that I have 
given in this thesis, they should hopefully find that this captures what they mean 
more exactly. However, what descriptions can be found are extremely compelling. 
First of all, we have this description from sociologist and jazz musician William 
Cameron:  
 
If this collective enterprise succeeds, each feels the full warm response 
that comes from the wholehearted cooperation of the group. Indeed, such 
feeling is greatly intensified, because the immediacy of expression 
possible for a musician who has command of his instrument provides a 
more profound emotional release than almost any other kind of activity. It 
certainly provides the supreme emotional experience for the jazzman. 
(Cameron 1963: 124) 
 
This sense of wholehearted cooperation is put in stronger terms by free jazz 
saxophonist Tim Berne: 
 
... And I think I just decided it was time for me to rely more on my 
playing and then I just said you know “we’re all gonna improvise and just 
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open it up” because I think you know that’s where the magic happens 
because when you do all kind of sense that you’re agreeing on something, 
even though you’re not playing the same thing- it’s the most amazing 
feeling... (Tim Berne quoted in Marsalis 2004)  
 
I claim that this ‘sense of agreeing on something’ is the main phenomenal 
characteristic (for individuals) of the experience of sharing emotion with others. 
 
The other main variable is the sense of losing individual control over what is 
happening, which is most associated with the idea of group flow. Group flow is 
similar to the case of individual flow that I introduced in chapter five. It represents a 
peak of musical performance in which the musicians involved are absorbed in the 
momentum of the music. For instance saxophonist Franklin Gordon says, 
 
Every jazz musician wants to be locked in that groove where you can’t 
escape the tempo... You’re locked in so comfortably that there’s no way 
you can break outside of it, and everyone’s locked in there together. It 
doesn’t happen to groups every single night, even though they may be 
swinging on every single tune. But at some point when the band is 
playing and everyone gets locked in together, it’s special for the 
musicians and for the aware, conscientious listener. These are the magical 
moments, the best moments in jazz. (quoted in Berliner 1994: 388) 
 
Similarly Jerry Garcia of rock band ‘The Grateful Dead’ (who often performed 
extended improvisational concerts) has said,  
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In The Grateful Dead when we’re playing very open with no structure, 
sometimes the sound level can speed a sensory overload of a kind which 
starts to become a physical experience rather than a musical one and that 
also has a certain kind of value... It’s sort of stumbling into this area 
where there’s a lot of energy and something happening and not a lot of 
control. So that the sense of individual control disappears and you are 
working at another level entirely. Sometimes this feels to me as though 
you don’t really have to think about what’s happening. Things just flow. 
It’s kind of hard to report on but it’s a real thing. I mean we’ve checked it 
out with each other and after twenty-five years of exploring some of these 
outer limits of musical weirdness this is stuff that we pretty much 
understand intuitively but we don’t have language to talk about it. But it’s 
reported back to us by people in the audience too so this is one of those 
things where we’re sort of collecting data without really knowing quite 
where it’s leading or what it’s about but we feel a certain custodian 
relationship to it. (quoted in Bailey 1992: 42-43)  
 
Similarly Trombonist Melba Liston says: 
 
I don’t know if I can describe it, but I know it when I feel it. Just one 
night, everybody can feel what each other is thinking and everything. 
You breathe together, you swell together, you just do everything together, 
and a different aura comes over the room. (quoted in Berliner 1994: 392) 
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Collective improvisation teacher Charles Ford attempts to articulate this collective 
phenomenon in more detail:  
 
When collective freedom finds its voice in musical improvisation, the 
relationship between individual and collective becomes a static, though 
modulating unity. Individual freedom may well be lost, but what is 
promised is the most extraordinary union of minds in music, a union that 
dissolves and assumes ethics, pleasure and aesthetic experience into itself. 
(Ford 1995: section 2) 
 
Finally one of the most compelling descriptions comes from jazz singer Carmen 
Lundy: 
 
It’s that freedom of expression and expressiveness that comes through 
from a feeling you have a musical rapport with other people. It’s 
something that you really can’t touch, but you know when you are 
sharing it with another musician. That’s the same thing that I shared with 
the person next to me when everybody was participating in the service [in 
reference to gospel singing]. I can remember some unbelievable things 
from that time which I experience even now when I sing jazz. Sometimes, 
I really feel that I am just the vehicle, the body, and that something is 
really something through me, like I am not controlling everything that I 
am singing. The last time I sang, I thought to myself, “Gosh, I feel like 
something is just singing through me,” That’s what I mean by the 
spiritual thing. (quoted in Berliner 1994: 392) 
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In chapter five, I mentioned that individual flow states may be characterised by the 
absence of self-analysis or self-predicated thoughts. Since these thoughts will be 
private to each musician, losing them will enable the musician to concentrate more 
on the group representational state. Yet this absence would not make the group state 
more cohesive. It would just allow the individual involved to appreciate that group 
cohesion more.  
 
However, I also argued in chapter five that this sense of flow is most likely caused 
when the intentions of the musician become better aligned with the momentum of the 
music. In emotional terms, the intentions of the musician correspond to his inner 
(and so individual) bodily feelings. Hence if these bodily changes have become 
perfectly aligned with the emotional momentum of the total music product, then it 
would indeed indicate a more intense coordination of the group on an emotional 
representation. This is because the private bodily changes of the musician have either 
become dominated by the patterns in the music (so they don’t contribute much 
distinctive content to the emotional state) or, they have become directly expressed in 
the music. Either way, this represents a smoother alignment of the emotional system 
as a whole and a sense in which the music plays a greater role in generating and 
maintaining the intrinsic content of the shared emotional state. 
 
This would not make the flow a group state however. In this case, individual flow 
has helped to align the group state. Rather group flow just seems to refer to a more 
perfect coordination of the musicians’ activities. Perhaps the music can generate such 
a powerful momentum, a particularly driving rhythm, or a particularly intense 
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emotional character, that the individuals involved can do nothing but submit to it. So 
the sheer momentum of the group activity may cause the individuals involved to let 
go of their individual musical and emotional intentions and simultaneously 
experience coordinated flow states. We might call this contagious flow. 
 
Keith Sawyer argues that group flow is more likely where the extent to which an 
extrinsic goal of the performance is specified is proportional to the amount of 
pre-existing structures the performers share, such as scored parts, conventions, or 
interactional routines (Sawyer 2003: 167). In jazz ensembles the lack of pre-arranged 
material may correspond to the lack of a specific musical goal. But group flow is 
equally possible for scored ensembles, where all the pre-planned materials required 
are available to produce a highly specific musical product. 
 
For instance, the Guarneri quartet also describes exceptional cases of mutual 
coordination. Dalley says for example, “it’s true that there are occasions when we 
really do seem to feel and breathe as one player.” Steinhardt agrees, “when a 
performance takes flight I feel as if all four personalities meet somewhere in the air - 
maybe two and a half feet above the quartet.” In reference to Beethoven’s ‘Heiliger 
Dankgesang’, a hymnlike movement within the Opus 132 that demands especially 
blended performances, John Dalley claims that on one occasion: 
 
I only felt that we were coming close to the essence of what Beethoven 
had in mind when wrote the piece: that kind of hymnlike obeisance to a 
higher power... I felt that all of us shared the same sense of something 
special taking place. (Dalley in Blum 1986: 169)  
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David Soyer agrees: 
 
Of course, by its very nature such a movement demands that we have a 
completely homogenous sound. But as John says, it’s sometimes more 
than our attempt to make it so: everything becomes concerted and 
blended and propelled as if by itself. The music seems to take over. 
(Soyer in Blum 1986: 169) 
 
Again these descriptions are suggestive of the group sharing a single token conscious 
experience. I make no claims about the possibility of sharing the phenomenal 
experience of music here, though we should note that it could only be their emotional 
experience rather than their auditory experience that is shared. At any rate, we can 
see that musicians can feel an especially intimate connection with the music and by 
extension with each other. In states of group flow, the momentum of the music 
dominates the shared emotional state. 
 
Now it should be noted that the descriptions I quoted do not focus purely on 
emotional feelings. However the expressive qualities of music are generally a given 
amongst musicians. Also it might not always feel appropriate to describe the 
emotions expressed in music in terms of everyday emotions like anger or sadness, 
yet a sense of the music capturing the personal significance of the situation, the sense 
of dynamic interaction with the world, the purpose and value of life being lived, are 
all fundamentally emotional states. Moreover a feeling of intense group coordination 
will almost by definition be a highly ecstatic or euphoric feeling with profound 
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impact on the individual’s sense of life afterwards. For instance Trumpeter Herb 
Pomeroy has said: 
 
It’s an incredibly warm feeling that you have, one that you’ve shared with 
the other musicians and you’ve shared with the audience. And when the 
evening’s engagement is over, you still retain it. It fills you up inside, and 
you feel it like there an aura all around you when you leave the club to go 
home. It’s the kind of precious feeling that no other kind of career can 
give you. (quoted in Berliner 1994: 394) 
 
How to Share an Emotion 
So if the experience of absorption into the shared emotion is so blissful, why don’t 
performers get into this state more often? And what factors make it more likely to 
occur? Some musician’s descriptions suggest that it is purely a matter of serendipity 
whether an ensemble manages to achieve group flow and thus a particularly intense 
sense of generating a shared emotion. Yet I think that understanding the nature of 
this group state allows us to identify several factors which will encourage shared 
emotions (again, I will focus on improvised performances here). 
 
The first thing to note is that the group must collectively commit to the music as the 
emotional representation of their situation. So the musicians should all be mutually 
aware of this goal, and should pay continual joint attention during performance to the 
expressive nuances of the music and the emotional impact of the shared situation. 
Yet although collective improvisation can be guided by ideals of group convergence, 
it is certainly not the case that every group improvised performance has emotional 
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unity as its goal. Sometimes musicians may want to surprise or challenge one another 
or simply to explore the possibilities of the music. 
 
However, let us suppose that the group has agreed to try and express an emotion ‘as 
a body’. Moreover, the greatest level of integration is achieved by reaching a state of 
group flow. So recall Sawyer’s claim that group flow is more likely where the 
specificity of the extrinsic goal is proportional to the amount of pre-existing 
structures the performers share. In the case we are focusing on here, the extrinsic 
goal is to emotionally represent the situation. Since the sincerity of this emotion, that 
it is a live response to a real situation, precludes planning it too explicitly, the 
pre-arranged material should not dictate any particular emotional response. At the 
same time however, since maximal coordination is desired, material should be 
provided that enables the musicians to interact and cohere fairly easily. These two 
factors are in tension with each other, so it is likely to be quite difficult to achieve the 
right balance between spontaneity and collectivity, between individual expressive 
freedom and submission to the emotion of the group. However, it is at least more 
likely to occur where these goals are deliberately sought, and this historically has 
been a common purpose within the free jazz movement. For instance musicologist 
James Collier writes of free jazz, 
 
For some musicians, the whole point of the music was no longer the 
reaction of the audience, but the emotional interaction of the musicians 
themselves. It came to be a sign of success when a musician could say, 
“There was a lot of love going on up on the stand tonight.” Too much 
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soloing, said many of these players, smacked of self-aggrandizement... 
(Collier 1978: 474-5) 
 
As Collier notes however, “the free-jazz players were further hampered by an 
ideology that was at cross-purposes with itself, espousing both individualism and 
collectivism at the same time” (Collier 1978: 475). 
 
Yet despite the fact that the goals of both collective and individual expression are 
often in tension, they need not be mutually exclusive. Some free jazz musicians have 
even attempted to articulate a synthesis between them. For example Lou Gare, a 
saxophonist with the free jazz improvisation group AMM has said: “It’s not the 
freedom to do anything you like. It’s the freedom to do what the music likes. And 
what the music likes happens to be what you like as well” (Gare quoted in Richards 
1992: 65). So if the individual musician closely identifies with the music and by 
extension with the group, then perhaps the sincere expression of the group and 
himself may all amount to the same thing. 
 
Yet no matter how it is interpreted, there is still a definite sense in which individual 
freedom as we commonly understand it is undermined. For instance saxophonist 
Evan Parker has said, 
 
What makes (free music) relevant is that it’s a group activity. You have to 
look for this other organism, which is the group mind. You block access 
to that group mind if (your own) personality is too strong. (quoted in 
Smith & Dean 1997: 63) 
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Remember that contributing one’s simulative activities to the group expression is 
greatly facilitated by being sincerely committed to that emotional activity. So the 
principle difficulty in achieving a shared emotion will be precisely the need to make 
a complete and sincere commitment to the emotion of the group. Since jazz music 
typically values virtuosic solo performances, and since our culture in general 
emphasises individual excellence, we can expect that this level of commitment will 
be hard to achieve. In addition, as dedicated musicians, jazz performers are also 
likely to be highly sensitive to their own and each other’s mistakes. As a virtuosic 
form, jazz performance is also liable to be both technically very difficult, and highly 
competitive. These factors make it less likely that the performers can coordinate on 
generating group emotions. 
 
Yet these limitations are not impossible to overcome. Sincere commitment to the 
group will be most easy where the musicians already share similar backgrounds and 
compatible personalities (cf. Sawyer 2003: 49 & Berliner 1994: 395). On a technical 
level as well, the musicians will collaborate most easily where they share common 
frames of reference in musical styles as well as similar levels of musical ability. 
Groups that rehearse and stay together over longer periods will also be more able to 
anticipate and react to each other’s musical ideas, as well as share similar musical 
backgrounds. Furthermore, a long-standing group is more likely to provide a 
musically safe and supportive environment, allowing musicians to emotionally 
commit to their performances without worrying too much about the critical 
evaluations of others. For example Sam Richards (part of the avant-garde 
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improvisation group AMM) describes the advantage of this kind of situation, 
explicitly referencing the idea of a group mind: 
 
[T]he individual was free to play whatever he was driven to knowing that 
the others were doing likewise. The permission given to each other to do 
this is what, paradoxically, produces a ‘group mind’. This, at times, 
seems to function autonomously. Thus the space becomes safe despite its 
ability to sound abrasive or even violent. Prévost and Rowe have written 
in a sleeve note: ‘The players could share a timeless immersion in a world 
of sound, while simultaneously being free to pursue their individual paths. 
It was not uncommon for the musician to wonder who or what was 
producing a particular sound, stop playing, and discover that it was he 
himself who had been responsible.’ (Richards 1992: 64)9 
 
When we get down to the details of the music itself, although musicians may wish to 
push themselves technically, music that is less technically demanding, or which only 
requires the musician to play at a level that suits them, is more likely to allow 
freedom from worries that distract from emotional expression, as well as to more 
easily enable coordination. With this in mind, I have in the appendix provided an 
example score that aims to maximally satisfy the various factors I have identified 
above. The principle goal of this score is to provide material that allows the 
musicians to cohere fairly easily, is emotionally nuanced though allowing for a range 
                                                     
9
 I find this idea that the musicians involved in a collective improvisation can lose track of their own 
contribution the music to be a striking and surprising effect (it also compares interestingly to the 
statement by Ornette Coleman that I quoted in the section on agreeing in jazz). The best way to 
understand it seems to be that by becoming absorbed in the group emotion, the musician stops 
attending to his own particular experience of generating the total musical product. 
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of expressive characters, and which is flexible enough to allow the musicians to react 
to one another spontaneously. In addition there are explicit instructions to treat the 
total musical product in emotional terms and various suggestions for how the 
material can be rehearsed and developed. The accompanying recording also provides 
an example of a jazz trio (myself and two friends) collectively improvising according 
to the rules specified by the score (tracks 2-5). 
 
As such, although it is admittedly rather limited, there is potential to test whether 
group emotions can be deliberately invoked. However there will always be difficulty 
in verifying whether the musicians really have generated a shared emotion. This is 
because whilst we should hopefully find that individual subjective reports as well as 
physical measurements of their emotional responses would align, this is not the same 
thing as the emotional response of the group as a whole. It would be like measuring 
the different parts of a brain coordinating to produce a single mental state and 
expecting them to match. Even if they did match it need only show that they were in 
similar though numerically distinct states. In the end the best way to appreciate an 
emotional state is from a first person perspective, or failing that, to directly 
empathise with it. So although we might observe some alignments between members 
of the group, or observe resulting group behaviours or bonding, the best way to 
observe a group emotion is to listen to the music that embodies and expresses it. 
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Conclusion
 
 
In this thesis I have explored and developed several general philosophical ideas: First 
of all I argued that emotions are primarily perceptual states, constituted by bodily 
changes and the bodily patterns that organise and register them. However, I also 
argued that emotional perceptions are of a more complex and evaluative nature than 
vision or hearing. This evaluative character is mostly a reflection of what it is that 
emotions perceive, which I have described as the dynamic relation between self and 
world. Emotional perceptions involve a sense of the self’s changing circumstances, 
its integrity and powers, and the affordances that the world offers for directed action. 
Given this focus on the self, and given also their evolutionarily ancient nature, 
emotions are likely to be an important factor in the development of a reflective sense 
of personal identity in the first place. At the very least, emotions come in at the 
‘ground floor’ of self. 
 
In the second chapter of this thesis I then extended this theory of emotions further; 
arguing that primary expressive behaviours should be construed as constitutive parts 
of emotional states, since they help to generate the bodily pattern. This is what 
underlines their communicative function. It also entails that we can cognitively 
manipulate our emotional states by means of expressive behaviour. Establishing the 
nature of emotional expressions then allowed me to show that when we recognise the 
emotions of others, we get a direct sense of the way it feels for them by recreatively 
forming neural simulations of their aroused states, directly accessible to us by 
perceiving their expressive behaviour. This basic form of emotion recognition is 
often foundational to more sophisticated acts of empathy. 
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I also made general claims about the nature of music; in particular that the patterns 
embodied in music display a deep isomorphism with emotions, and that we may 
view the expressive capacities of music as real dispositional properties. So music is a 
pre-eminent form of artistic expression of emotions because it vividly captures the 
most intrinsic character and content of emotional states. Yet one of the central 
problems in the philosophy of music is accounting for how music may express 
emotional experiences despite not having a psychology. I argued that our ability to 
recognise emotions in music is a result of music hijacking our simulative capacity. 
Ironically, given that musicians may use music to extend their cognition of emotions, 
it may turn out that sometimes the music really does have a psychology (at least 
partially). 
 
This brings us to most important general idea of this thesis; that the mind is often 
partly physically constituted by its interactions with the environment and other 
people. In particular I argued that a musician could use the music he produces to 
extend the cognition of his own emotional state. Here the music either elaborated 
upon his bodily changes or played a dominant role in generating his bodily pattern. 
Moreover, just as ordinary bodily changes are constitutive of emotions, so also 
musical changes can be constitutive of emotions. Within these cycles or systems of 
interaction whereby the emotion is generated, it is unreasonable to locate any final 
state in the brain as the mental state. Certainly the mind can function independently 
of the environment, as when we dream or imagine, but that is more likely to be a 
sophisticated feature of human minds rather than an essential feature of all minds, all 
the time. 
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Since things outside the brain may constitutively contribute to the character of a 
mental state, it entails that the mind is not essentially dependent on neural processes. 
Nor is the mind necessarily private to each person who has one. Rather it is possible 
for several minds to be integrated with one another in a variety of ways. All that is 
required is a medium of interaction that permits the contents of mental states to be 
fluently manipulated and coherently blended together. 
 
In order to justify this point, I had to gradually develop an account of how we can 
integrate our mental states from the most basic level. First of all, I argued that the 
simple act of joint attention allows our perceptual activities to be interdependently 
structured. This behaviour, almost unique as well universal amongst humans, 
provides a foundation for more radical interactions. It defines a group subject that 
can allow people to mutually fix the character of objects and share their responses to 
those objects. The case of collective intentions is then built upon this foundation, 
allowing the intrinsic content and causal powers of a mental state to be collectively 
realised. I then returned to the case of the musical expression of emotion. I showed 
that musicians may use their total musical productions to constitute an emotional 
reaction of the group. 
 
Due to its expressive potential as well as its capacity to allow the coherent blending 
of individual activities, music is inherently suitable for the sharing of emotional 
states. However shared emotions in music may be just one of a variety of possible 
shared emotional states. Scenes of mass rallies, mob riots, the roaring football crowd 
or the singing congregation also suggest the potential for shared emotions. Where 
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large crowds of people are mutually focused on a target (scoring a goal, the 
worshipped dictator) and mutually express their attitude towards that target, then it 
may be the case that a shared emotion is generated. This can be a terrifying as well as 
exhilarating prospect.  
 
The key difference between shared emotion in music and these other possible cases 
is that music is almost certainly more likely to allow more sophisticated emotional 
reactions. It is claimed for instance (e.g. McDougall (1920), Le Bon (1896)) that 
mob emotions encourage the lowest common denominator of emotional type. 
Though the force and range of the mob emotion may be greatly extended, the fluency 
and complexity of the emotional interaction afforded by music is far greater than that 
afforded by ordinary emotional expression. Shared emotions in music may genuinely 
encourage an enhancement of our emotional cognitions, to bring out emotions that 
we have never experienced before. Most of all however, it can provide a profound 
sense of reaching beyond the normal boundaries of the self. 
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Appendix 
Experiment in Shared Emotions No.1 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1st Movement: Uncertain SAXOPHONE PIANO 
DRUMS 
 
2nd Movement: More Intense SAXOPHONE PIANO 
DRUMS 
 
3rd Movement: More Relaxed SAXOPHONE PIANO 
DRUMS 
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Experiment in Shared Emotions No. 1 
Guide to performers 
1. Goal 
The purpose of this piece is to enable performers to generate a shared emotion. This 
shared emotion is to be physically constituted by the music the performers 
collectively produce and its means of production (including the brains of the 
musicians). The goal of sharing emotion should be prioritised over the quality, 
originality or technical virtuosity of the music. 
 
2. Basic Rules 
2.1. Everyone must agree to use the music to express the situation that confronts the 
group. 
 
2.2. Each performer must always use his or her sense of feeling to generate sounds. 
 
2.3. Each performer must pay close attention to the expressive qualities of the music 
produced by others and the group as a whole. 
 
3. Set up 
3.1. It is conducive to the goals of this piece if the musicians involved share similar 
cultural backgrounds or attitudes, stylistic preferences, and compatible levels of 
technical proficiency. The musicians should hopefully be friends prior to 
approaching the piece or become friends during the rehearsal process. 
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3.2. It is recommended that performers warm up by engaging in cooperative forms of 
play (e.g. telling a story or describing a situation, taking turns to say one word each). 
 
3.3. Performers may also warm up by trying to imitatively copy themes from one to 
the other, or coordinating their timing by gradually speeding up or slowing down on 
a single note. 
 
3.4. Performers should spend time listening to each others’ solo performance. They 
should mutually encourage a feeling of confidence in the music they produce. 
 
3.5. It is recommended that performers spend a significant amount of time rehearsing 
together and exploring the emotional content of the score, so that they are completely 
familiar and comfortable with the expressive possibilities of the music. 
 
3.6. In order to use the music to agree on the emotional impact of the situation, it is 
helpful to make a statement to this effect before starting, perhaps using a ritualistic 
formulation such as: 
A: “A, do you agree to express the situation that confronts us?”  
B: “I do so agree it!” 
 
3.7. Performers may also pre-arrange certain signals or gestures that indicate 
agreement or not on the expressive content of the music. 
 
3.8. The situation that confronts the group may include the physical surroundings, 
any audience response and even their ability to produce a coherent piece of music. 
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Alternatively performers can agree on a particular reference that impacts them all 
(such as global warming). Performers may wish to reflect on their feelings about the 
situation for a few minutes prior to performance (either silently or in conversation). 
 
4. The Score 
4.1. The purpose of the score is to stimulate the expressive imagination of the 
performers without dictating too much any particular emotional state. 
 
4.2. The score should enable musicians of varying ability to play together without 
having to worry about the technical demands of the music. 
 
4.3. As such, performers can treat the scored material very freely. In general the 
performers should treat the score as a starting point for more general improvisation. 
 
4.4. In particular performers can skip or add notes, augment intervals, alter tempos 
and rhythms, repeat and loop material and so on according to what feels natural at 
the time. They may use material written for other instruments, or from any part of the 
score at any time. 
 
4.5. For ease of coordination however, performers are encouraged to concentrate on 
the part scored for their instrument and on one movement at a time. 
 
4.6. Performers can prepare details, such as themes, or ways in which the material 
can be looped. They should not, however, plan the overall progress of the music but 
should react immediately to the unique circumstances of the performance event. 
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5. During performance 
5.1. Although each performer must always use his or her own sense of feeling to 
generate sounds, the performer need not personally identify with those feelings. 
However it is strongly suggested that the performer should only play sounds that they 
can sincerely commit to as expressions of their actual occurrent feeling. 
 
5.2. Performers need not play all the time. But if they feel the music does not 
accurately reflect the situation that confronts the group, they should try to change it. 
 
5.3. Whilst it is expected that musicians will be heavily influenced by a stylistic 
genre (e.g. modal jazz), musicians should not allow the clichés of that genre to 
dictate what they play. 
 
5.4. It is suggested that performers begin by taking turns, i.e. one musician plays a 
couple of phrases and other musicians then answer. This dialogue may then become 
more overlapping. 
 
5.5. It is suggested that performers start very simply, perhaps by holding or repeating 
a single note. 
 
5.6. It is suggested that performers imitate and harmonise with each other. 
 
5.7. It is suggested that performers exchange eye contact frequently throughout 
performance. 
 316
Bibliography
 
 
Aou, S., Oomura, Y., Hishino, H., Ono, T., Yambe, K., Sikdar, S. K., Noda, T. & 
Inoue, M. (1983). ‘Functional heterogeneity of single neuronal activity in the 
monkey dorsolateral prefrontal cortex’. Brain Research 260: 121-124. 
 
Adachi, M., Trehub, S. E. & Abe, J. (2004). ‘Perceiving emotion in children’s songs 
across age and culture’. Japanese Psychological Research Vol. 46, No. 4: 322-336. 
 
Adorno, T. W. (2002). ‘The Radio Symphony’. Printed in Essays on Music. Leppert. 
R. ed. University of California Press, London. 
 
Asendorpf, J. B. (2002) ‘Self-awareness, other-awareness, and secondary 
representation’. In Meltzoff & Prinz ed.: 63-73. 
 
Austin, J. L. (1979). ‘Other Minds’. In Philosophical Papers. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford: 76-116. 
 
Bailey, D. (1992). Improvisation: Its nature and practice in music. The British 
Library Sound Archive, London. 
 
Baldwin, D. (1995). ‘Understanding the Link Between Joint Attention and 
Language’. Printed in Moore & Dunham ed.: 131-158. 
 
Balkwill, L-L. & Thompson, W. F. (1999). ‘A cross-cultural investigation of the 
perception of emotion in music: Psychophysical and cultural cues’. Music Perception 
Vol. 17, No. 1: 43-64. 
 
Balkwill, L-L. Thompson, W. F. & Matsunaga, R. (2004). ‘Recognition of emotion 
in Japanese, Western, and Hindustānī music by Japanese listeners’. Japanese 
Psychological Research Vol. 46, No. 4: 337-349. 
 
Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). ‘The Eye Detection Detector (EDD) and the Shared 
Attention Mechanism (SAM): Two Cases for Evolutionary Psychology’. In Moore & 
Dunham ed.: 41-60. 
 
Baron-Cohen, S., Tager-Flusberg, H. & Cohen, D. (1996). Understanding Other 
Minds: Perspectives from Autism. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Benjamin, W. (1968) [1935]. ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction’. In Illuminations. Schocken Books, New York: 217-251. 
 
Berliner, P. (1994). Thinking in Jazz: The infinite art of improvisation. University of 
Chicago Press, London. 
 
Blacking, J. (1976). How Musical is Man? Faber and Faber Ltd. London. 
 
Blacking, J. ed. (1977). Anthropology of the body. Academic Press, London. 
 317
 
Blood, A. J. & Zatorre, R. (2001). ‘Intensely pleasurable responses to music correlate 
with activity in brain regions implicated in reward and emotion’. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Vol. 98, No. 20: 
11818Ð11823. 
 
Blum, D. (1986). The Art of Quartet Playing: The Guarneri quartet in conversation 
with David Blum. Victor Gollancz Ltd. London. 
 
Bogdan, R. ed. (1986). Belief: Form, content and function. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
 
Bratman, M. (1993). ‘Shared Intention’. Ethics Vol. 104, No. 1 (October 1993): 
97-113.  
 
Bratman, M. (1999). Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Bruner, J. (1995). ‘From Joint Attention to the Meeting of Minds: An Introduction’. 
In Moore & Dunham ed.: 1-14. 
 
Buck, R. (1980). ‘Nonverbal behaviour and the theory of emotion: The facial 
feedback hypothesis’. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 38, No. 5: 
811-824. 
 
Budd, M. (1985). Music and the Emotions: The Philosophical Theories. Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, London. 
 
Budd, M. (1995). Values of Art. Pictures, Poetry and Music. Penguin Books, 
London. 
 
Butterworth, G. (1995). ‘Origins of Mind in Perception and Action’. Printed in 
Moore & Dunham ed.: 29-40. 
 
Cacioppo, J. T., Uchino, B. N., Crites, S. L., Snydersmith, M. A., Smith, G., & 
Berntson, G. G. (1992). ‘Relationship between facial expressiveness and sympathetic 
activation in emotion: A critical review, with emphasis on modelling underlying 
mechanisms and individual differences’. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 42, No. 1: 110-128. 
 
Call, J. & Tomasello, M. (2005). ‘What chimpanzees know about seeing, revisited: 
An explanation of the third kind’. Printed in Eilan, Hoerl, McCormack & Roessler 
ed.: 45-64. 
 
Cameron, W. B. (1963). ‘Sociological Notes on the Jam Session’. Printed in 
Informal Sociology: A Casual Introduction to Sociological Thinking. Random House, 
New York: 118-130. 
 
Campbell, J. (2002). Reference and Consciousness. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
 
 318
Campbell, J. (2005). ‘Joint Attention and Common Knowledge’. Printed in Eilan, 
Hoerl, McCormack & Roessler ed.: 287-297. 
 
Chanan, M. (2000). Repeated Takes: A short history of recording and its effects on 
music. Verso, London. 
 
Charlan, L. C. (1997). ‘Reconciling cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion: A 
representational proposal’. Philosophy of Science, Vol. 64, No. 4 (Dec. 1997): 
555-579. 
 
Clark, A. (1997). Being there: putting brain, body, and world together again. MIT 
Press. Cambridge, Mass. 
 
Clark, A. & Chalmers, D. (1998). ‘The Extended Mind’. Analysis 58: 10-23. 
 
Clark, M. S. ed. (1992). Review of personality and social psychology: Vol. 13, 
Emotion. Sage, Newbury Park, California. 
 
Clarke, E. (2002). ‘Listening to Performance’. Chapter 13 in Rink ed.: 185-196. 
 
Clynes, M. (1977). Sentics: The Touch of Emotions. Anchor Press & Doubleday, 
New York. 
 
Collier, J. L. (1978). The Making of Jazz: A Comprehensive History. MacMillan, 
London. 
 
Collingwood, R. G. (1958). The Principles of Art. Oxford University Press, London. 
 
Cook, N. (1990). Music, imagination and culture. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
 
Cook, N. (1998). Analysing Musical Multimedia. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
 
Cooke, M. & Horn, D ed. (2002). The Cambridge Companion to Jazz. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Corazza, E. (2004). ‘Empathy, Imagination, and Reports’. Chapter 7 in Reflecting the 
Mind: Indexicality and Quasi-Indexicality. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Corkum, V. & Moore, C. (1995). ‘Development of Joint Visual Attention in Infants’. 
Printed in Moore & Dunham ed.: 61-84. 
 
Croce, B. (1992). The Aesthetic as the Science of Expression and of the Linguistic in 
General. Trans. Lyas, C., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Currie, G. (2004). ‘Anne Brontë’ and the uses of imagination’. Chapter 9 in Arts and 
Minds. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Currie, G. (2007). ‘Framing Narratives’. In Hutto, D. ed. Narratives and Persons. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
 319
Currie, G. & Ravenscroft, I. (2002). Recreative Minds. Imagination in Philosophy 
and Psychology. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
 
Darwin, C. (1872). The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals. Located at 
http://pages.britishlibrary.net/charles.darwin3/expression/expression_intro.htm 
accessed 3.7.05. 
 
Damasio, A. (2000). The Feeling Of What Happens: Body, Emotion and the Making 
of Consciousness. Vintage, London. 
 
Damasio, A. (2004). Looking for Spinoza. Vintage, London. 
 
Davidson, D. (2001a). ‘The Emergence of Thought’. In Subjective, Intersubjective, 
Objective. Clarendon Press, Oxford: 123-134. 
 
Davidson, D. (2001b). ‘Three Varieties of Knowledge’. In Subjective, Intersubjective, 
Objective. Clarendon Press, Oxford.: 205-220. 
 
Davidson, J. (1997). ‘The Social in Musical Performance’. Chapter 11 in Hargreaves 
& North ed.: 209-228. 
 
Davidson, J. (2002). ‘Communicating with the body in performance’. Chapter 10 in 
Rink ed.: 144-152. 
 
Davies, S. (1980). ‘The Expression of Emotion in Music’. Mind, Vol. 89, No. 353 
(Jan. 1980): 67-86. 
 
Davies, S. (1994). Musical Meaning and Expression. Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca and London. 
 
Davies S. (1997). ‘Contra the Hypothetical Persona in Music’. Printed in Hjort & 
Laver ed.: 95-109. 
 
Davies, S. (1998). ‘Artistic Expression’. Printed in Craig, E. ed. (1998) Routledge 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol. 1. Routledge, London: 493-498. 
 
Deliege I. & Sloboda, J. ed. (1996). Musical Beginnings: Origins and Development 
of Musical Competence. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
De Sousa, R. (1987). The Rationality of Emotions. MIT Press, Cambridge. 
 
Desrochers, S., Morissette, P. & Ricard, M. (1995). ‘Two Perspectives on Pointing in 
Infancy’. Printed in Moore & Dunham ed.: 85-102. 
 
Deutsch, D. ed. (1999). The Psychology of Music. Second edition. Academic Press, a 
division of Harcourt Brace & company, London. 
 
Dewey, J. (1894). ‘The Theory of Emotion. (I) Emotional Attitudes’. Psychological 
Review 1, (1894): 553-569. Located at 
http://spartan.ac.brocku.ca/~lward/Dewey/Dewey_1894a.html 
 320
accessed 7.11.06. 
 
Dewey, J. (1971). ‘The Act of Expression’ from Art as Experience (1934). Printed in 
Hospers ed.: 72-94. 
 
Dimberg, U., Thunberg, M. & Elmehed, K. (2000). ‘Unconscious facial reactions to 
emotional facial expressions’. Psychological Science, Vol. 11: 86-89. 
 
Dowling, W. J. (1999). ‘The Development of Music Perception and Cognition’. 
Chapter 15 in Deutsch ed.: 618-619. 
 
Dretske, F. (1981). Knowledge and the flow of information. MIT Press, Cambridge. 
 
Dretske, F. (1986). ‘Misrepresentation’. In Bogdan ed.: 17-36. 
 
Dunham, P. & Dunham, F. (1995). ‘Optimal Social Structures and Adaptive Infant 
Development’. Printed in Moore & Dunham ed.: 159-188. 
 
Eilan, N. (2005). ‘Joint Attention, Communication and Mind’. In Eilan, Hoerl, 
McCormack & Roessler ed.: 1-33. 
 
Eilan, N., Hoerl, C., McCormack, T. & Roessler, J. ed. (2005). Joint Attention: 
Communication and Other Minds. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
 
Eisenberg, E. (1988). The Recording Angel: Music, records and culture from 
Aristotle to Zappa. Picador, London. 
 
Ekman, P. (1977). ‘Biological and cultural contributions to body and facial 
movement’. In Blacking, J. ed. (1977): 34-84. 
 
Ekman, P. (1997). ‘Should we call it expression or communication?’ Innovations in 
Social Science Research, 10: 333-344. 
 
Ekman, P. (2003). Emotions revealed: Understanding faces and feelings. Weidenfeld 
& Nicholson, London. 
 
Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Pavesi, G. & Rizzolatti, G. (1995). ‘Motor facilities during 
action observance: A magnetic stimulation study’. Journal of Neurophysiology 73: 
2608-2611. 
 
Fitzpatrick, D. (2003). ‘Searle and Collective Intentionality. The Self-Defeating 
Nature of Internalism with Respect to Social Facts’. Printed in Koepsell & Moss ed.: 
45-66. 
 
Ford, C. C. (1995). ‘Free Collective Improvisation in Higher Education’. First 
printed in British Journal of Music Education 12, (1995): 103-112. Located at 
http://www20.brinkster.com/improarchive/cf_fci.htm accessed 20.11.04. 
 
Franco, F. (2005). ‘Infant Pointing: Harlequin, Servant of Two Masters’. In Eilan, 
Hoerl, McCormack & Roessler ed.: 129-164. 
 321
 
Fridlund, A. (1994). Human facial expression: An evolutionary view. Academic 
Press, San Deigo. 
 
Gabrielson, A. (2001). ‘Emotions in strong experiences with music’. Chapter 19 in 
Juslin & Sloboda ed. (2001): 431-449. 
 
Gallese, V. & Goldman, A. (1998). ‘Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of 
mind-reading’. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 2: 493-501. 
 
Gilbert, M. (1989). On Social Facts. Routledge, New York. 
 
Gilbert, M. (2000). Sociality and Responsibility: New essays in Plural Subject 
Theory. Rowman & Littlefield publishers, Maryland. 
 
Goldie, P. (2000). The Emotions, A Philosophical Exploration. Clarendon Press, 
Oxford.  
 
Goldie, P. (2004). ‘Emotion, feeling, and knowledge of the world’. In Solomon ed. 
(2004): 91-106. 
 
Goldman, A. I. & Sripada, C. S. (2005). ‘Simulationist models of face-based emotion 
recognition’. Cognition, Vol. 94, No. 3, (Jan 2005): 193-213. 
 
Goodman, E. (2000). ‘Analysing the ensemble in music rehearsal and performance: 
the nature and effects of interaction in cello-piano duos’. Ph.D. thesis, University of 
London. 
 
Goodman, E. (2002). ‘Ensemble Performance’. Chapter 11 in Rink ed.: 153-167. 
 
Graham, K. (2002). Practical Reasoning in a Social World: How We Act Together. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Gregory, A. H. (1997). ‘The roles of music in society: the ethnomusicological 
perspective’. Chapter 7 in Hargreaves & North ed.: 123-140. 
 
Greenspan, P. (1988). Emotions and Reasons. Routledge, New York. 
 
Grice, P. (1957). ‘Meaning’. The Philosophical Review, Vol. 66, No. 3 (July 1957): 
377-388. 
 
Griffiths, P. (1997). What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological 
Categories. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
 
Griffiths, P. (2003). ‘Basic emotions, Complex emotions, Machiavellian Emotions’. 
In Hatzimoysis ed. (2003): 39-67. 
 
Hanslick, E. (1986). On the Musically Beautiful. Trans. Payzant, G. 8th ed. of 1891. 
Hackett, Indianapolis. 
 
 322
Hargreaves, D. J. & North, A. C. ed. (1997). The Social Psychology of Music. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Harré, R. ed. (1986). The Social Construction of Emotions. Blackwell, Oxford. 
 
Hatfield, E., Cacioppo, J. T. & Rapson, R. L. (1994). Emotional Contagion. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Hatzimoysis, A. ed. (2003). Philosophy and the Emotions. Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Supplement: 52. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Hatzimoysis, A. (2003a). ‘Emotional feelings and intentionalism’. In Hatzimoysis ed. 
(2003): 105-111. 
 
Heaton, P., Hermelin, B. & Pring, L. (1999). ‘Can children with autistic spectrum 
disorders perceive affect in music? An experimental investigation’. Psychological 
Medicine 29: 1405-1410. 
 
Heble, A. (2000). Landing on the Wrong Note; Jazz, Dissonance, and Critical 
Practice. Routledge, London. 
 
Heelas, P. (1986). ‘Emotion talk across cultures’. In Harré ed. (1986): 234-266. 
 
Hentoff, N. (1962). The Jazz Life. Peter Davies, London. 
 
Higgins, K. M. (1991). The Music of our Lives. Temple University Press, 
Philadelphia. 
 
Hjort, M. & Laver, S. ed. (1997). Emotion and the Arts. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
 
Hobson, R. P. (1989). ‘On sharing experiences’. Development and Psychopathology, 
1 (1989): 197-203. 
 
Hobson, R. P. (2005). ‘What Puts the Jointness into Joint Attention?’ In Eilan, Hoerl, 
McCormack & Roessler ed.: 185-204. 
 
Hospers, J. ed. (1971). Artistic Expression. Meredith Corporation, New York. 
 
Hurley, S. (2005). ‘The Shared Circuits Hypothesis: A Unified Functional 
Architecture for Control, Imitation, and Simulation’. Printed in Hurley & Chater ed. 
Vol. 1: 177-193. 
 
Hurley, S. & Chater , N. ed. (2005). Perspectives on Imitation: From Neuroscience 
to Social Science. Vols. 1 & 2. Bradford Book/MIT Press, London. 
 
James, W. (1884). ‘What is an Emotion?’ Mind, 9: 188-205. Located at 
http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/James/emotion.htm accessed 21.6.05. 
 
 323
Juslin, P. N. (1997). ‘Emotional Communication in Music Performance: A 
Functionalist Perspective and Some Data’. Music Perception, Vol. 14, No. 4 
(Summer 1997): 383-418. 
 
Juslin, P. N. (2001). ‘Communicating emotion in music performance: A review and a 
theoretical framework’. Chapter 14 in Juslin & Sloboda ed. (2001): 309-337. 
 
Juslin, P. N. (2003). ‘Five Facets of Musical Expression: A Psychologist’s 
Perspective on Music Performance’. Psychology of Music 31(3): 273-302 
 
Juslin, P. N. & Sloboda, J. ed. (2001). Music and Emotion: Theory and research. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Kemp, A. (1997). ‘Individual differences in musical behaviour’. Chapter 2 in 
Hargreaves & North ed.: 25-45. 
 
Kenny, A. (1963). Action, Emotion and Will. Routledge, London. 
 
Kieran, M. ed. (2005). Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics. Blackwell Publishers, 
London. 
 
Kinsbourne, M. (2004). ‘The Multimodal Mind: How the senses combine in the 
brain’. Located at 
http://www.semioticon.com/virtuals/multimodality2/talks/kinsbourne.pdf 
accessed 24.6.04. 
 
Kivy, P. (1980). The Corded Shell. Reflections on Musical Expression. Princeton 
University Press, Guildford, Surrey. 
 
Kivy, P. (1990). ‘What was Hanslick Denying?’ Journal of Musicology, 8: 3-18. 
 
Koepsell, D. & Moss, L. S. (2003). John Searle’s Ideas about Social Reality: 
Extensions, Criticisms, and Reconstructions. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford. 
 
Lange, C. G. (1912) [1885]. ‘The Mechanism of The Emotions’. Trans. Rand, B. 
Located at http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Lange/ accessed 21.6.05. 
 
Langer, S. K. (1951) [1942]. Philosophy in a New Key. Mentor Books, Harvard 
University Press, New York. 
 
Laird, J. & Bresler, C. (1992). ‘The process of emotional experience: A 
self-perception theory’. Printer in M. S. Clark ed. (1992): 213-234. 
 
Lawrence, A., Goerendt, I. & Brooks, D. (2006). ‘Impaired recognition of facial 
expressions of anger in Parkinson’s disease patients acutely withdrawn from 
dopamine replacement therapy’. Neuropsychologia, Vol. 44, June 2006 (Epub ahead 
of print). 
 
Lazarus, R. S. (1984). ‘On the primacy of cognition’. American Psychologist, 39: 
124-129. 
 324
 
Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Emotion and Adaptation. Oxford University Press, New York. 
 
Le Bon, G. (1896). The Crowd: A study of the popular mind. London: Ernest Benn, 
Ltd. Located at http://etext.lib.virginia.edu accessed 26.1.07. 
 
LeDoux, J. (1998). The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of 
Emotional Life. Simon Schuster, New York. 
 
Levinson, J. (1990). ‘Hope in The Hebrides’. Chapter 14 in Music, Art & 
Metaphysics: Essays in Philosophical Metaphysics. Cornell University Press, 
London. 
 
Levinson, J. (1997). ‘Music and Negative Emotions’. In Robinson ed. (1997): 
215-241. 
 
Levinson, J. (2002). ‘Review of Aesthetics of Music by Roger Scruton’. The 
Philosophical Review, 109, No. 4: 608-614. 
 
Levinson, J. (2005). ‘Musical Expressiveness as Hearability-As-Expression’. 
Chapter 12 in Kieran ed.: 192-206. 
 
Lewis, A. (1987). ‘The social interpretation of modern jazz’. printed in White ed.: 
33-55. 
 
Locke, J. (1996). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Winkler, K. ed. 
Hackett Publishing Inc. Indianapolis. 
 
Magrini, T. (1998). ‘Improvisation and Group Interaction in Italian Lyrical Singing’. 
Chapter 8 in Nettl & Russell ed.: 167-198. 
 
Marsalis, B. (2004). ‘It’s a Jazz Thing’. Television programme aired on Channel 4, 
Saturday 13th November 2004. 
 
Martin, P. J. (2002). ‘Spontaneity and Organisation’. Printed in Cooke & Horn ed.: 
133-152. 
 
Matravers, D. (1998). Art and Emotion. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
 
Matravers, D. (2003). ‘The Experience of Emotion in Music’. The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism Vol. 61, No. 4 (Fall 2003): 353-363. 
 
McDougall, W. (1920). The Group Mind. A sketch of the principles of collective 
psychology with some attempt to the interpretation of national life and character. 
Cambridge University Press, London. 
 
McEwan, I. (1998). Enduring Love. Vintage, Random House, London. 
 
Meijers , A. W. M. (2003). ‘Can Collective Intentionality be Individualised?’ Printed 
in Koepsell and Moss ed.: 167-183. 
 325
 
Meltzoff, A. N. (2005). ‘Imitation and Other Minds: The “Like Me” Hypothesis’. In 
Hurley & Chater ed. vol. 2: 55-77. 
 
Meltzoff, A. N. & Gopnik, A. (1996). ‘The role of imitation in understanding 
persons and developing a theory of mind’. In Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg & Cohen 
ed.: 335-366. 
 
Meltzoff, A. N. & Moore, M. K. (1983). ‘Newborn infants imitate adult facial 
gestures’. Child Development, 54: 702-709. 
 
Meltzoff, A. N. & Prinz, W. ed. (2002). The Imitative Mind: Development, Evolution, 
and Brain Bases. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Meyer, L. B. (1956). Emotion and Meaning in Music. University of Chicago Press, 
London. 
 
Moore, C. & Dunham, P. ed. (1995). Joint Attention. Its Origins and Role in 
Development. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc., New Jersey. 
 
Moore, C. & Dunham, P. (1995a). ‘Current Themes in Research on Joint Attention’. 
In Moore & Dunham ed.: 15-28. 
 
Nettl, B. & Russell, M. ed. (1998). In the course of performance: studies in the world 
of musical improvisation. University of Chicago Press. London. 
 
Noordhof, P. (2005). ‘Artistic Expression in Action’. Unpublished draft of a paper 
presented at the Workshop on the Work of Kendall Walton, Nottingham University, 
1.7.05. 
 
Papousek M. (1996). ‘Intuitive Parenting: a hidden source of musical stimulation in 
infancy’. Printed in Deliege & Sloboda ed.: 89-112. 
 
Peacocke, C. (2005). ‘Joint Attention: Its Nature, Reflexivity, And Relation to 
Common Knowledge’. In Eilan, Hoerl, McCormack & Roessler ed.: 298-324. 
 
Peretz, I. (2001). ‘Listen to the brain: a biological perspective on musical emotions’. 
Chapter 5 in Juslin & Sloboda ed. (2001): 105-134. 
 
Peretz, I., Gagnon, L. & Bouchard, B. (1998). ‘Music and Emotion: Perceptual 
determinants, immediacy, and isolation after brain damage’. Cognition, 68: 111-141. 
 
Philip, R. (2004). Performing Music in the Age of Recording. Yale University Press, 
New Haven and London. 
 
Pickard, H. (2003). ‘Emotions and the Problem of Other Minds’. In Hatzimoysis ed. 
(2003): 87-103. 
 
Pleasants, H. (1969). Serious Music - and All that Jazz! Victor Gollancz, London. 
 
 326
Pratt, C. C. (1931). The Meaning of Music. McGraw-Hill, New York. 
 
Pressing, J. (1998). ‘Psychological Constraints on Improvisational Expertise and 
Communication’. Chapter 2 in Nettle & Russell ed.: 47-67. 
 
Pressing, J. (2002). ‘Free jazz and the avant-garde’. Printed in Cooke & Horn ed.: 
202-216. 
 
Prinz, J. (2003). ‘Emotion, Psychosemantics, and Embodied Appraisals’. In 
Hatzimoysis ed. (2003): 69-86. 
 
Prinz, J. (2004). Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
 
Prinz, J. (2004a). ‘Embodied Emotions’. Chapter 3 in Solomon ed. (2004): 44-58. 
 
Proust, M. (1996) [1913]. Swann’s Way. Book 1 of In Search of Lost Time. Trans. 
Moncrieff & Kilmartin, revised by Enright, D. J. Vintage, London. 
 
Putnam, H. (1981). ‘Brains in a vat’. Chapter 1 in Reason, Truth & History, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1-21. 
 
Racy, A. J. (1998). ‘Improvisation, ecstasy, and performance dynamics in Arabic 
music’. Chapter 4 in Nettl & Russell ed.: 95-112. 
 
Ramachandran, V. & Hubbard, E. (2003). ‘Hearing Colors, Tasting Shapes’. 
Scientific American, May 2003. 
 
Richards, S. (1992). Sonic Harvest: towards musical democracy. Amber Lane Press, 
London. 
 
Ridley, A. (1995). Music, Value and the Passions. Cornell University Press, New 
York. 
 
Ridley, A. (1997). ‘Not Ideal: Collingwood’s Expression Theory’. Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism Vol. 55, No. 3 (Fall 1997): 263-272. 
 
Rink, J. ed. (2002). Musical Performance. A Guide to Understanding. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Robinson, J. ed. (1997). Music and Meaning. Cornell University Press, New York. 
 
Robinson, J. (2006). ‘Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion’. Book review 
in British Journal of Aesthetics. Vol. 46, No. 2, (April 2006): 206-208. 
 
Rochat, P. (2002). ‘Ego function of early imitation’. In Meltzoff & Prinz ed.: 85-97. 
 
Roessler, J. (2005). ‘Joint Attention and the Problem of Other Minds’. In Eilan, 
Hoerl, McCormack & Roessler ed.: 230-259. 
 
 327
Roland, P. E., Larsen, B., Lassen, N. A. & Skinhoj, E. (1977). ‘Regional cerebral 
blood flow increase due to treatment of somatosensory and auditive information in 
man’. Acta Neurologica Scand. Supplement 64: 540-541. 
 
Rosenthal, D. (1991). ‘The independence of consciousness and sensory quality’. In  
Villanueva, E. ed. Philosophical Issues. Vol. 1, Consciousness: 15-36. Ridgeview 
Press, Atascadero, California. 
 
Salmela, M. (2006). ‘True Emotions’. The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 224, 
(July 2006): 382-405. 
 
Samet, J. (1996). ‘Autism and theory of mind: some philosophical perspectives’. In 
Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg & Cohen ed.: 427-449. 
 
Sawyer, R.. K. (2003). Group Creativity: music, theatre, collaboration. Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, London. 
 
Schachter, S. &  Singer, J. (1962). ‘Cognitive, social and physiological 
determinants of emotional state’. Psychological Review, 69: 379-399. 
 
Scheler, M. (1954). The Nature of Sympathy. Trans. Heath, P. Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, London. 
 
Scherer, K. R., Johnstone, T. & Klasmer, G. (2003). ‘Vocal Expression of Emotion’. 
Chapter 23 in Davidson, R. J., Scherer, K. R., & Hill Goldsmith, H. ed. (2003). 
Handbook of Affective Sciences. Oxford University Press, London. 
 
Scherer, K. & Zentner, M. R. (2001). ‘Emotional effects of music: production rules’. 
Chapter 16 in Juslin & Sloboda ed. (2001): 361-392. 
 
Schiffer, S. (1972). Meaning. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
 
Schopenhauer, A. (1907). The World as Will and Idea. 6th ed., trans. Haldane, R. B. 
& Kemp. J. Kegan Paul, London. 
 
Schutz, A. (1971). ‘Making music together: A study in social relationship’. In 
Collected Papers II: Studies in Social Theory. Brodersen, A. ed. Martinus Nijhioff, 
The Hague: 159-178. 
 
Scruton, R. (1997). The Aesthetics of Music. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
 
Searle, J, R. (1995). The Construction of Social Reality. The Free Press, New York. 
 
Sibley, F. (1959). ‘Aesthetic Concepts’. Philosophical Review Vol. 68, No. 4 
(October 1959): 421-450 
 
Slawek, S. (1998). ‘Keeping it going: Terms, practices, and processes of 
improvisation in Hindustānī instrumental Music.’ Chapter 14 in Nettl & Russell ed.: 
335-368. 
 
 328
Sloboda, J. A. & Juslin, P. N. (2001a). ‘Psychological perspectives on music and 
emotion’. Chapter 5 in Juslin & Sloboda ed. (2001): 71-104. 
 
Small, C. (1998). Musicking, the meanings of Performing and Listening. Wesleyan 
University Press, London. 
 
Smith, C. (1998). ‘A sense of the possible: Miles Davis and the semiotics of 
improvised performance.’ Chapter 12 in Nettl & Russell ed.: 261-289. 
 
Smith, H. & Dean, R. (1997). Improvisation, hypermedia and the arts since 1945. 
Harwood Academic Publishers, Amsterdam. 
 
Solomon, R. C. (1976). The Passions. Doubleday, New York. 
 
Solomon, R. C. (2003a). ‘Against Valence (“Positive” and “Negative” Emotions)’. 
Chapter 10 in Not Passion’s Slave. Oxford University Press, Oxford.: 162-177. 
 
Solomon. R. C. (2003b). ‘Thoughts and Feelings: What is a ‘Cognitive Theory’ of 
the Emotions, and does it Neglect Affectivity?’. Chapter 11 in Not Passion’s Slave. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford.: 178-194. 
 
Solomon, R. C. ed. (2004). Thinking about Feeling. Contemporary Philosophers on 
Emotions. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Sperber, D. & Wilson, D. (1993). Relevance: Communication and Cognition. 
Blackwell Publishers, Oxford. 
 
Stelmack, R. M. & Campbell, K. B. (1974). ‘Extraversion and auditory sensitivity to 
high and low frequency’. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 38: 875-9. 
 
Storr, A. (1992). Music and the Mind. Harper Collins, London. 
 
Stoutland, F. (1997). ‘Why Are Philosophers of Action so Anti-Social?’ in Alanen, 
Heinamaa, & Wallgreen ed. Commonality and Particularity in Ethics. St. Martin’s 
Press, New York. 
 
Stowell, R. ed. (2003). The Cambridge Companion to the String Quartet. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Strack, F., Martin, L. L., & Stepper, S. (1988). ‘Inhibiting and facilitating conditions 
of facial expressions: A nonobstrusive test of the facial feedback hypothesis’. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54: 768-777. 
 
Strawson. P. F. (1971). ‘Intention and Convention in Speech Acts’. In 
Logico-Linguistic Papers. Methuen & Co. Ltd., London: 149-169. 
 
Tanila, H., Carlson, S., Linnankoski, I., Lindroos, F., Kahila, H. (1992). ‘Functional 
properties of dorsolateral prefrontal cortical neurons in awake monkey’. Behavioural 
Brain Research 47: 169-180. 
 
 329
Tollefsen, M. (2004). ‘Collective Intentionality’. Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, located at http://www.iep.utm.edu/c/coll-int.htm accessed 26.5.06. 
 
Tolstoy, L. (1899). What is Art? Trans. Maude, A. Walter Scott Ltd., London. 
 
Tolstoy, L. (1933). War and Peace. Trans. Maude, A. Oxford University Press, 
London. 
 
Tomasello, M. (1995). ‘Joint Attention as Social Cognition’. In Moore & Dunham 
ed.: 103-130. 
 
Tomasello, M. (1999). The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Harvard 
University Press, London, England. 
 
Tomes, S. (2003). ‘Emotional Rescues’. The Guardian, Saturday November 22, 
2003. 
 
Tuomela, R. (1991). ‘We Will Do It: An Analysis of Group-Intentions’. Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research Vol. 51, No. 2 (June 1991): 249-277. 
 
Trivedi, S. (2001). ‘Expressiveness as a Property of the Music Itself’. The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism Vol. 59. No. 4 (Fall 2001): 411-420. 
 
Unger, P. (1990). Identity, consciousness, and value. Oxford University Press, New 
York. 
 
Velleman, D. (1997). ‘How to Share an Intention’. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 57, No. 1 (March 1997): 29-50. 
 
Vermazen, B. (1986). ‘Expression as Expression’. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 
67: 196-234. 
 
Violentyev, A., Shimojo, S., & Shams, L. (2005). ‘Touch-induced visual illusion’. 
Neuroreport. Vol. 16, No. 10: 1107-1110. 
 
Walton, K. (1978). ‘Fearing Fictions’. Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 75, No. 1: 5-27 
 
Walton, K. (1990). Mimesis as Make Believe: On the Foundations of the 
Representational Arts. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
 
Walton, K. (1994). ‘Listening with Imagination: Is Music Representational?’ The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism Vol. 52, No. 1 (Winter 1994): 47-62 
 
Waterman, D. (2003). ‘Playing quartets: a view from the inside’. Chapter 5 in 
Stowell ed.: 97-126. 
 
Waterman, M. (1996). ‘Emotional Responses to Music: Implicit and Explicit Effects 
in Listeners and Performers’. Psychology of Music Vol. 24, (1996): 53-67. 
 
 330
Werner, H. & Kaplan, B. (1963). Symbol Formation. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, New 
Jersey. 
 
Wierzbicka, A. (1999). Emotions across language and cultures: Diversity and 
universals. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Wilson, R. A. (2004). Boundaries of the Mind. The Individual in the Fragile Sciences. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
White, A. L. (1987). Lost in music: culture, style, and the musical event. Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, London. 
 
Wollheim, R. (1980). Art and its Objects. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Wordsworth, W. (1802). Preface to Lyrical Ballads. Located at 
http://www.english.upenn.edu/~mgamer/Etexts/lbprose.html#preface accessed on 
16.9.05 
 
Young, V. & Colman, A. (1979). ‘Some Psychological Processes in String Quartets’. 
Psychology of Music Vol. 7 (1979): 12-18. 
 
Zaibert, L. A. (2003). ‘Collective Intentions and Collective Intentionality’. Printed in 
Koepsell & Moss ed.: 209-232. 
 
Zajonc, R. B. (1984). ‘On the primacy of affect’. American Psychologist, 39: 
117-123. 
 
Zajonc, R. B., Murphy, S. T. & Inglehart, M. (1989). ‘Feeling and facial efference: 
Implications of the vascular theory of emotion’. Psychological Review, 96: 395-416.
 331
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
